Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corporation : Petition for Writ of Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1988
Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources
Corporation : Petition for Writ of Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Crockett; Clark; Niederhauser; Romriell; Kimball, Parr, Crockett, and Waddoups; Mark Reinhardt;
Attorneys for Petitioner..
Unknown.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corporation, No. 880168.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2110
UTAH 
DOCUMtw 3 
K F U 
45.9 
DOCKETNC W O / * * 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766) 
Robert S. Clarkf Esq. (A4015) 
Jill A. Niederhauser (A4641) 
Brian J. Romriell (A4757) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Mark W. Reinhardt, Esq. 
4601 DTC Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2100 
Denver, Colorado 80237 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES ) 
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR ] 
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL ] 
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY; ] 
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and ] 
JOHN DOES I through 10, ; 
Defendants. ] 
GETTY OIL COMPANY and ] 
GETTY MINING COMPANY, ] 
Petitioner/Appellants, ] 
vs. ; 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., ] 
Appellee. 
| Dist. Ct. No. CV-86-374 
1
"X 
! nP/\ ii y ! yju/bd 
i Supreme Ct. No. 
Cisrk wj„f- 3->»6 
PETITION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
INTRODUCTION 
Company a n c G e t t *. p^wy
 t i , L C ^ 
#
* -o*-t-w * i t i o r * > s t r i c t \ ) u r 
u iu t . . , ^ . ~ s ^ a g a i n s t 
. d * ; f f G r i n S t a n d r JU t d a d u u u ^ u <~ 
O L a i i i i ci i >a , *-. U u I i 3 t_ j*. «* „ I . 
„ o e ' • i , ; : • d e c i s i o n s and d / t i v ; n & ioii^x*^ I , . . 
«-.*.. . r , in^-;.-c«t- ; p t t - \ t o a e t h e r * i ' 
announcemtir. * * lunUu... 
copiMctini ^Juitiona, u r ! t »'iterv,f-w v* tr otrn ! former ottt) 
e i l t j j J i ny e t j t j . 
F^1 lowing brief* 
i listrlrt fur * - . - Memorandum Decision aateu H[:I . 
19b, , -J* py i i« • -tap.f^r"!'^ 
attorneys are free - ;iuj» u-. iv^x, .e:i; 
parte. Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corn), , 
3i
 i?ii copy of Getty's Petition ioi Order to Uhow Cause is 
attached hereto Exhibit WA," 
^ Copies of the memoranda submitted to the district court 
by the parties in this matter a *- attached hereto as Exhibi ts •"'^" 
through #I*"D v 
G E T - fa j r n 2 n 2 
CV86-374, slip. op. (3rd Dist. Ut. April 1, 1988).3 On April 
13, 1988, the district court entered its final order, denying 
Getty relief.4 This Petition for Permission to Appeal the 
district court's Order follows. 
In accordance with Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Getty submits the following: 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises from a dispute over the ownership and 
operation of the Mercur Gold Mine located southeast of Tooele, 
Utah. Plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. brought this action against 
Getty and others, alleging various theories of liability based 
principally upon Getty's conduct with respect to a written 
Operating Agreement between Getty and Gold Standard dated 
December 11, 1973. Among other allegations, Gold Standard 
asserts that a feasibility study concerning the Mercur Mine, 
delivered by Getty in 1981, did not satisfy the provisions of the 
Operating Agreement and that, as a result, Gold Standard was 
unable to obtain financing to fund its share of project costs. 
Gold Standard argues that it was then improperly converted from a 
25% working interest holder in the mine to a 15% net profits 
3
 A copy of the district court's opinion is attached hereto 
as Exhibit "E." 
4
 A copy of the court's Order is attached hereto as Exhibit 
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interest holder pursuant to the Operating Agreement. Gold 
Standard alleges damages in excess of $900,000,000. 
Without notifying Getty's counsel, Gold Standard's 
counsel contacted former key Getty management employees whose 
acts or omissions while employed by Getty form the basis of Gold 
Standard's allegations.5 Virtually every one of the former Getty 
employees contacted by Gold Standard's counsel or identified to 
be contacted was party to privileged communications which 
directly relate to the issues raised by this lawsuit.6 Upon 
D
 The key Getty employees contacted ex parte by Gold 
Standard's counsel include Robert P. Blanc, Vice President of 
Getty Mining Company, Robert L. Hautala, Production Manager of 
Getty's United States Mineral District, responsible for United 
States mining projects including the Mercur Project; Joseph Berg, 
in-house counsel for Getty with responsibility for advising Getty 
on Mercur-related issues from 1981 to 1984; and Charles J. 
Kundert, Minerals Engineering Manager, responsible for all 
engineering functions of the mining group. Gold Standard's 
counsel met with and interviewed Kundert and Hautala. Gold 
Standard also prepared an affidavit for Kundert to sign in 
conjunction with their interview. Blanc and Berg were contacted 
by Gold Standard's counsel but declined further ex parte contact 
with them. In addition to these contacts, Gold Standard's 
president has stated in an affidavit that Gold Standard intends 
to have its counsel contact additional former management 
employees, including Charles Trimble, Getty's District Minerals 
Landman who assisted in negotiating the terms of the written 
agreement; and Cecil H. Smith, District Minerals Exploration 
Manager for Getty at the time of the original contract 
negotiations. 
b
 Getty's log of privileged documents reveals that each of 
the management employees contacted or identified by Gold Standard 
was party to a number of privileged communications. Since 
privileged communications need not be written to be protected, 
the privilege log is only a partial listing of the privileged 
communications to which these former management employees were a 
party and which Getty has a right to protect. 
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becoming aware of the contacts, Getty's counsel objected. 
However, despite these objections, Gold Standard's counsel 
persisted in the contacts until Getty filed its Petition seeking 
an order prohibiting future contacts and imposing sanctions for 
those contacts which had already occurred. 
II. STATEMENT OF QUESTION OF LAW 
The questions of law involved in this case include: 
1. Whether Rule 4.2 of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which was adopted by the Utah Supreme Court effective 
January 1, 1988, prohibits Gold Standard's counsel from 
contacting ex parte former Getty management employees whose acts 
or omissions relating to the Mercur Mine may be imputed to Getty 
for purposes of this case. 
2. Whether Gold Standard's counsel violated DR 7-
104(a) of the superseded Revised Rules of Professional 
Responsibility by their previous ex parte contacts with former 
Getty management employees. 
3. Whether Getty is entitled to sanctions against Gold 
Standard for the ex parte contacts which have already occurred, 
including the exclusion at trial of the information obtained 
through such contacts. 
III. REASONS WHY GETTY'S APPEAL SHOULD BE GRANTED 
Rule 8 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides 
that the court may grant an appeal from an interlocutory order 
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"if it appears that the order involves substantial rights and may 
materially affect the final decision, or that a determination of 
the correctness of such order before final judgment will better 
serve the administration and interests of justice." As is 
evidenced by this court's recent decision in Trail Mountain Coal 
Co, v, Arco Coal Sales Co,, 749 P.2d 637 (Utah 1988) (inter-
locutory appeal from an order denying a motion to compel), an 
interlocutory appeal from a pre-trial discovery order may be 
granted when the appeal is based upon unsettled questions of law 
which may affect substantial rights. See also, Utah v. Petty, 17 
Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914, 916 (1966)(intermediate appeal granted 
in discovery dispute involving interrogatories because "the 
problem here presented will have an important bearing on this 
lawsuit" and "is one which is continually recurring in discovery 
procedure under the new rules"). 
A. Getty's Substantial Rights are In Jeopardy. 
It is Getty's position that opposing counsels7 ex parte 
contacts with former Getty management employees is improper and 
exceeds the bounds of permissible discovery. Getty has a right 
and interest in protecting itself from such overreaching by 
opposing counsel. Moreover, such ex parte contacts jeopardize 
Getty's attorney-client privilege and effectively deny Getty the 
right to protect privileged information. The district court's 
order in this matter places responsibility for protecting Getty's 
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attorney-client privilege in the hands of third parties, 
including counsel for Getty's party opponent and former 
employees7 who cannot be expected to accurately identify the 
parameters of the privilege. 
The district court's Order involves questions which go 
to the heart of the attorney-client relationship. The ethical 
rules prohibiting or restricting direct contacts with an adverse 
party, absent consent of that party's counsel, are essential to 
the exercise of a party's right to effective assistance of 
counsel. The attorney-client privilege is equally important, but 
is only as strong as a client's ability to protect it. 
B. Post-Trial Remedies are Inadequate. 
An interlocutory appeal of the district court's order 
is necessary to protect Getty's rights. It will be impossible to 
place a dollar value on the damages which Getty will sustain as a 
result of impermissible ex parte contacts or to annul the 
disclosure of privileged information. There are only two 
potential methods of remedying the effects of improper ex parte 
contacts. The first, and clearly most effective method, is to 
prohibit the contacts before they occur. The second, and only 
available means of redressing contacts which have already 
occurred, is the imposition of restrictions on the use of 
1
 See Slip op. at 5. 
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information obtained as a result of the impermissible contacts. 
Neither of these remedies is available following trial. 
Even the granting of a new trial following an appeal 
would be ineffective to protect Getty's rights. The parties in 
this matter are engaging in extensive discovery. Following 
months of such discovery and a trial on the merits, it will be 
practically impossible to sort out that evidence which was 
obtained through impermissible ex parte contacts or through a 
breach of the attorney-client privilege. 
C. This Appeal Serves the Administration of Justice. 
An interpretation and decision by this court on the 
scope and intent of Rule 4.2 of the newly adopted Rules of 
Professional Conduct will serve the administration and interests 
of justice. If Getty's position is correct, then additional ex 
parte contact with former Getty management employees is improper, 
Getty is entitled to protection and further contacts by Gold 
Standard's attorneys should be prohibited. If the court deems 
that sanctions for past contacts are appropriate, such sanctions 
can be imposed prior to trial and final judgment. 
The district court acknowledged that there is a "split 
of authority on this issue [of ex parte contact with former 
management employees]." Slip op. at 2. Where a substantial 
basis exists for a difference of opinion on a question of law as 
to which appellate resolution may protect a party from 
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irreparable injury or resolve an issue of general importance in 
the administration of justice, the court should exercise its 
discretion and grant the interlocutory appeal. This is 
particularly true in cases, such as the case at bar, where the 
issue is governed by a newly adopted rule. Utah v. Petty, 17 
Utah 2d 382, 412 P.2d 914, 916 (1966). 
The Comment to Rule 4.2 clearly suggests that ex parte 
contacts with at least some former employees is prohibited under 
the Rule. The Comment states that Rule 4.2 prohibits ex parte 
contact with current managerial employees and 
any other person whose act or omission in 
connection with the matter [in dispute] may be 
imputed to the organization for purpose of civil 
or criminal liability or whose statement may 
constitute an admission on the part of the 
organization. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, Comment (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
In denying Getty's Petition, the district court focused 
solely on the second part of the Comment and ruled that, because 
a former employee's current statements cannot constitute 
admissions on the part of the corporation, ex parte contact with 
such employees is not contemplated by the Rule. The sentence in 
the Comment, however, is disjunctive. The first part of the 
disjunction is not restricted to current statements or acts but 
expressly covers "any other person" whose acts or omissions in 
connection with the subject of the litigation can be imputed to 
GET-bjr.020 9 
the corporation. The permissibility of ex parte contacts does 
not, and should not, depend upon the fortuitous factor of whether 
an employee remains employed by the corporation throughout the 
course of subsequent litigation. Despite the clear intent of the 
language in the Comment to Rule 4.2, the district courts opinion 
makes no reference to the Comment or its language. 
Moreover, the district court cited no authority to 
support its ruling. Several federal district courts have stated 
that Rule 4.2 prohibits contacts with former managerial employees 
whose past acts or omissions form the basis for asserted 
liability in pending litigation. See Porter v. Arco Metals Co. , 
642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986); Chancellor v. Boeing Co., 678 
F. Supp. 250 (D. Kan. 1988) . A handful of state bar opinions 
have split on the issue with the majority concluding that such 
contacts are permissible.8 A few other judicial decisions have 
involved ex parte contacts with current or former employees but 
have not involved contacts with former management employees whose 
past acts or omissions are the subject of a later dispute. See, 
e.g., Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 
(D. Mass. 1987) ; Wright v. Group Health Hospital, 103 Wash. 2d 
192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984). 
b
 None of these advisory opinions, however, comes from a 
state where Rule 4.2 was the controlling Rule at the time the 
opinion was issued. For the most part, they expressly involve 
interpretations of DR7-104(a). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has adopted Rules of 
Professional Conduct as the controlling provisions on attorney 
conduct in Utah. A number of these rules, including rules on 
conflicts of interest, ex parte contacts, and confidentiality, 
are designed to protect the interests of those who deal with 
attorneys. Rule 4.2 is of critical importance in imposing 
restrictions upon the boundaries of permissible discovery. Thus, 
the issue of ex parte contact with a party opponent's former 
employees is a matter of significant importance in the discovery 
process of this litigation, as well as other litigation. 
In all cases where this issue arises, a ruling 
following judgment will be wholly inadequate to remedy the 
improper contacts. Under such circumstances, it is proper and 
important for the Supreme Court to exercise its discretion and 
consider this issue on interlocutory appeal. 
IV. REASONS WHY APPEAL MAY ADVANCE TERMINATION OF LITIGATION 
If this issue is not decided on appeal prior to final 
judgment, then Getty's only remedy would be an appeal following 
trial and final judgment. If the court rules at that time that 
the contacts were improper, it will be very difficult to 
ascertain the extent of the tainted evidence presented at trial 
or the impact of that evidence on the outcome of the case. A new 
trial may be the only, although imperfect, remedy. Thus, 
granting Getty's Petition for Interlocutory Appeal would 
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materially shorten the time required for final resolution of this 
litigation. 
Moreover, this appeal would not expedite the discovery 
in this matter. The former employees that Getty seeks to protect 
are those who played key roles in the decisions and actions 
forming the basis for plaintiff's allegations. Thus, whether or 
not plaintiff's attorneys are permitted to interview these former 
Getty management employees ex parte, these individuals will 
undoubtedly be deposed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, Getty hereby petitions 
the court to grant it leave to appeal the interlocutory order of 
the district court in this matter. 
DATED this % 7 day of April, 1988. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
By: JJuJ U {JU<^JU# 
Stephfen G.^Crockett, Esq. 
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company and 
Getty Mining Company 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing "Petition for Permission to Appeal From Interlocutory 
Order" was mailed, postage prepaid, this c^n-tt^ day of April, 
1988, to the following: 
Gordon L. Roberts 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
James Lowrie 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert M. McDonald 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Tab A 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766) 
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015) 
Brian Romriell, Esq. (A4757) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Mark H. Reinhardt, Esq. 
4601 DTC Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2100 
Denver, Colorado 80237 
Attorneys for Defendants Getty 
Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES 
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR 
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL 
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY; 
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and 
and JOHN DOES I through 10, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR ORDER 
1 TO SHOW CAUSE 
l Civil NO. CV-86-374 
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
(collectively, "Getty"), hereby petition the Court for an order 
requiring plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. to show cause why 
sanctions should not be imposed against them by reason that 
plaintiff's counsel have contacted and interviewed, on an ex 
parte basis, former management employees of Getty in violation of 
DR 7-104(A) of the Revised Rules of Professional Conduct of the 
Utah State Bar, and of Rule 4.2 of the Proposed Rules of 
Professional Responsibility* 
To remedy the improper contacts which have occurred and 
which may continue to occur absent a court order, Getty requests 
that the Court order the following sanctions: 
1. Order immediate cessation of any further ex parte 
contact by plaintiff's counsel with former Getty employees, 
absent leave of court or consent from Getty's counsel; 
2. Require plaintiff to immediately identify every 
former Getty employee that has been contacted or interviewed by 
plaintiff's counsel; 
3. Require plaintiff to produce all documents, taped 
statements, written statements, and all other materials received 
from former Getty employees; 
4. Require production of all written notes taken or 
summaries prepared by any person, including plaintiff's counsel, 
which record or were made during or after those contacts or 
interviews; and 
5. Prohibit use of the statements and materials at 
trial or for any other purpose. 
CET-C019.RK 2 
This Petition is supported by the accompanying 
Memorandum in Support of Petition for Order to Show Cause. 
DATED this
 r? / u day of November, 1987. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
By: .Ltd Ch*j*tr 
'Stepmen G. Crockett, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants Getty Oil 
Company and Getty Mining Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/LL 
I hereby certify that on the S{ day of November, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing "Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Order to Show Cause" was hand-delivered to the 
following: 
James S. Lowrie, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gordon L. Roberts. Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert M. McDonald, Esq. 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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TabB 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766) 
Robert S. Clark, Esq. (A4015) 
Brian Romriell, Esq. (A4757) 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street 
Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Mark W. Reinhardt, Esq. 
4601 DTC Boulevard 
P.O. Box 2100 
Denver, Colorado 80237 
Attorneys for Defendants Getty 
Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., ] 
Plaintiff, 1 
vs. ; 
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES 
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR 
GOLD MINES, INC.; GETTY OIL 
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY; 
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and 
and JOHN DOES I through 10, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT | OF PETITION FOR ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE 
i Civil No. CV-86-374 
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
(collectively/ "Getty") submit the following Memorandum in 
Support of their Petition for Order to Show Cause. 
J. FACT? 
Plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. ("Gold Standard*) brought 
this action against Getty and others, alleging various theories 
of liability based principally upon Getty's conduct with respect 
to an Operating Agreement dated December 11, 1973. Among other 
allegations, Gold Standard asserts that the feasibility study 
delivered by Getty in 1981 did not satisfy the requirements of 
the Operating Agreement, and that in 1982 Getty improperly 
converted Gold Standard from a 25% working interest to a 15% net 
profits interest. 
The key Getty employees involved in delivering the 
feasibility study and in the conversion included Robert P. Blanc, 
Vice President of Getty Mining Company; Robert L. Hautala, 
Production Manager of the Mercur Project; and Joseph E. Berg III, 
Esq., in-house counsel for Getty with responsibility for advising 
Getty on Mercur-related issues from 1981 to 1984. Other former 
Getty management-level employees involved with Mercur include 
Mike Beck, a financial analyst, and Charles J. Kundert, Getty's 
Minerals Engineering Manager. Virtually every one of these 
individuals was party to privileged communications directly 
relating to the issues raised by the lawsuit. 
Despite the central role and privileged knowledge of these 
individuals, attorneys for plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. have, 
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without notice to Getty's attorneys and without leave of court, 
met with and/or contacted each of these former managerial 
employees of Getty. At the deposition of Scott L. Smith, Gold 
Standard's President and CEO, taken on October 28, 1987, Smith 
testified that he and his counsel met with Hautala, discussed 
issues in the lawsuit, and reviewed a number of documents.1 
Getty is also informed that plaintiff's counsel has met with 
Kundert, who was Getty's Minerals Engineering Manager from 1979 
to 1984. Plaintiff's counsel has contacted but not met with 
Blanc, Berg, and Beck. 
Following the contact of Blanc, Berg, and Beck, Getty 
notified Gold Standard in writing of its objections to such 
contact through letters and telephone calls from Parsons, Behle & 
Latimer (who represented Getty at that time). The letters 
attached as Exhibits B, C, and D reflect Getty's objections and 
Gold Standard's response. Despite such objections, it appears 
that Gold Standard has persisted in its ex parte contact and 
persuaded at least Hautala and Kundert to make statements 
relating to the lawsuit. It is possible that other former Getty 
employees have been contacted or interviewed and Getty may even 
yet be unaware of such contact. 
1
 A copy of the relevant pages from the reporter's draft 
version of the deposition transcript are attached as Exhibit "k." 
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In their respective roles as managerial employees and 
legal advisor of the corporation, these individuals were party to 
privileged communications between the corporation and its 
counsel. The ex parte contact set forth above may have 
jeopardized, and could continue to jeopardize, the privileged 
nature of these communications. Since Getty's counsel was not 
informed of and did not participate in the ex parte contacts, 
Getty could not protect its privilege and cannot now assess the 
extent to which its position and privilege have been compromised. 
Unless the court, among other things, prohibits further ex parte 
contact with Getty's former management personnel, there is a 
danger that such contact will continue to occur and may unfairly 
prejudice Getty's position in this litigation and its attorney-
client privilege. 
II. EX PARTE CONTACT IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
A. The Rules of Professional Conduct Prohibit Ex 
Parte Contact With the Opposing Party. 
Ex parte contact by an attorney with an adverse party's 
employees and former employees is controlled by the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The discovery actions of the attorneys 
involved in this case are governed by the Revised Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar ("Revised Rules''). 
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These rules are modeled after the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility. The relevant rule provides: 
During the course of his representation of a 
client a lawyer shall not: 
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate 
on the subject of the representation with a party 
he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that 
matter unless he has the prior consent of the 
lawyer representing such other party or is 
authorized by law to do so. 
DR 7-104 (A) (1985). The language of DR 7-104 is nearly identical 
to that of Rule 4.2 of the "Rules of Professional Discipline" 
(which will replace the Revised Rules on January 1, 1988, and 
which are patterned after the more recently enacted ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct).2 Courts interpreting DR 7-104 
frequently look to Rule 4.2 and cases construing it as authority 
for the intent and reach of DR 7-104. This court likewise should 
look to Rule 4.2 and cases construing it as persuasive authority 
on the scope and intent of the prohibition against ex parte 
contact of an adverse party. 
2
 Rule 4.2 of the Proposed Rules provides: 
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not 
communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by 
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the 
consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to 
do so. 
Rule 4.2# Rules of Professional Conduct (1987) hereinafter 
referred to as the "Proposed Rules"). 
The prohibition under DR 7*104 and Rule 4.2 serves 
several vital functions. One important aim is to "preserve the 
proper functioning of the legal profession" by ensuring that in 
making decisions relating to a dispute a client has the benefit 
of the advice of the legal expert he has employed to assist him. 
American Bar Ass'n, Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. No. 
108 (1934); see also In re Korea Shipping Corp.. 621 F. Supp. 
164, 167 (D. Alaska 1985); In re McCaffrey. 275 Or. 23, 549 P.2d 
666, 668 (1976). More recently, the ABA has stated that the rule 
is intended to "protect[] the represented party from the superior 
knowledge and skill of the opposing lawyer." American Bar Ass'n, 
Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 268 (1984) 
(construing Rule 4.2). The ex parte contact by opposing counsel 
in this case frustrates the purposes and intent of the Rules of 
Conduct and, as explained below, violates its provisions. 
B. The Prohibition Against Ex Parte Contact with an 
Adverse Party Applies to Contact with Former 
Management-Level Employees. 
Both DR 7-104 and Rule 4.2 prohibit ex parte contact 
with a party opponent. In the case of an individual, it is a 
simple matter to identify the party. In the case of a 
corporation, it is more difficult to define "party," yet the 
protection against ex parte contact is equally important to the 
preservation of the corporation's rights. 
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In the corporate context, although the corporation is 
the party, its rights and interests are represented by third-
party individuals. As a result, protection for a corporation can 
come only through prohibiting contact with individuals who 
represent the corporation. The official comment to Proposed Rule 
4.2 discusses the application of the rule in this context: 
In the case of an organization, this Rule 
prohibits communications by a lawyer for one party 
concerning the matter in representation with 
persons having a managerial responsibility on 
behalf of the organization, and with any other 
person whose act or omission in connection with 
that matter may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose 
statement may constitute an admission on the part 
of the organization. • . . 
Proposed Rule 4.2 (1987) (emphasis added).3 
Since the constituency of a corporation's management 
may change, merely prohibiting contact with current management 
personnel of a corporation does not adequately protect the 
corporation. The comment acknowledges this inadequacy by 
providing that the prohibition against ex parte contact of an 
adverse party applies to contact with "any other person whose act 
or omission in connection with the matter may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or criminal liability." 
3
 Although the comment to Rule 4.2 is not yet formally 
adopted in Utah, it should be followed in this case since Rule 
4.2 is nearly identical to DR 7-104 and since the comment does 
not alter the content of the rule but merely clarifies its scope. 
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The corporate "party" must include all those who had 
power to "speak for the corporation" at the period in time in the 
corporation when the incidents or actions forming the basis of 
the dispute arose• The rights of a corporation with respect to a 
particular matter cannot depend on the coincidence of whether or 
not management personnel involved have ceased their employment 
with the corporation• The acts or omissions of Getty's former 
management employees will clearly be sought to be imputed to 
Getty in this lawsuit. Consequently, such former management 
personnel fall within the scope of the comment's prohibition 
against contact with "other persons."4 Therefore, contact with 
such former employees is prohibited absent leave of court or 
consent of counsel.5 
4
 There is also a danger that a court may admit the 
statements of a former employee as admissions against the 
corporation. See American Craft Hosiery Corp, v. Damascus 
Hosiery Mills, Inc.. 575 F. Supp. 816, 818-19 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (as 
discussed in Miller & Calfo, Ex parte Contact with Employees and 
Former Employees of a Corporate Adversary: Is it Ethical?. 42 
Bus. Law. 1053, 1059 n.29 (1987)). 
&
 The corollary to this rule is that some current 
employees may not be covered under the rule in situations where 
their actions cannot be imputed to the corporation and their 
statements are not admissible as admissions of the corporate 
party. The critical factor, then, is not whether a person is a 
current or former employee, but whether the person had managerial 
responsibilities relating to the dispute between the parties. 
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The cases interpreting DR 7*104 and Rule 4.2 are 
consistent with this approach. The court in Porter v. Arco 
Metals Co.. 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), acknowledged that 
a different rule applies to management personnel than to low-
level employees. The court indicated that interviews with 
former managerial employees is improper under the attorney-client 
privilege doctrine and Rule 4.2. Ex parte contact of lower level 
current and former employees of the opponent was allowed, but the 
court cautioned that such ex parte contact was permitted only 
so long as plaintiff does not attempt to interview 
present or former employees with managerial 
responsibilities concerning the matter in 
litigation, and does not inquire into privileged 
areas of communication* 
Id. at 1118. 
In an unpublished decision, another federal district 
court held that Rule 4.2 prohibited ex parte contact with certain 
former management employees. Sperber v. Washington Heiahts-W. 
Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council. Inc.. Civ. No. 82-7428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated and withdrawn (available on LEXIS, 
Cenfed library, Dist file) (attached as Exhibit "E").6 In 
* Although the Order was withdrawn, the court's reasoning 
and treatment of the issue is useful since the contact in ffperber 
bears close resemblance to the contact in this case. Other 
courts have cited the Sperber decision despite the fact that it 
was subsequently withdrawn. See, e.g., Amarin Plastics, Jnc. v. 
Maryland CUD Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36, 39-40 (D. Mass. 1987). 
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Sperber. the plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongful 
termination. In the course of discovery, the plaintiff's 
attorneys contacted ex parte the former executive director and 
former administrator of the defendant regarding the case. 
Neither was a party to the suit or formally represented by the 
defendant's attorneys. The court emphasized the importance of 
distinguishing among former employees according to whether they 
served in management positions and whether they were "actors for 
the organization with respect to the conduct giving rise to [the] 
lawsuit." The court concluded: 
Even if [the former employees'] statements to [the 
opposing counsel] cannot be treated as admissions 
by the organization, their actions and motives 
are, nevertheless, precisely those which plaintiff 
seeks to impute to the organization. The fact 
that [they] are now former employees does not 
alter this relation or connection with defendant 
or its potential civil liability based on their 
conduct as its highest officers. 
LEXIS Slip op. at 7. 
In another unpublished decision, the Federal District 
Court for the District of Nevada ruled that ex parte contact with 
a highly-placed former employee of the opposing party was an 
improper violation of Canon 9 of the Mode Code which prohibits 
the appearance of impropriety. American Protection Ins. Co. v. 
MGM Grand Hotel. No. CV-LV-82-26 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 1986). Prior 
to the district court's decision in this opinion, the Ninth 
GET-C017.rk 10 
Circuit had previously ruled that the ex parte contact with the 
former employee infringed upon the attorney-client privilege and 
violated Rule 4.2. American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand 
Hotel. Nos. 83-2674, 83-2728 (9th Cir. Dec. 3, 1984). The Ninth 
Circuit opinion was later withdrawn on procedural grounds. 
American Protection Ins. Co. v. MGM Grand Hotel—Las Vegas, Inc.. 
765 F. 925 (9th Cir. 1985). 
When a case involves lower level employees whose 
testimony is sought regarding their role as third-party witnesses 
to incidents occurring within an organization, courts have 
permitted ex parte contact without regard to the employees' 
status as current or former employees. For example, in Wright v. 
Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 P.2d 564 (1984), the 
most frequently cited case permitting ex parte contact, the court 
permitted ex parte interviews with current and former nurses of a 
hospital who witnessed an alleged incident of malpractice. The 
court stated that the function of DR 7-104 was to preclude 
interviewing those employees who have authority to bind the 
corporation. It further found that the attorney-client privilege 
did not apply to the testimony of nurses involved in the case. 
As a result, the court permitted interviews of the nurses.7 
7
 One recent case permitted ex parte contact with a former 
executive employee where the executive left the corporation 
before the circumstances occurred which led to the litigation. 
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In both Wright and Porter the interviews were sought 
with low-level employees, not regarding their own actions which 
might be imputed to the corporation, but regarding incidents 
which they witnessed while working for the organization. These 
cases did not involve management-level employees who are 
questioned regarding their actions or the actions and decisions 
of other executives taken in behalf of the corporation. The 
Porter case properly took the differences between its facts, 
Wright, and this case into account by acknowledging that contact 
with former management employees is governed by a different 
standard from that applied to low-level employees. 
In Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. 
Mass 1987), the court refused to issue a protective order or 
impose sanctions against counsel for conducting an ex parte 
interview with a former corporate president. In arriving at this 
conclusion, however, the court stated that "[i]t is undisputed 
that Shapiro [the former officer] left the employ of the 
defendant prior to the contract dispute that forms the basis for 
the litigation." Id. at 40. The court concluded that there was 
"no evidence that Shapiro's acts or omissions could be imputed to 
[the corporation] for purposes of its civil liability." Id. The 
court cited Soerber and distinguished it on the grounds that "the 
acts of the former employees [in Soerber] were the subject of the 
litigation." Amarin, 116 F.R.D. at 40. Our case, like Sperber, 
involves former management employees who were employed by the 
corporation and involved in decisions during the time when many 
of the contracts and disputes arose in this case. Unlike the 
situation in Amarin, there is a real threat in this case that the 
opposing party will attempt to impute to the corporation the 
actions or omissions of the former employees which it has 
contacted ex parte. 
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Ill, EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER MANAGEMENT-LEVEL 
EMPLOYEES MUST BE PROHIBITED TO PROTECT 
DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
Contact with certain former employees must also be 
prohibited in order to protect the corporation's interest in 
preventing disclosure of its own privileged attorney-client 
communications. Communications between an attorney and his 
client are protected under Utah R. Evid. 501 and Utah Code Ann. § 
78-24-8(2). When management personnel, as representatives of the 
corporation, consult with counsel, any privileged communications 
inure to the benefit of the corporation. The corporate employee, 
as a necessary party to the communication, has no right to 
divulge the contents of the communication. Under Utah law, 
whenever a third person's presence "is reasonably necessary under 
the circumstances," the party protected by the privilege can 
prevent the third person from disclosing the confidential 
communications. Hofmann v. Conder, 712 P.2d 216, 216-17 (Utah 
1985). Accordingly, a former managerial employee, even though no 
longer an employee, is not entitled to disclose confidential 
attorney-client communications of the corporation.8 See, e.g.. 
8
 Some courts have stated that communications between 
corporate counsel and a former management employee which occur 
after the employment relationship has ended Bay still be 
protected attorney-client communications. See, e.g., Command 
Transp.. Inc. v. Y.S. Line fUSAl Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 94, 95-97 (D. 
Mass. 1987); Porter v. Arco Metals Co.. 642 F. Supp. 1116, 1117-
18 (D. Mont. 1986). 
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Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co. (In re Coordinated Pretrial 
Proc). 658 F,2d 1355, 1361 n«7 (9th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 
455 U.S. 990 (1982) (*the attorney-client privilege is served by 
the certainty that conversations between attorney and client will 
remain privileged after the employee leaves*)• 
Any ex parte communications with persons privy to 
corporate attorney-client communications deprives the corporation 
of the right to protect its privilege. In the absence of Getty's 
counsel, protection of the corporation's privilege is in the 
hands of the former employee. The employee may be unaware of 
which communications were privileged or may be otherwise unable 
or unwilling to adequately protect the confidence. Either way, 
the corporation's interests may be jeopardized without providing 
the corporation an opportunity to protect its privilege. The 
remedies available once privileged communications have been 
released are either inadequate for the corporation or drastic for 
the opposing party. Requiring that corporate counsel be given 
the opportunity to attend interviews with former management 
employees provides the simpler, more just solution to the 
problem. 
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IV, ANY INFORMATION GAINED THROUGH IMPROPER EX PARTE 
CONTACT IS INADMISSIBLE AND SHOULD NOT BE 
VgSP FOR ANY PVRPQSE 
Even when ex parte contact with lover level employees 
is permitted, courts have restricted the admissibility of any 
evidence obtained through the contact. In Allen Steel Co, v, 
Deseret Title Holding Corp., No. C-80-9512 (Utah Dist. Ct. May 4, 
1984) (attached as Exhibit "F"), presiding Judge Scott Daniels 
allowed the plaintiffs' attorneys to interview specified former 
lower level supervisory employees of a defendant. They included 
"assistant project managers, assistant project superintendents, 
supervisors and foremen." Id. . slip. op. at 2. Although the 
court allowed the interviews to occur, it restricted the 
admissibility of any evidence obtained in the interviews: 
[Plaintiffs] may interview past employees of 
[defendants] who served in the above categories. 
Any statements received# however, from such 
employees, either oral or in writing, past or 
prospective, will be excluded from use at the 
trial either as evidence or for the purpose of 
impeaching any witness. Furthermore, any 
statements, oral or in writing, obtained from 
such employees will not be considered binding 
upon [defendant]; will not be imputed to said 
company and will not be treated as an admission 
of said company. 
Jfl. h fortiori, any statements obtained through the ex parte 
contact in this case should be excluded from use at trial and 
from any other use in this proceeding. Where low-level employees 
are involved, there is not the danger that their actions will be 
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imputed to the corporation or that they will disclose 
confidential attorney-client communications. Thus, where 
management-level employees are involved, restrictions on 
admissibility, alone, are insufficient to protect the 
corporation's interest. Any evidence, information, or statements 
obtained through the ex parte contact of Gold Standard's counsel 
with Getty's former employees should be ruled inadmissible for 
any purpose at trial. 
V. OPPOSING COUNSEL SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO DISCLOSE THE 
CONTENTS OF AND SURRENDER THE DOCUMENTS OBTAINED 
THROUGH CONTACTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED 
Getty cannot adequately ascertain the injury which it 
has sustained through the improper ex parte contact unless it has 
access to the information and materials acquired through the 
contacts, including notes of any person present, documents 
produced from the former employees, and any recorded or written 
statement given by such individuals. Furthermore, since the 
contacts were improper, the plaintiff should not be allowed to 
benefit from the information or retain any documents that 
memorialize or were received through the contacts. 
Gold Standard and its counsel should be required to 
provide Getty with all information and material obtained through 
the ex parte contact. Allowing ex parte interviews but 
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prohibiting the admission of any evidence obtained in the 
Interviews may have been sufficient in Judge Daniel's ruling in 
Allen Steel to prevent prejudice to the defendant, but that 
remedy is not sufficient here. Allen Steel involved interviews 
of only lower level supervisory personnel. The court 
specifically limited its ruling to those employees. In this 
case, the opposing counsel has contacted former executives and 
key members of Getty's management. These former employees were 
privy to information that is protected against disclosure under 
the attorney-client privilege and their actions or omissions 
regarding the substance of the complaint against the defendants 
will almost certainly be sought to be imputed to Getty. 
Consequently, the interviews themselves are potentially unfairly 
injurious to Getty. A restriction on the admissibility of 
evidence will not alone properly protect Getty's interest in 
preventing nondisclosure of information protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. Further ex parte contact must be 
prohibited and the substance and extent of contact which has 
already occurred must be examined to determine whether additional 
sanctions, such as disqualification, may be justified. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Good cause has been shown. The ex parte contact 
between Gold Standard's attorneys and Getty's former executive 
and key management employees is improper, and is in violation of 
the provisions of both the current and Proposed Rules of 
Professional Conduct. The ex parte contact endangers Getty's 
right to protect its confidential communications with its 
attorneys. Gold Standard is now in possession of information 
improperly obtained through ex parte contact. Unless an order of 
the court issues, further improper contacts may occur and 
information improperly obtained may be unfairly used to the 
prejudice of Getty. The proposed Order should be entered. 
DATED this *J ' day of November, 1987. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. 
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company and 
Getty Mining Company 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the^^ w day of November, 1987, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing "Memorandum in Support of 
Petition for Order to Show Cause" was hand-delivered to the 
following: 
James S. Lowrie, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Gordon L. Roberts. Esq. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street 
Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert M. McDonald, Esq. 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^khj.s^ 0^/7 y /»''-
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1 I /"/'. / / * . P R O C E E D I N G S /-N J 
L. SMITH. by / L^ / 2 I SCOTT 
CALLED AS A WITNESS 8Y AND ON BEHALF OF THE DEFENDANTS. 
BEING FIRST DULY SWORN. WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
MR. MCDONALD: BEFORE WE BEGIN, I WOULD LIKE TO 
MAKE A FORMAL REQUEST ON THE RECORD. MY INVOLVEMENT IN THIS 
8 | AS ATTORNEY FOR MR. SMITH INVOLVES A VERY LIMITED ISSUE, AND 
I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A REQUEST THAT YOU BEGIN INQUIRY ON THE 
10 j ALTER EGO ISSUES AND ADVISE ME WHEN YOU ARE DONE SO THAT I 
11 CAN MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHETHER TO CONTINUE. 
12 j MR. ROBERTS: I AM NOT PREPARED TO DO THAT. I CAN 
TELL YOU, FOR WHATEVER GOOD IT MAY QE. THAT IT IS NOT WITHIN 
1C j MY PLANS FOR TODAY'S QUESTIONING TO FOCUS ON THAT ISSUE, 
15 ALTHOUGH IT MAY WELL BE THAT SOME BITS OF EVIDENCE THAT COME 
16 OUT TODAY MIGHT APPLY TO THAT ISSUE. BUT IT IS NOT MY INTENT 
17 TO DO TODAY FOCUSED EXAMINATION ON THAT PARTICULAR SUBJECT. 
18 IF THAT'S OF ANY HELP TO YOU, SOB. 
19 MR. MCDONALD: WELL, THAT'S A LITTLE HELP. I TAKE 
20 IT THEN YOU ARE DENYING MY REQUEST? 
21 MR. ROBERTS: I AM SIMPLY NOT PREPARED. I 
22 J PREPARED MY DEPOSITION ANOTHER WAY, AND I AM NOT PREPARED TO 
23 DO IT THAT K.W. C 0 JT'5 N 0 T A MATTER OF PEAK: IT'S A MATTER 
2C THAT j AM NOT PREPARED TO DO IT THAT WAY, BUT I HAVE GIVE\! 
25 YOJ AN INDICATION OF WHAT I AM PREPARED TQ Q Q TODA** « AND I" 
1 0 HAVE YOU SUBSEQUENTLY, SINCE THIS LAWSUIT GOT 
2 STARTED OR IN PREPARATION FOR FILING OF THIS LAWSUIT. HAVE 
3 YOU EVER TALKED ABOUT HAUTALA ABOUT THIS LETTER- WHICH WAS 
4 I ATTACHED TO EXHIBIT 97 ? 
5 I A YES. 
6 0 WHEN WAS THAT? 
7 A TWO OR THREE WEEKS AGO, A MONTH AGO. 
8 0 HE WAS DOWN HERE IN SALT LAKE CITY, WAS HE? 
9 A YES. 
10 0 ASSISTING YOU IN DOING SOME WORK ON THIS 
11 LITIGATION? 
12 A NO . 
13 0 WHAT WAS HE DOING DOWN HERE? 
14 A HE WAS ASKED TO COME DOWN TO SEE IF HE COULD 
15 RECOLLECT ANYTHING. 
16 0 HE MET WITH YOU AND MR. LOWRIE? 
17 A UH-HUH (AFFIRMATIVE). THE SAME AS HE MET WITH 
IS YOU, HE SAID. 
19 O I'M NOT CRITICIZING IT? 
20 J A NO, BUT I MEAN, HE MADE A VERY BIG POINT THAT I AM 
21 J NOT TAKING SIDES, AND BOB AND I HAVE HAD OUR DIFFERENCES, AND 
22 I FELT THAT THAT WAS GOOD OF HIM TO SAY THAT. 
23 O WHO WAS IN THE MEETING WITH MR. HAUTALA TrAT WE 
24 ARE NOW TAL-IING ABOUT WHERE THIS LETTER THAT IS ATTACHED TO 
25 EXHIBIT 97 WAS DISCUSSED? 
A WELL, PEOPLE WERE COMING IN AND OUT OF THE ROOM, 
AND SPECIFICALLY THIS THINS. IT WAS NOT DISCUSSED VERY MUCH. 
I MEAN, THAT WAS JUST, I THINK, IT WAS ASKED. IF I REMEMBER 
RIGHT, BY GYM, DO YOU REMEMBER THIS LETTER. AND I THINK HE 
SAID YES. AND IT WENT ONTO OTHER SUBJECTS. IT WASN'T A BIG 
DEAL. 
O HE SAID, YES, HE SPECIFICALLY REMEMBERED THIS 
LETTER? 
A I BELIEVE HE DID. YES. I MEAN, I WASN'T PAYING 
THAT MUCH ATTENTION TO THAT, BUT TO ME, THAT WAS NOT 
IMPORTANT. 
0 YOU DON'T THINK A LETTER IS IMPORTANT? 
A IT'S JUST REITERATING EVERYTHING THAT WENT ON ON 
AND ON AND ON. IT'S ALL THE WAY UP TO SEPTEMBER OF '£3, THE 
SAME TYPE OF LETTER. IT'S NOT MUCH DIFFERENT, I IMAGINE FROM 
THIS AP.-.IL LETTER THAT YOU ARE TALKING ABOUT. WE DIDN'T GO 
THROUGH ALL THE DOCUMENTS, AT LEAST I DIDN'T WITH HA'JTALA. 
O WELL, WHO ASKED HIM. DID YOU OR MR. LOWRIE ASK HIM 
WHETHER HE RECALLED SEEING THIS LETTER? 
A HE WAS GOING THROUGH THE PAGES AND PAGES OF THIS 
JUNK. AND IT WAS ONE OF THEM THAT HE HAD REMEMBERED SEEING, 
WAS NO BIG DEAL. 
O -E JUST VOLUNTEERED THAT? 
A WELL, YES. DO YOU REMEM3EF THIS ONE, DO /0 
REMEMBER THIS ONE. 00 YOU REMEMBER THAT ONE. I DON% ~ -.NOW 
A60UT THIS ONE. YES. THAT ONE IS ONE THAT HE WENT THROUGH 
THAT HE HAD SEEN. 
O HOW MANY DOCUMENTS DID YOU GO THROUGH WITH HIM? 
A OH, MAYBE THIRTY OR FORTY. 
O AND HE UNEQUIVOCALLY TOLD YOU HE HAD SEEN THIS 
DOCUMENT BEFORE? 
A I'M SURE HE DID. 
8 | O I AM TRYING TO PUT MYSELF A LITTLE BIT IN YOUR 
THINKING, WHEN YOU SAY YOU DECIDED NOT TO TAKE THIS LETTER TO 
10 j THE MEETING ON FEBRUARY 5TH. I THINK YOU SAID BUT IT WOULD BE 
11 DISRUPTIVE, I HOPE I'M NOT MYSELF QUOTE GO YOU; IS THAT THE 
12 WORDS YOU USED? 
13 A THAT IS CORRECT, BUT EVERY TIME THIS SUBJECT 
14 MR. LOWRIE: WHY IS ANSWER THE QUESTION 
15 Q (BY MR. ROBERTS) DID YOU ALWAYS THINK IT WOULD BE 
16 DISRUPTIVE TO MAIL THE LETTER? 
17 A NO. 
18 Q I DON'T UNDERSTAND THAT. CAN YOU EXPLAIN TO THAT 
19 TO ME, WHY WOULD IT BE DISRUPTIVE TO GIVE IT TO THEM 
20 MR. MCDONALD: DISRUPTIVE OF THE MEETING? 
21 O (BY MR. ROBERTS) WHATEVER. 
22 I A OF THE MEETING. I JUST WANTED A LETTER IN WRITING 
23 I OF WHAT WE HAD BEEN DISCUSSING ALL THIS TIME BEFORE THEY WENT 
TO THEIR MEETING IN LOS ANGELES. 
25 I O MY POINT IS. DO YOU THINK. THE LETTER IS ANY LESS 
tint C TAYLOR 
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December 22, 1986 
Robert S. McConnell, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick 
Resources, et. al. 
Dear Bob: 
We have been contacted by Mike Beck, a former 
employee of Getty, who advised us that you have contacted him 
regarding the above matter. 
We are concerned that Mr. Beck may have been a party 
to privileged communications and it is our clients1 position 
that they wish to preserve and assert the privilege as appro-
priate. Mr. Beck has asked us to advise you that it is his 
desire that all communications with him be in the context of 
formal discovery proceedings so that we may be present to 
assert the privilege wherever appropriate. If you would like 
to depose Mr. Beck, we would be happy to arrange a mutually 
convenient time for the deposition. 
RD0N L. ROBERTS 
GLR:khm 
cc: Mike Beck 
bec: Stephen Dattels 
Ken Hanley 
Frank Wicks 
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February 11, 1987 
James S. Lowrie, Esq. 
Robert S. McConnell, Esq. 
JONES# WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Re: Gold Standard Inc. v. American Barrick, et al. 
Dear Gentlemen: 
This will confirm the telephone conversation that 
Fran Wikstrom and I had with Bob yesterday concerning your 
attempts to interview Bob Blanc and Joe Berg. Messrs. Blanc 
and Berg have contacted us and have requested us to advise you 
that any attempts to contact them should be made through this 
office. 
Furthermore, Bob agreed that you will not attempt to 
contact any former Getty employees without first notifying us 
of your intention to do so, so that we may seek appropriate 
relief in order to protect the attorney-client privilege. 
Sincerely, 
on L. Roberts 
GLR:lmf 
cc: Robert P. Blanc 
Joseph E. Berg, III 
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HAND-DELIVERY 
Mr. Gordon Roberts 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer 
185 South State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Re: Gold Standard v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 
et ah 
Dear Gordy: 
Bob McConnell has reported to me the substance of 
your telephone conversation with him yesterday. Among 
other things, he related that you have requested that we 
give you notice if we intend to contact any ex-Getty employee 
to inquire respecting the attorney-client relationship 
with Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher. I am writing to tell you 
that I have no desire whatsoever to cause there to be any 
breach of the attorney-client privilege between Getty and 
Pruitt, Gushee 6 Fletcher. On the other hand, I do fully 
intend to ascertain whether or not Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher 
was ever engaged to do anything or did anything adverse 
to Gold Standard or Scott Smith while Dick Johns was employed 
by that firm. 
Toward that end, I do not intend to give you advance 
notice any time I try to do any investigation in regard 
to those matters. I don't think I am required to do that 
under the rules and I don't think that you are entitled 
to have such close control of our work product. Furthermore, 
your client's former employees have done an adequate job 
of protecting themselves. For example, Mr. Mike Beck, 
Mr. Gordon Roberts 
February 11, 1987 
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when we called him, wouldn't tell us whether or not Pruitt, 
Gushee ft Fletcher's fees were billed through to Gold Standard, 
a fact which you have now readily admitted. Mr. Blanc 
said he wouldn't talk to us at all until he talked with 
you. Mr. Berd was abrasive and obnoxious about the whole 
notion that I would presume to call him, even though he 
called me back. 
Please consider that I have taken your request under 
consideration, discussed it with our work team over here, 
and that we deny it. Our response to this may have been 
somewhat different if your discovery responses hadn't been 
couched to carefully refrain from telling us whether or 
not Getty ever employed Pruit, Gushee ft Fletcher to render 
any legal services adverse to Gold Standard while Dick 
Johns was employed by Pruitt, Gushee & Fletcher. If your 
responses had been forthright in that regard, it would 
be unnecessary for us to engage in further investigation 
at this time. The inadequacy of your responses will be 
the subject of a separate letter. 
I will shortly be scheduling the depositions of Berg 
and Blanc. If you wish input as to the dates, you should 
contact me at your early convenience. 
Very truly yours, 
James S. Lowrie 
JSL/ac 
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of Professional Conduct. 
At the tine of Sperber's discharge, Robert Uelsh was the Executive Director 
of defendant and Edward Brent was the Administrator. Both were directly 
involved in the decisions and actions taken to discharge Sperber. They both 
subsequently left their positions with defendant, are currently employed 
elseuhere, and are not parties to this suit. Neither is formally represented by 
defendant's attorneys. 
On June 27, 1963, plaintiff's attorney Eary Trachten deposed Robert Uelsh 
after first giving notice to defendant's attorneys. An attorney for defendant 
was present at and participated in the Uelsh deposition. On July 16, 1983, 
defendant's attorney wrote to Trachten directing him to refrain from 
communicating with defendant's present and former employees without the consent 
of defendant's counsel, but Trachten replied that he considered It proper to 
communicate with defendant's former employees. 
On August 10 and 12, 1963, Trachten visited Uelsh unannounced at Uelsh's 
ilace of employment and questioned him further without notice to or consent by 
lefendant's attorneys. After his second encounter with Trachten, Uelsh notified 
efendant's counsel and the following day at an August 16, 1963 pre-trial 
onference defendant's attorney informed the court of Trachten's ex parte 
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tnmunlcatlons with Uelsh. At that time, Trachten admitted to having 
smunicated with Brent in a similar manner. That communication took place 
netime in mid-August. 
XI. 
The District Court has not only the power but the duty to investigate claims 
professional misconduct and to levy appropriate sanctions. Ceramco, Inc. v. 
Pharmacuticals, 510 F.2d 268, 270-71 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit has 
agnized the American Bar Association's Model Code of Professional 
)onslbllity as "providing appropriate guidelines for proper professional 
ivlor," Cheng v. 6AF Corp., 631 F.2d 1052, 1055 (2d Cir. 1980). 
he conduct complained of took place in mid-August, 1963. On August 2, 1983, 
A.B.A. adopted a new set of Rules of professional Conduct which were 
ctlve immediately. 51 U.S.L.u. 1 (Statute Section). The new Rules, 
efore, rather than their predecessors contained in the American Bar 
nation's Code of Professional Responsibility, are applicable to the motion 
refore the court. 
« defendant focuses its argument on the claim that Trachten's conduct 
ted Rule 4.2, which provides in full: 
CO 
I * 
5! 
to 
to 
t * 
LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 1 CASE 
JOEL SPERBER, Plaintiff, aoalnst WASHINGTON HE16HT5-UEST 
HARLEM-INUOOD MENTAL HEALTH COUNCIL. INC.. COUNCIL'S HENTAL 
HEALTH CENTER, Defendant^ 
NO. 82 CIV. 7428 CCBN) 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
Slip Opinion 
November 21, 1982; VACATED AND WITHDRAWN 
COUNSEL: 
JAY J. 6URFEIN, P.C., 2 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10005, for plaintiff. 
TEITELBAUM & HILLER, P.C., 1 U 0 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 
10036, for Gary Trachten. 
EPSTEIN BECKER BORSODY t, GREEN, P.C., 250 Park Avenue, New York, New York 
10D17, for defendant. 
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0P1N10NBY: MOTLEY 
OPINION: 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
# 
to 
MOTLEY,. C.J. 
I. 
This Is an action in which the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from 
tils employment by defendant In violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and 42 U.S.C. S 1981. The defendant employer, Washington, Heights-west 
Harlea-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc., Council's Mental Health Center is a 
non-profit community mental health center. The plaintiff, Joel Sperber, is a 
white former employee who was terminated from his position as Coordinator of 
Adolescent Services in July 1980. This action was filed in November 1962 and 
the parties have been engaged In discovery. The defendant has now moved this 
court for an order disqualifying the plaintiff's attorneys, Jay J. 6urfein and 
»ary Trachten; revoking Trachten's pro hac vice admission; precluding the r w * . 
introduction of certain evidence; and awarding costs including attorney's fees n ^ ^ 
to defendant on the motion. The basis of the motion is conduct by plaintiff's • 
ittorneys alleged to be in violation of the American Bar Association's Rules 
EXHIBIT "E* 
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In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of 
the representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another 
lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or 
is authorized by law to do so. 
51 U.S.L.W. 21. The meaning of the term "party" is clear when dealing with an 
individual, but when the party formally represented by counsel Is an 
organization, which can act only through its members or employees, the meaning 
of "party" for the purposes of the Rule is not as easily resolved. The Rule 
does not explicitly address Itself to the question. The old Rule, Disciplinary 
Rule 7-104 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional 
Responsibility, was similarly silent on the meaning of the term "party" as 
applied to organizations. n1 
n1 The old rule, Disciplinary Rule 7-104 (A)(1) provided in full: 
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not: 
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the 
representation with a party he Knows to be represented by a lawyer in that 
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other 
party or is authorized by law to do so. 
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This omission in the rules, however, was addressed by the A.8.A. in the 
official Comment to new Rule 4.2. The Comment Identifies three categories of 
individuals as parties for the purposes of the Rule's application to 
organizations. It provides in part: 
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a 
lawyer for one party concerning the matter in representation with [13 persons 
having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization, and with any 
other person C2I whose act or omission in connection with that matter may be 
imputed to the organization for the purposes of civil or criminal liability or 
(33 whose statement may constitute an admission on the part of the organization. 
51 U.S.L.W. 21 (bracketed numbers added). 
The phrase preceding the second category of the Comment, "any other person," 
ts plainly broad enough to cover certain former employees, and there Is nothing 
explicitly Halting the Comment's application to current employees. Also, in 
this case Welsh and Brent were the individuals who made and carried out the 
decision to discharge Sperber. it is their actions and motives as officers of 
the organization at the time which are the subject of plaintiff's claims of 
discrimination and which plaintiff will seek to Impute to the defendant 
organization in order to hold it civilly liable to plaintiff. It would appear, 
therefore, that the conversations with Welsh and Brent fall under the 
i 
5 
ft 
in 
to 
n 
Furthermore, while the various opinions presented to the court by plaintiffs W * 
make general observations, at times in dicta, regarding the permissibility of V * J 
communications with former employees under the old rule, they make no distiction p i S 
between different types of former employees. In this case Welsh and Brent are — ^ 
not merely witnesses to events and actions taken by the defendant organization 
while they were employed there. They were in the highest management positions 
of the organization as well as the primary actors for the organization with 
respect to the conduct giving rise to this lawsuit. Even if their statements to 
Trachten cannot be treated as admissions by the organization, their actions and 
motives are, nevertheless, precisely those which plaintiff seeks to Impute to 
Slip Opinion 
protection of Rule 4.2 as interpretated by the second category in the Comment. 
Whether or not a statement by Welsh or Brent can be treated as an admission by 
the organization for the purposes of rules of evidence or agency law is not 
relevant to the inquiry here because those criteria are treated separately in 
the third category of the Comment and are presented as distinct ind independent 
of the criteria in the second category. 
Prior bar association opinions cited by plaintiff are not necessarily 
dispositive regarding the meaning of "party" for the purposes of the old Rule 
7-104 because they did not have the benefit of an official Comment addressing 
this specific issue such as that accompanying the new Rule. 
Slip Opinion 
the organization. The fact that Welsh and Brent are now former employees does 
mt alter this relation or connection with defendant or its potential civil 
Liability based on their conduct as its highest officers. For similar reasons, 
:hey are also unlike the kinds of "witnesses" whose Interviews with attorneys 
tere given work product protection in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 395 (1947). 
lee also J.B.M. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 41-43 (2d Cir. 1975). This 
ase also does not implicated the constitutional rights of criminal defendants 
o prepare an adequate defense. Cf. I.B.n. Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d at 
3-44. 
The continuing relation or connection between Welsh and the defendant is 
ighllghted by the fact that although no longer an employee, not a party, and 
3t represented by the defendant's attorney, Welsh was In communication with 
ifendant during the course of this case, cooperated with defendant In the 
rvelopment of its defense, was prepared and accompanied by defendant's attorney 
: his deposition by Trachten, and will be testifying as a defense witness. 
ent's status with respect to defendant is essentially the same. Brent 
Omitted two affidavits in support of defendant's motion to disqualify and 
ated that had he known that Trachten was an attorney and represented Sperber, 
would have first notified defendant before speaking with him. n2 
0) 
N 
0) 
0) 
axijj ufiinion 
n2 The circumstances of the communication with Brent are in dispute. The 
defendant contends not only that Trachten failed to identify himself as a lawyer 
who represented Sperber but that Trachten denied he was a lawyer when questioned ^ 
by Brent. Trachten denied these allegations. It was unnecessary for the court ^ 
to aake a determination with respect to this dispute. *^ 
In view of these considerations as well as the official Comment regarding 
organizations as parties, Trachten*s ex parte communications with Welsh and 
Brent were in violation of Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct despite 
the fact that technically they were no longer current employees. Trachten's 
conduct with respect to welsh is particularly problematic because of the fact 
that prior to his ex parte communication with Welsh, he had already deposed him 
for eight hours accompanied by defendant's counsel. 
III. 
In Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the Supreme Court 
acknowledged a court's "inherent power" to levy sanctions in response to abusive 
litigation practices. 447 U.S. at 765, citing Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 632 (1962). 
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An order of preclusion is a less severe sanction than is disqualification or 
revocation of a pro hac vice admission,, both, of notch, the court considers 
unwarranted and excessive In this case in view of the fact that discovery is 
almost completed and the trial is Imminent. 
Therefore, in order to prevent plaintiff's counsel from benefitting from 
their misconduct in this matter, plaintiff will be barred from using on the 
trial any of the statements taken from Welsh or Brent during their ex parte 
interviews with plaintiff's attorney. Plaintiff will also be similarly barred 
from utilizing during the trial of this case the fruits of those conversations. 
The defendants will also be awarded costs and attorney's fees on this motion 
upon the service and filing of a proper affidavit as to costs and fees. The 
award of counsel fees and costs will, however, be stayed pending appeal. 
SO ORDERED 
It 
c 
# 
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Plaintiff, 
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j Civil MD. G42-7180 
Thla aatter cose on for hearing before the dUwn entitled Court on 
April 69 1964, the Rcnmble Jutfee Scott Dmiela, presiding. Jack Falirlouuft 
atyeeied far Gfcland-Foulfer Gocpanyt Bruce Muk and Thanes Qnm ^ e e i e d MM 
cornel far Crossroad* Plaza Associates md The Equitable Life Assunnce 
Society of the thitad States; and Ferny Rodeen ^jpeaied ea cornel far Ellas 
Itarle Coopny. Counsel for Allan Steel Coopmy did not appear. The Court 
bend atguBent on the u£tsr fictn al l counsel present, and the Court tab* 
fcflly apprised in titd preadsee and gpod cause appearing 
!CHt IffiXfcHJKE, XT XS HESEB? CREED, ADJUDGED MD IBCTEED that 
Mbtlcn of Odaod^FouIser Cdqpeny to stay the interview of vfnyaara aa to 
Allen gt*»i Cccpany and Ellas Morris & Sons Goopany ia granted aa folloua: 
1. This Order applies to a l l present or fanner enploy«s of Odand-
Foolger Company who acted in an? capacity aa assistant project wawgBLB, 
assistant project aupexiiiLeul03ts9 aupervisars and foremen. 
2. As tx> pieseut enployees, Allen Steel Gaapaay and Elias Harris 
Oaopany are oidered not to crrrtrt interview of sudb enployees without the 
permission of counsel for CUand-Foulger Gonpany. 
3. Eliaa Mania Gcapany and Allen Steel Gonpany say interview past 
enployees of Odaod-Foulger Goopany who served In the aboo* catenaries. Any 
statenents received, however, £rcn such eaployees, either oral or in wiring,, 
past or prospective, will be excluded £rn& use at the trial eithnr aa evidence 
or for the purpose of inpeachin* mtj witness. FuilLeinme, any statanents, 
oral or in writing, obtained f r a such cnployees Mill not be considered 
binding upon Odand-Foulgex Ccnpany; will not be hooted to said conpany and 
will not be treated as an artwfstlm of said coapsny. 
BtfSD this n dsy of /^^ 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
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George W. Pratt (USB #A2642) 
James W. Peters (USB #5131) 
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Plaintiff Gold Standard, Inc. respectfully submits 
this Substitute Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Petition for Order to Show Cause. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
(hereafter collectively -Getty-) have petitioned this Court for 
an order preventing Gold Standard's lawyers from interviewing 
former -managerial- employees of Getty. Getty's Petition also 
seeks sanctions against Gold Standard, including the complete 
destruction of plaintiffs work product which resulted from 
these interviews. For reasons described below, the Getty 
Petition must be denied in its entirety. 
First, discovery has proven, contrary to the 
assertions in Getty's moving papers, that the interviews 
conducted by plaintiff's lawyers with former Getty employees 
1/ When Gold Standard filed its first Memorandum in 
Opposition to the Getty Petition in November, 1987, it had not 
yet had the opportunity to conduct necessary discovery to flesh 
out factual questions raised by the Petition. At a hearing 
held November 20, 1987, the court granted Gold Standard's 
request to conduct limited discovery going to the issues raised 
by the Petition. That discovery, depositions of former Getty 
employees Charles J. Kundert and Robert L. Hautala, has now 
been completed. The court need not refer to Gold Standard's 
initial Memorandum, because this Substitute Memorandum 
reiterates the matters discussed in the first memorandum, and 
also incorporates pertinent portions of the testimony of 
Kundert and Hautala. 
thus far have not invaded Getty's attorney-client privilege, 
nor threatened any other legitimate interest of Getty. 
Second, while Getty's papers suggest that interviews 
by plaintiffs lawyers with its former employees came as a 
complete surprise to Getty last November, the depositions of 
two such individuals, Charles Kundert and Robert Hautala, 
demonstrate that Getty has known about these contacts since 
early 1987, but failed to do anything about this situation 
until November. 
Third (putting aside the false representations Getty 
has advanced in support of its Petition, and its acquiescence 
for over nine months in the contacts with its former 
employees), the law, as we will demonstrate, clearly permits 
the lawyers for a party in litigation to interview the former 
employees of an adverse corporation. 
Thus, the sanctions sought by Getty are completely 
unwarranted. Any evidence obtained by plaintiff through its 
contacts with former Getty employees was obtained properly and, 
consequently, plaintiff is entitled to the full benefit of its 
work product. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. GETTY'S MOTION IS PREDICATED ON FALSE FACTUAL ASSERTIONS 
Throughout its moving papers, the principal concern 
articulated by Getty is that contact with its former employees 
threatens its attorney-client privilege- In its Memorandum In 
Support of Petition for Order to Show Cause ("Getty 
Memorandum"), Getty urges: 
Unless the court, among other things, 
prohibits further ex parte contact with 
Getty's former management personnel, there 
is a danger that such contact will continue 
to occur and may unfairly prejudice Getty's 
position in this litigation and its 
attorney-client privilege. 
Getty Memorandum, p. 4. To demonstrate the imminence of this 
-danger," Getty makes several false representations of fact 
regarding alleged unethical encroachments by plaintiff's 
counsel into Getty's attorney-client privilege. 
The deposition testimony of two of the key former 
Getty employees involved, Charles J. Kundert and Robert L. 
Hautala (depositions which, back in November, Getty objected to 
2 
as "irrelevant-) has now revealed not only that Getty's 
%S See Getty's Memorandum In Opposition to Gold 
Standard's Motion to Continue Hearing and to Permit Limited 
Discovery, p. 10. 
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representations were false, but that Getty did little, if 
anything, to investigate the factual basis for its Petition 
before it was filed. To begin with, Getty states that: 
these individuals (referring to Hautala and 
Kundert) were party to privileged 
communications between the corporation and 
its counsel. 
Getty Memorandum, p. 4. (emphasis added). See also Getty 
Memorandum at 17. Mr. Kundert testified unequivocally to the 
contrary, however, that he was not a party to attorney-client 
privileged communications relating to the Mercur project while 
employed at Getty: 
Q (By Mr. Lowrie) I'm going to 
rephrase the last question and ask you this, 
Mr. Kundert. From the time of October, 1980 
when the responsibility for the Mercur 
project was transferred to Salt Lake City 
and therefore out of your hands until the 
time in the fall, was it, of '84 when you 
took early retirement? 
A (Witness nods) 
Q Did you have any conversations with 
any lawyers representing Getty with respect 
to the Mercur project? 
A I don't think so. 
Q Prior to that time of October of 
1980, did you have any conversations with 
any lawyers with respect to the Mercur 
project? 
•4-
A Frankly, I can't think of anything 
specific. I am sure I probably talked to 
Jack Sample (a Getty attorney) on occasion 
but I don't remember anything that we 
focused on. It may have been just general 
terms. 
Kundert Deposition, pp. 32-33. Later, the witness clarified 
that even prior to October, 1980, he could not recall any 
conversations with lawyers regarding Mercur: 
0 First of all, do I correctly 
understand that you do not recall for sure 
whether or not you discussed Mercur with 
Jack Sample prior to October, 1980? 
A That's correct. 
Id. at 34. Moreover, Mr. Kundert testified that no one 
representing Getty even bothered to ask whether he was a party 
to attorney-client privileged communications: 
Q (By Mr. Lowrie) The question was 
has anybody ever asked you in connection 
with this litigation whether or not you hold 
any attorney-client privileged information 
from your prior employment, arising from 
your prior employment with Getty? 
A No. 
111. at 17. 
In further support of its Petition, Getty has 
suggested that Gold Standard's lawyers in fact have caused 
-5-
Getty's former employees to divulge confidential 
attorney-client communications. In Getty's Memorandum In 
Opposition to Gold Standard's Motion To Continue Hearing And To 
Permit Limited Discovery (-Memorandum In Opposition-) on the 
instant Petition, Getty asserts: -Allowing further discovery 
while Gold Standard is improperly in possession of evidence, 
including privileged material, will exacerbate the injury which 
has already occurred without assisting in the resolution of the 
dispute.M Getty's Memorandum In Opposition, p. 3. Getty 
reiterates at page 4: "The injury to Getty from these contacts 
is real and ongoing- Privileged communications received 
through the contacts may improperly be used as the foundation 
3 
for other discovery efforts." (Emphasis added). 
In fact, Getty's former employees have not disclosed 
any privileged attorney-client communications to Gold 
Standard's lawyers. Three of the former employees discussed in 
the Getty Petition, Robert Blanc, Joseph Berg, and Michael 
Beck, simply declined Gold Standard's invitation to speak, and 
3/ Gold Standard recognizes it is theoretically 
possible to interpret these statements only to assert the 
possibility that confidences have been breached, but believes 
the assertions are carefully couched to suggest, erroneously, 
that Gold Standard has already invaded Getty's attorney-client 
privilege. 
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Gold Standard's attorneys have since that time observed their 
wishes. See Affidavit of James S. Lowrie, Mf 3 and 4. 
As to the two former employees that were contacted by 
plaintiffs counsel, Robert Hautala and Charles Kundert, both 
James S. Lowrie and George W. Pratt testified in their 
Affidavits filed with the court in November, that 
attorney-client communications were neither sought nor 
received. Lowrie Affidavit, % 13; Pratt Affidavit 1[1f 6 and 
15. This testimony was confirmed by Messrs. Kundert and 
Hautala in their depositions, where they both testified that no 
privileged information had been disclosed to plaintiffs 
counsel. Mr. Hautala testified as follows: 
Q. During the course of the Jones, 
Waldo meetings did anyone ask you to 
disclose conversations that you had had with 
Mr. Joe Berg (the in-house Getty lawyer at 
the Salt Lake City office) while you had 
been employed at Salt Lake City? 
A. Not to my recollection, I don't 
remember that question. 
Q. And to the best of your 
recollection, during the course of the 
Jones, Waldo meeting did you, in fact, 
disclose the contents of any communications 
you had with Mr. Berg while you were 
employed at Salt Lake City? 
A. I don't think so. I don't 
remember any. . . . 
Hautala Deposition, p. 43. 
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Mr. Kundert, of course, said that he was not even 
party to attorney-client communications regarding the Mercur 
project, and therefore obviously could not have disclosed 
them. Mr. Kundert testified, moreover, that he was not asked 
to reveal such communications: 
Q. During the course of that meeting, 
did Mr. Pratt ask you to talk about any 
conversations that you had had with lawyers 
with respect to Gold Standard and the Mercur 
project? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Kundert Deposition at 39. 
In short, by filing the instant Petition, Getty has 
charged Gold Standard's lawyers with unethically invading 
Getty's attorney-client privilege. After making this assertion, 
it vigorously resisted Gold Standard's motion to conduct the 
depositions of the former employees from whom these confidences 
allegedly were extracted. After the court granted Gold 
Standard's motion to take these depositions, Messrs. Hautala 
and Kundert testified, contrary to Getty's assertions, not only 
that no attorney-client privileged communications had been 
divulged, but that in Mr. Kundert's case, he was never a party 
to privileged communications to begin with. The facts reveal 
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that any harm to Getty from the contacts, which it urges is 
"real and ongoing," is a product only of Getty's imagination. 
Getty's allegations of ethical violations, made 
without any attempt to verify the facts, is offensive. The 
information which Getty has misrepresented was either known to 
Getty or could have been learned easily, by inquiring of 
Messrs. Kundert and Hautala. Gold Standard believes that the 
instant Petition, like the disqualification motion filed by 
Getty at the outset of this litigation (which Getty 
inexplicably withdrew several months after it had been filed 
and argued to the court), has not been brought before the court 
to redress any real injury, but instead has been utilized for 
purely tactical purposes—to make it as difficult as possible 
for Gold Standard to prepare its case for trial. See Affidavit 
of Scott L. Smith In Opposition to Getty Petition, %M 6 and 7. 
II. DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED TO CLAIM THAT PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL 
WRONGFULLY CONTACTED FORMER EMPLOYEES. 
A. Getty Has Known About Contacts Bv Plaintiffs 
Lawyers With Its Former Employees Since 
Egrly 1987. 
Getty further asserts in its Petition, again falsely, 
that it -was not informed of plaintiffs contacts with former 
employees, which allegedly took place "without notice" to 
Getty. Getty Memorandum, pp. 3 and 4. Getty suggests it was 
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completely unaware of any such contact until it was revealed 
during the deposition of Gold Standard's President, Scott L. 
Smith, on October 28, 1987. 13. at 3. 
In fact, the depositions of Hautala and Kundert have 
demonstrated that Getty knew about the contacts of plaintiff's 
counsel with its former employees well before April 1987, but 
acquiesced in the conduct until November, when it apparently 
determined it could obtain some advantage by seeking to 
prohibit this conduct. 
Mr. Hautala, a former Production Manager in Getty's 
Salt Lake City office, testified that in April 1987, he 
attended a day-long information gathering meeting with lawyers 
representing all the defendants, at the offices of Parsons, 
Behle & Latimer. Hautala Deposition, pp. 26-29. He testified 
further that well before this meeting he had received a phone 
call from Fran Wikstrom, of Parsons, Behle & Latimer (which at 
that time still represented Getty). I£. at 32-35. At that 
time he told Mr. Wikstrom that he had previously been contacted 
by Gold Standard's lawyer, James Lowrie, with respect to the 
disqualification motion that was then pending. Hautala 
Deposition, p. 35. Mr. Wikstrom replied that he would be 
willing to prepare a letter to plaintiff's counsel instructing 
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them not to speak to Mr. Hautala, but Mr. Hautala said that was 
unnecessary: 
Q. Moving back to the meeting at 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer—did you have 
something you wanted to say? 
A. I don't want to talk out of context 
here, but the question has come up about 
whether somebody from Jones, Waldo had 
talked to me prior to the meeting with 
Parson. The reason I am fairly certain of 
this is—is this okay? Can I bring this up? 
Q. You can say whatever you want. 
A. The reason I am fairly certain of 
this is because when I talked to the Parson 
firm, I think this was Fran Wickstrom. At 
that time I believe I must have told him 
that I had a call from somebody from this 
law firm (referring to Jones, Waldo) and he, 
or whoever that attorney was, indicated that 
other people had requested or that the law 
firm had written letters to prevent your law 
firm (referring to Jones, Waldo) from 
contacting them or bothering them, and he 
said that they would do that for me if I 
wished. I said no, it doesn't make any 
difference to me. I am neutral. I don't 
know. 
So that is why I believe that I know 
that I had talked to somebody from both law 
firms well before I went down to the Parson 
meeting. 
Hautala Deposition, pp. 31-32. After they were specifically 
advised of this contact, well before April 1987, neither Mr. 
Wikstrom nor anyone else representing Getty took any steps to 
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prevent any further contact between plaintiffs counsel and 
Mr. Hautala. 
Mr. Hautala further testified that, during his April 
information-gathering meeting at the offices of Parsons, Behle 
and Latimer, he reiterated that he had previously spoken to Mr. 
4 
Lowrie. Hautala Deposition, pp. 35-36. Again, Getty did 
nothing to prohibit the contacts with former Getty employees 
that has now suddenly become such an urgent concern. 
Not only did Getty fail to object to the contacts, but 
in early 1987, when the contacts were brought to its attention, 
its counsel expressly acknowledged plaintiff's intention to 
speak to former employees that were willing to be interviewed. 
Back in February, Gordon Roberts and James Lowrie exchanged 
correspondence concerning this subject, and other matters. In 
a letter dated February 11, 1987, Mr. Lowrie advised 
Mr, Roberts he did not believe Gold Standard's lawyers were 
obliged to notify Mr. Roberts before contacting former 
employees. Mr. Roberts then acknowledged Mr. Lowrie's 
4/ Mr. Hautala later expressed some doubt whether 
he had first advised Getty of his contact with plaintiff's 
counsel during his conversation with Mr. Wikstrom, or later at 
the April 1987 meeting at Parsons, Behle, & Latimer. See 
Hautala Deposition, p. 73. 
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intention to speak with former Getty employees in his letter 
dated February 13, 1987, which concludes: MSo be it.- See 
Lowrie Affidavit, MM 5-10. 
Later, in June, 1987, plaintiff's counsel also 
interviewed, and obtained an affidavit from, Mr. Charles 
Kundert, a former Manager of Mining Engineering for Getty. 
That meeting, and the affidavit that was obtained, is discussed 
in the Affidavit of George W. Pratt, at 1f1f 7-15, and in 
Mr. Kunderfs deposition, at pp. 37-48. During Mr. Kundert's 
deposition, counsel for Getty stipulated that it had been aware 
of this contact with Mr. Kundert as early as August, 1987. See 
Kundert Deposition, p. 14, and letter from Robert S. Clark to 
George W. Pratt, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit A. Here again Getty did nothing to prevent this 
conduct, which it now claims is unethical, until November. 
B. Getty Is Estopped To Prevent Plaintiff's Counsel 
From Interviewing Former Employees. 
Getty is estopped to prohibit the conduct it 
acknowledged so many months ago. The doctrine of equitable 
estoppel prevents Getty from claiming ethical violations after 
acquiescing in that conduct by its silence. For example, in 
Warpar Manufacturing Corp. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 
852, 858 (N.D. Ohio 1984), where a party had been aware of dual 
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representation by adverse counsel but waited two years to file 
a motion for disqualification, the Court found the party 
••estopped at this late date to raise the issue of 
qualification.* The Court found that "[d]uring that period 
[when the party had been aware of the conflict], a substantial 
amount of time was expended by attorneys. . . . The time 
expended . . . amounts to detrimental reliance.M id. See also 
Smith v. Whatcott, 757 F.2d 1098, 1100 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(••disqualification motions must be diligently pursued to avoid 
waiver and may not be used as strategic litigation tactics-) 
(citing Redd v. Shell Oil Co., 518 F.2d 311, 315 (10th Cir. 
1975)). 
Similarly, Gold Standard's counsel have taken valuable 
time and effort to interview former Getty employees with the 
full understanding that Getty's attorneys acknowledged this 
practice and indicated a determination not to contest it. They 
should not now be heard to complain about this conduct. 
III. GOLD STANDARD HAS AN IMPORTANT. JUDICIALLY RECOGNIZED 
INTEREST IN CONDUCTING INFORMAL DISCOVERY OF FORMER 
GETTY EMPLOYEES 
It is manifest that litigation can be conducted more 
economically and expeditiously if counsel may informally 
interview the individuals who have knowledge of the pertinent 
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facts. In this case, there are former Getty employees who, 
like Kundert and Hautala, are willing to be interviewed by Gold 
Standard's lawyers, and who Gold Standard believes should be 
interviewed in order to properly prepare its case for trial. 
Without the opportunity to do so, the cost and time to litigate 
this matter will be needlessly increased. See Smith Affidavit, 
IHf 6 and 7. 
The courts have consistently recognized the important 
interest a party has in conducting informal interviews of the 
employees of an adverse corporate party. According to one 
court, the desired information "may be in the exclusive 
possession of the corporation and may be too expensive or 
impractical to collect through formal discovery.- Frev v. 
Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 106 F.R.D. 32, 37 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985). The result, according to the Frey court, may be to 
-frustrate the right of an individual plaintiff with limited 
resources to a fair trial and deter other litigants from 
pursuing their legal remedies.- Xfl. at 36. See also Mompoint 
v. Lotus Development Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 417 (D. Mass. 1986) 
("courts have looked with considerable disfavor on attempts to 
place limits on a lawyer#s ability to interview prospective 
witnesses. . . .-) 
In short, the right to prepare one*s case by 
conducting interviews, even of the former employees of an 
adverse corporate party, is an important one. 
IV. CONTACT WITH FORMER GETTY EMPLOYEES CANNOT BE PROHIBITED 
UNDER ANY OF THE THEORIES ADVANCED BY GETTY. 
Getty seeks to prevent and sanction plaintiffs access 
to virtually all the important fact witnesses in this case on 
the grounds that they are former Getty employees. Getty 
contends that this relief is justified because (1) the current 
statements made by these employees may be binding on the 
corporation; and (2) the contact may prompt some breach of the 
attorney-client privilege. As demonstrated below, these 
concerns are totally unfounded. 
A. The Current Statements of Former Getty Employees 
Cannot Possibly "Bind" Gettv As Admissions. 
Former Rule DR 7-104(A)(1) of the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility, and newly enacted Rule 4.2 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct (which became effective 
January 1, 1988), are designed to prevent a lawyer from taking 
unfair advantage of his adversary, by prohibiting the lawyer 
from contacting the adverse party outside the presence of 
opposing counsel. In the case of an organization, the "party" 
consists of those representatives that may prejudice the 
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organization because they have authority to make statements 
that may be binding, as admissions, against it: 
In the case of an organization, this Rule 
prohibits communications by a lawyer for one 
party concerning the matter in 
representation with persons having a 
managerial responsibility on behalf of the 
organization, and with any other person 
whose act or omission in connection with 
that matter may be imputed to the 
organization for purposes of civil or 
criminal liability or whose statement may 
constitute an admission on the part of the 
organization. 
Official Comment to Rule 4.2. 
The Comment expressly recognizes the right of counsel 
to contact even the present employees of an adverse corporate 
party, but in order to protect the corporate party against 
unwitting statements of its employees, the Rule limits this 
right in the case of employees that, due to their status, may 
make admissions that become binding against the corporation. 
In short, in the case of a corporation the Rule is designed -to 
preclude the interviewing of those corporate employees who have 
the authority to bind the corporation.- Wright v. Group Health 
Hospital, 691 P.2d 564, 519 (Wash. 1984) (emphasis in original). 
Getty argues that the current statements of even 
former Getty employees may constitute -admissions- that will be 
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binding against Getty at trial. As demonstrated below, 
however, Getty's concern is totally unfounded, for the simple 
reason that the statements of former corporate employees simply 
cannot, as a matter of law, bind the corporation as 
admissions. The leading case treating this issue is Wright v. 
Group Health Hospital, 691 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984). In Wright, 
the court rejected the claim that a former employee could make 
admissions binding on the corporation, and correctly defined 
the term -party- to include only employees who have -speaking 
authority- for the corporation: 
We hold that the best interpretation of 
-party- in litigation involving corporations 
is only those employees who have the legal 
authority to -bind- the corporation in a 
legal evidentiary sense (i.e., those 
employees who have -speaking authority- for 
the corporation). 
Id. at 569. Since former employees cannot bind the 
corporation, the court concluded that Rule 7-104(A) does not 
apply to them: 
We hold current Group Health employees 
should be considered -parties- for the 
purposes of the disciplinary rule if, under 
applicable Washington law, they have 
managing authority sufficient to give them 
the right to speak for, and bind, the 
corporation. Since former employees cannot 
possibly speak for the corporation, we hold 
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that CPR PR 7-104(AHl) does not apply to 
them. 
Id. (emphasis added). The court's decision to permit contact 
with former employees is consistent with the purposes of the 
Rule: 
This interpretation is consistent with 
the declared purpose of the rule to protect 
represented parties from the dangers of 
dealing with adverse counsel. (citation 
omitted.) A flexible interpretation of 
-parties-, moreover, advances the policy of 
keeping the testimony of employee witnesses 
freely accessible to both parties. See ABA 
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, 
Formal Op. 117 (1934). We find no reason to 
distinguish between employees who in fact 
witnessed an event and those whose act or 
omission caused the event leading to the 
action. It is not the purpose of the rule 
to protect a corporate party from the 
revelation of prejudicial facts. (citation 
omitted.) Rather, the Rule's function is to 
preclude the interviewing of those corporate 
employees who have the authority to bind the 
corporation. (emphasis in original.) 
H. Drinker, Legal Ethics 201 (1953). 
1£. (emphasis added). See also Amarin Plastics, Inc. v. 
Maryland Cap Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 1987). Accord 
Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp., 110 F.R.D. 414, 417-18 (D. 
Mass. 1986) (current employees whose statements would not, 
under rules of evidence, be -admissions," are not -parties-); 
Frev v. Department of Health and Human Services, 106 F.£.D. 32, 
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36-38 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (current employees whose statements would 
not be evidentiary admissions are not "parties" subject to DR 
7-104). 
Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of state bar 
committees that have examined this question have likewise 
permitted contact with former employees. For example, the 
Wisconsin State Bar has ruled that: 
a lawyer may contact a former employee of an 
opposing party to obtain material 
information, even though the former employee 
was a managing agent, where he has severed 
all relationship with the corporation and is 
therefore not in a position to commit the 
corporation. 
Wisconsin State Bar Comm. on Prof. Ethics, Opinion E-82-10, 
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Ethics Opinions: 1980-1985 
(ABA/BNA), P. 801:9107 (1985). Likewise, the Ethics Committee 
of the Colorado Bar Association has ruled: 
After leaving the organization's employ, a 
former employee cannot bind the organization 
as a matter of law. A lawyer does not 
violate DR 7-104(A)(1) by communicating 
directly with the organizations former 
employee about the substantive dispute 
without the prior consent of the 
organization's counsel. 
_?n_ 
Colorado Bar Association Opinion 69, 3 Law. Man. on Prof. 
Conduct (ABA/BNA), pp. 281-82 (1987).5 True and correct 
copies of the abstracts of the foregoing bar opinions, and 
those cited in footnote 5, from the ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on 
Professional Conduct, are attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, in the only 
authority we are aware of in Utah dealing with this subject, 
Judge Daniels, while prohibiting contact with certain classes 
of present employees, expressly permitted counsel to interview 
the former employees of the corporate adversary in connection 
with its trial preparation. Allen Steel Company v. 
Okland-Fouloer Company, Civil No. C-80-9512 (Third District 
Court Order of May 4, 1984), a copy of which is attached to the 
Getty Memorandum. Thus, the Allen case, cited by Getty in its 
S/ See also Maryland State Bar Assoc. Comm. on 
Ethics, Opinion #86-13, Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct, Ethics 
Opinions: 1980-1985 (ABA/BNA) p. 801: 4364 (1985) ("A lawyer 
may communicate with a former employee of an adverse corporate 
party . . . . " ) ; Illinois State Bar Assoc. Comm. on Prof. 
Resp., Opinion #85-12, (April 4, 1986), 2 Law Man. on Prof. 
Conduct (ABA/BNA) p. 191 (1986) ("Since former employees are no 
longer in a position to act or speak on behalf of the 
corporation, direct communication with these persons does not 
deprive the corporation of legal counsel.-); but see West 
Virginia State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion #87-01 (Jan. 
20, 1987), 3 Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 25 (1987) 
(authority contra, but no reasoning or explanation given). 
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Memorandum, expressly supports the right to contact former 
employees which Getty seeks to prohibit by its Petition. 
After an individual has left the employ of a 
corporation, he may well have knowledge of matters that later 
become the subject of litigation and thus, like any citizen, a 
potential fact witness. As the foregoing authorities amply 
demonstrate, however, Getty cannot be bound by the current 
statements of its former employees, no matter what position 
these employees once held, and there is therefore no reason why 
those persons should not be interviewed like any other fact 
witness. 
B. Nor Can the Statements of Former Employees Be 
"Imputed" to Getty. 
Apparently recognizing that former employees cannot, 
by definition, utter admissions binding on a former corporate 
employee, Getty next seizes on a vague and poorly worded 
portion of the Official Comment to Rule 4.2, to support its 
backup position that *[t]he acts or omissions of Getty's former 
management employees will clearly be sought to be imputed to 
& Judge Daniels' Order imposes certain limitations 
on the use that may be made at trial of statements made by 
former employees, which plaintiff believes would not be 
appropriate here. This issue is discussed below, at Part VI. 
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Getty in this lawsuit.- Getty Memorandum, p. 8. Getty relies 
on the following language of the Comment: 
This Rule prohibits communications by a 
lawyer for one party concerning the matter 
in representation with persons . . . whose 
act or omission in connection with that 
matter may be imputed to the organization 
for purposes of civil and criminal 
liability. (emphasis added.) 
Getty contends that this -imputed" language should be 
interpreted to include any former employee who once had 
authority to speak for the corporation and now has personal 
knowledge relevant to a litigated matter involving the 
corporation. In Getty's view, the fact that a former employee 
once possessed speaking authority means, contrary to common 
sense, that his current statements can still be -imputed- to 
his employer, within the meaning of the Rule. 
This argument was squarely rejected in Amarin 
Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland CUP Corp., 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass. 
1987). In Amarin, the corporate defendant sought sanctions, 
and a protective order preventing plaintiffs counsel from 
interviewing the defendant's former President, Mr. Shapiro. In 
support of its motion, the defendant made virtually the 
identical argument Getty makes here: 
Maryland Cup has simply stated in conclusory 
fashion that -it is Shapiro's actions and 
m _ 
motives as an officer of Sweetheart at the 
relevant time which are in dispute and which 
plaintiff will seek to impute to the 
defendant organization.-
116 F.R.D. at 40. The court rejected, however, the argument 
that the statement of this former employee, who had no 
remaining relationship with the corporation, could be "imputed" 
to the defendant: 
[T]he defendant has presented no facts which 
would demonstrate that Shapiro had an 
ongoing agency or fiduciary relationship 
with Maryland Cup, or that Shapiro's acts or 
omissions could be imputed to Maryland Cup 
for purposes of its civil liability. The 
mere fact that Shapiro may be a prospective 
witness, even a critical one, does not 
trigger the prohibitions of PR 7-104(AHl). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Like the Amarin court, this court should give the 
-imputed" language of the Comment a plain reading, consistent 
with the underlying purpose of the Rule. The Rule is not 
designed to completely prohibit counsel from talking to a 
corporation's employees. It is designed to keep an attorney 
from overreaching the adversary by going directly to the 
adverse lawyer's client. It carries out this design by 
applying the prohibition only to a specific class of employees 
-those corporate employees who have the authority to bind the 
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corporation,* Wright, supra at 569- As discussed above, only 
a certain class of current employees, and never former 
employees, may bind the corporation by their statements. The 
Comment can hardly have been intended to discard this simple 
conceptual distinction, by bringing within its reach any former 
employee who may have personal knowledge of facts relevant to 
litigation. 
Significantly, the Comment is all phrased in the 
present tense, and makes no reference to former employees. If 
the draftsmen had intended to include former employees, they 
could have done so by clear, unequivocal language. Instead, it 
is evident, as at least one court has indicated, that the 
"imputed* language was intended to more precisely identify 
those current employees, in addition to "persons have 
managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization," who 
are in a position to bind or commit to the corporation. See 
Massa v. Eaton Corp., 109 F.R.D. 312, 314 (W.D. Mich. 1985). 
Getty is correct in its assertion that plaintiff will 
attempt to "impute" to Getty any favorable evidence it may 
learn by interviewing former Getty employees. But it will do 
this only in the same way it would introduce the testimony of 
anv fact witness, former employee or not, who has personal 
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knowledge of Getty's conduct. The former Getty employees are 
now people who have knowledge of what Getty did. Although they 
can describe past conduct that may have been binding on Getty 
when it occurred, they presently have no authority to bind 
Getty. Plaintiff will therefore be unable to "impute" their 
statements or conduct to Getty in any greater or different 
sense than it could impute the testimony of any fact witness to 
Getty. 
C. Getty's Authorities Lack Value As Precedent. 
Against the persuasive reasoning in Wright and Amarin, 
Judge Daniels' decision in Allen Steel, and the opinions of the 
bar committees of Colorado, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Maryland -
which all permit contacts with former employees - Getty can 
cite only to three cases, each of which has questionable value 
as precedent. 
First, Getty relies upon Porter v. ARCO Metals Co., 
642 F.Supp 1116 (D. Mont. 1986) where# admittedly, the court 
prohibited contacts with "former employees with managerial 
responsibilities.- Ifl. at 1118. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court fully endorsed the Wright court's central 
proposition, that Hthe term 'party* . . . encompasses 'only 
those employees who have the legal authority to 'bind* the 
corporation is a legal evidentiary sense, i.e., these employees 
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who have speaking authority for the corporation.•" Ifi. 
(emphasis added) (quoting Wright, supra, at 569). The 
conclusion the court then draws from this premise, that former 
employees (who, as explained above, cannot possibly "bind" the 
corporation) may not be contacted, almost appears to be a 
mistake in reasoning, since it does not logically follow from 
the court's main premise. At best, the court*s reasoning is 
confused and, we submit, hardly a compelling authority for 
Getty's position. 
In addition, Getty relies heavily on Sperber v. 
Washington Heights-West Harlem - Inwood Mental Health Council, 
Inc., Civ. No. 82-7428 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), vacated and withdrawn. 
This opinion was withdrawn by the judge who authored it, 
however, indicating that he has repudiated his own reasoning on 
this issue, and therefore lacks real value as precedent. 
Finally, Getty cites American Protection Ins. Co. v. 
MGM Grand Hotel, No. CV-LV-82-86 (D. Nev. Mar. 13th 1986). 
This case involved egregious overreaching by the offending 
attorney, and is completely distinguishable on its facts. The 
offending attorney in MGM was contacted by an individual who 
was both a former vice-president and a current litigation 
consultant for the hotel. The consultant offered to sell his 
knowledge of the hotel's litigation preparation for $1,000,000. 
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The court found the attorney in violation of Canon 9, 
which prohibits the -appearance of impropriety,- because he was 
facilitating this employee's scheme to collect a -bonanza for 
being disloyal to MGM." 2 Law. Man. of Prof- Conduct (ABA/BNA) 
pp. 89-90 (1986). The court did not base its decision on the 
fact that the consultant was a former employee. Instead, the 
court focussed on the lawyer's apparent unconscionable efforts 
to extract the adversary's litigation strategy from the 
consultant. Needless to say, these outrageous facts bear no 
resemblance to those here and the case is of no help on the 
issue before this court. 
V. THE HYPOTHETICAL RISK OF INVASION OF THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE SHOULD NOT BAR CONTACT 
WITH FORMER GETTY EMPLOYEES. 
Getty also claims that ex parte contact between Gold 
Standard's lawyers and their former employees threatens its 
attorney-client privilege, but offers only paranoid speculation 
in support of this contention. The facts before this court 
demonstrate that Getty's fears are unfounded. 
Both Gold Standard's counsel, James Lowrie and George 
Pratt, have testified under oath that when Hautala and Kundert, 
the two Getty employees discussed in its Petition, were 
interviewed, that no privileged attorney-client communications 
-28-
were either sought or obtained. Pratt Affidavit H 15; Lowrie 
Affidavit M 13. These facts were corroborated by Hautala and 
Kundert, who both testified that plaintiffs counsel had not 
inquired regarding attorney-client communications, and that no 
privileged attorney-client communications were divulged during 
the course of their interviews. Kundert Deposition, pp. 32-3, 
34, 39; Hautala Deposition, p. 43. 
This evidence plainly demonstrates that former Getty 
employees can be interviewed without any risk of intrusion upon 
Getty's attorney-client privilege. 
Of course, there is always some risk that when an 
attorney interviews a former employee (or anyone else, for that 
matter), that attorney-client communications may be disclosed. 
However, the cases recognize that this risk is insufficient to 
justify a blanket prohibition against interviewing former 
employees. Instead, some showing that attorneys have 
deliberately attempted to invade the attorney-client privilege 
by interviewing former employees is required before any relief 
will be granted. For example, in Porter v. ARCO Metals Co., 
642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), the court rejected the 
argument that the possible disclosure of attorney-client 
communications constituted a basis to stop interviews of former 
corporate employees: 
-29-
Plaintiff's counsel has interviewed former 
employees of defendant as prospective 
witnesses. This presents no question of 
privilege unless counsel asks the employees 
to divulge confidential communications. 
Id. at 1118 (emphasis added), gee also Amarin Plastics, Inc. 
v. Maryland Cup Corporation. 116 F.R.D. 36, 42 (D. Mass. 1987) 
(potential invasion of attorney-client privilege only a basis 
for relief M[i]f [movant] can demonstrate. . . that Amarin's 
counsel sought in any way to cause Shapiro to divulge 
confidential attorney-client communications . . . . H ) ; Colorado 
Bar Ass'n Ethics Comm. Opinion 69, supra ("The inquiring lawyer 
may not, however, while communicating with the organizations 
former employees, inquire into privileged attorney-client 
communications.") 
Getty significantly has cited no authority for its 
proposition that the risk of invading the attorney-client 
privilege may justify impairing a party's trial preparation 
effort or encroaching, arguably, on the free speech rights of 
former employees. 
The Court should not place Getty's attorney-client 
privilege on a pedestal, and bow to it in derogation of the 
important interests of other parties. Instead, a rule of 
reason should be applied. \Getty must rely on the good judgment 
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of its managers, both present and former, to recognize the 
importance of attorney-client communications, and instruct them 
accordingly. At the same time, the Court can expect all 
counsel practicing before it to closely observe its ethical 
7 
obligation not to pry into attorney-client matters. 
Finally, the court can prevent the use of any attorney-client 
communications at trial, which is the ultimate protection. 
These safeguards are plainly sufficient to protect Getty's 
interests, as the evidence before the court demonstrates. 
VI. GETTY'S REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS IS COMPLETELY WITHOUT 
JUSTIFICATION. 
Getty's Petition requests the court to impose a number 
of far-reaching sanctions against Gold Standard. As described 
below, no sanctions are justified in this case. 
First, Getty requests an order prohibiting plaintiff's 
counsel from contacting former Getty employees. For the 
reasons described in Part IV above, the court should instead 
2/ Plaintiff notes that the risk of an inadvertent 
disclosure of privileged communications is actually much less 
when former employees talk to plaintiff's lawyers than when 
they talk to non-lawyers (which Getty does not seek to enjoin) 
because a non-lawyer has no sensitivity to, or responsibility 
to avoid, learning about privileged communications. 
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order that plaintiffs counsel are permitted to interview 
former Getty employees. 
Second/ Getty requests the court to require plaintiff 
to disgorge its entire work product generated through its prior 
contacts with Getty's former employees: it seeks 
identification of all former Getty employees contacted to date, 
production of all documents and statements received from former 
Getty employees, and finally, all notes taken by plaintiffs 
counsel in connection with those interviews. 
Gold Standard submits that, since any work product 
derived through interviews of former Getty employees was 
obtained properly, there is no reason to treat this work 
product differently than any other attorney work product. Even 
if the court were to rule to the contrary, however, Getty has 
cited no legal authority whatsoever for its novel proposition 
that plaintiff should relinquish to it everything it obtained 
by talking to former employees. 
Finally, the Petition requests the court to prohibit 
the use of any statements that may have been obtained from 
former employees at trial, or for any other purpose. This 
remedy has an obvious appeal to Getty, but it is wholly 
inappropriate in this case. 
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The only -statement- that has been obtained by 
plaintiffs counsel through its contacts with former Getty 
employees thus far, is an affidavit that was signed by 
Q 
Mr, Charles Kundert. The Kundert Affidavit authenticates 
and explains two internal Getty memoranda that had come to the 
attention of plaintiff's counsel- Mr. Kundert testified at his 
deposition that he signed the affidavit of his own free will 
(Kundert Deposition, pp. 40-1), and that the statements 
contained in the affidavit were true and correct: 
Q. Did you believe the affidavit to fairly 
and truly state the matters contained 
therein when you signed it? 
A. Yes. 
1£. at 42. 8 
Mr. Kundert signed the Affidavit because he was 
willing to have set forth in writing his memory of events that 
pertain to this lawsuit, like anv witness who signs any 
statement in connection with litigation. He properly responded 
to his duty, as a citizen, to assist litigation by providing 
&S Mr. Kundert also signed a letter addressed to 
Mr. John Wilson of Parsons, Behle and Latimer, that had been 
prepared for his signature by plaintiffs counsel. 
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his recollection of material facts. Having reaffirmed the 
truthfulness of his Affidavit during his deposition, in the 
presence even of Getty's counsel, there is no reason for the 
court to place any restriction on the future use of his 
Affidavit. 
The only authority cited by Getty to support its 
request to prohibit the use of statements received from former 
employees is Judge Daniels* decision in Allen Steel Co. v. 
Okland - Fouloer Co., Civil No. C-80-9512 (Third District Court 
Order dated May 4, 1984), where the court ruled that -any 
statements received, however, from [former] employees, either 
oral or in writing, past or prospective, will be excluded from 
use at the trial either as evidence or for the purpose of 
impeaching any witness.-
Unfortunately, Judge Daniels' Order gives no 
explanation why this restriction was ordered. It appears 
entirely inconsistent with his ruling that former employees may 
be interviewed, like any other independent fact witnesses. 
Furthermore, our research reveals no authority anywhere else in 
the law to so restrict the use of statements of former 
employees. Additionally, a preclusion order like that imposed 
by Judge Daniels should not be issued without greater factual 
sharpening, including knowledge of the content of the * 
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statements affected, the context in which they would be used, 
and the purpose for which they would be offered• The Allen 
Steel case simply was not ripe for the restrictions imposed by 
Judge Daniels. The interlocutory order imposed in that case 
would, in all events, be subject to revision by the court 
during the course of the case or at the time of trial as issues 
were more precisely focused. 
Gold Standard submits that the limitations imposed by 
Judge Daniels were ill-considered, have never been imposed by 
9 
any other court, and should not be imposed in this case. 
Instead, the court should permit plaintiff to make full use of 
any materials it obtains through its contacts with former Getty 
employees willing to speak to plaintiff, as it would with any 
other fact witnesses in this case. Evidentiary rulings should 
await trial or properly framed motions in limine which are 
&/ Judge Daniels was in the unenviable position of 
interpreting new law in response to fairly undeveloped and 
short-sighted memoranda of law, which have been reviewed by 
plaintiff's counsel. The plaintiffs attempted to argue that no 
employee, past or current, manager or lower level, could be 
deemed a "party.H The defendant took an equally unreasonable 
position, that the Comment to Rule 4.2 dictated that all 
employees, past or current, are protected from contact under 
the Rule. Judge Daniels did not have the benefit of any of the 
recent, well-reasoned authorities discussed above, in making 
his decision. We submit that, had these authorities been 
before the court, Judge Daniels would not have imposed 
restrictions on the use of statements made by former employees. 
-35-
sharpened by knowledge of the actual evidence sought to be 
precluded. 
Particularly here, where Getty has acquiesced for many 
months in the contacts of which it now complains, it is hardly 
in a position to request any of the draconian sanctions sought 
in its Petition, The fact of the matter is that plaintiffs 
counsel have merely obtained, and seek to obtain in the future, 
the facts, through informal discovery, from parties having 
knowledge of those facts. There is no basis for the 
suppression of truth or any of the other sanctions sought by 
Getty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Getty Petition 
should be denied in its entirety. The court should order that 
plaintiff is free to interview former Getty employees as part 
of its discovery effort in this case, and may freely use any 
statements/ affidavits, and other materials generated from 
those interviews both before trial and at the trial of this 
matter. 
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DATED this J> 
A-
day of February, 1988 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK/& McDtWOUGH 
J?mes S. Low#ie 
George W. Pratt 
James W. Peters 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Gold Standard, Inc. 
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1988, I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of tne foregoing PLAINTIFF'S SUBSTITUTE MEMORANDUM 
IN OPPOSITION TO (3ETTY DEFENDANTS' PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE to: 
Stephen G. Crockett 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Gordon L. Roberts 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Robert M. McDonald 
MCDONALD & BULLEN 
American Plaza III 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
A PROFESSIONAL COKFOHATION 
SUITE 1300 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET 
POST OFFICE BOX 11019 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84147 
ROBERT 8 . CLJLRK TELEPHONE (SOD 5 3 2 - 7 8 4 0 
February 9, 1988 
HAND DELIVERED 
George W. Pratt, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK 
& MCDONOUGH 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
RE: Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick 
Resources Corp., et al 
Dear George: 
You have asked me to review the transcript of Charles Kundert's 
deposition, taken in your office on December 2, 1987, to determine 
whether a statement made on the record was correctly transcribed. 
On page 14, lines 23-25, the transcript reads: "Counsel, we will 
stipulate that as of that point in time you learned about the 
meeting." (Emphasis added.) 
This letter will confirm what I have told you orally, that the 
statement actually made was: "Counsel, we will stipulate that as of 
that point in time s*e learned about the meeting." (Emphasis added.) 
We agree with you that the transcript should be corrected in that 
respect. 
Very truly yours, 
y&&fU £&^ 
Robert S. Clark 
of 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
RSC:rk 
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lawyer a form of payment consisting of a mixture 
of a fixed fee and a contingent fee. Tbe lawyer 
would receive a monthly payment equal to SO 
percent of bis usual hourly fee. In addition, if the 
litigation succeeds and tbe client recovers tbe 
stock and other property tbat is tbe subject of tbe 
action, tbe lawyer will receive a $150,000 bonus, 
plus half of any punitive damages tbe client may 
recover. Tbe lawyer seeks an opinion on tbe 
propriety of this arrangement, and of a contract 
by which he would share one-third of tbe bonus 
with his client's out-of-state counsel. 
This committee concludes tbat tbe proposed 
arrangement is not unreasonable per se under tbe 
Nevcda Rules of Professional Conduct The com-
mittee is not a fact-finding body, however, and 
cannot determine the ultimate reasonableness of 
a particular fee, since the determination of rea-
sonableness is a factual one and cannot be made 
until the lawyer's representation has ended. Su-
preme Court Rule 155(1) sets forth a number of 
factors to consider in deciding whether a fee 
arrangement is reasonable, including such things 
as the time, labor and skill required of the lawyer, 
the novelty and difficulty of the issues, the likeli-
hood that other employment would be precluded, 
the amount involved and the results obtained, and 
the type of fee. whether fixed or contingent. 
Other factors not mentioned in tbe rule are the 
sophistication of the client, the fact that tbe 
arrangement was proposed by the client, and the 
importance of the issues It should be noted that 
in this case, the lawyer risks losing only 20 
percent of his usual fee, which is much less than 
the all-or-nothing risks inherent in conventional 
contingent fee contracts Therefore, the reason-
ableness of the bonus and punitive damages 
share, which in absolute terms amount to a high 
percentage, would have to be measured against 
the total amount at stake and the degree of 
difficulty and risk involved in tbe case generally 
and on the punitive damages aspect — matters 
which are not addressed in the inquiry. Further-
more, Rule 158(10) prohibits a lawyer from ac-
quiring through a contingent fee arrangement 
such a substantial investment in tbe case tbat be 
loses bis perspective. 
In addition to being reasonable, tbe fee ar-
rangement must be in writing and must be thor-
oughly explained to and understood and approved 
by tbe client. Tbe client must understand bow 
costs will be billed and that tbe mixed-fee nature 
of tbe contract may result in tbe inability of tbe 
lawyer to distinguish billable from nonbiliaWe 
hours. 
The plan to divide tbe bonus with out-of-state 
counsel u not inherently unethical either. Under 
Rule 155(5), if tbe one-third share that would be 
paid to the other lawyer is not proportionate to 
the services be performs, then both lawyers most 
assume joint responsibility for the representation, 
and the client, after full disclosure, must approve 
the fee-sharing plan in writing The lawyer must 
also guard against participation by out-of-state 
counsel tbat would constitute the unauthorized 
practice of law in Nevada. 
(Netada State Bar 
•a t Professional " 
4;o/14/t7) 
Coaanittee oo Ethics 
fy, FonnaJ Opiate 
Obligations to Third Persons 
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON 
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - EM-
P L O Y E E S -
Lawyer may mot communicate with ad-
verse organization's current employees who 
have authority to bind organization on sub-
ject matter of representation unless lawyer 
receives permission of organization's coun-
sel; former employees may be interviewed, 
kowever, without permission of counsel with 
recard to all matters except communications 
subject to attorney-client privilege. 
Digest of Opinion: This committee is a wire of 
a great concern by members of the bar about tbe 
propriety of communicating with the employee or 
former employees of an adverse party organiza-
tion. DR /-104(A)(1) prohibit* a lawyer from 
communicating on the subject of a representation 
with a party who the l»wyer knows is represented 
by counsel without the prior consent of opposing 
counsel or unless tbe lawyer u authorized by law 
to do so. 
The protection of DR 7-104(A)(1) is not solely 
dependent upon the organization being named in 
litigation. The organization should be considered 
a party anytime it has specifically retained coun-
sel to represent its interest regarding the subject 
of representation or has specifically referred the 
matter to house counsel. Once it has been deter-
mined tbat an organization is a party under DR 
7-104(A)(l), it should be determined which per-
sons within that organization constitute the party, 
and which individuals are bystander witnesses. 
Employees who constitute the party are differ-
entiated from those who are bystander witnesses 
by their authority to commit the organization to a 
position regarding tbe subject matter of tbe repre-
sentation. If an employee is in a position to 
commit an organization in a particular situation 
because of his authority or because for some 
other reason the law cloaks him with authority, 
then he, as the alter ego of the organization, is a 
party for purposes of DR 7-104(A)(1) See also 
tbe Comment to Model Rule 4.2. 
The distinction between bystander and non-
bystander witnesses does not apply to an organi-
zation's former employees. After leaving tbe or-
ganization's employ, a former employee cannot 
bind tbe organization as a matter of law. A 
lawyer does not violate DR 7-104(A)(l) by com-
municating directly with the organization's for-
mer employee about the substantive dispute with-
out tbe prior consent of the organization's 
counsel. 
The inquiring lawyer may not, however, while 
communicating with the organization's former 
employees, inquire into privileged attorney-client 
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communications Nor may the inquiring ltwyer 
listen while the former employee attempts to 
divulge privileged communication* voluntarily. 
An> privilege existing between the former em-
ployee and the organization's counsel belongs to 
the organization, and can be waived on!) by the 
organization 
(Colorado Bar Association Ethics Committee, 
Opinion 69 Ret.; 4/20/87) 
THREATENING CRIMINAL PROSECU-
T I O N -
Ohio lawyer nay , as required by state 
statute and without violating DR 7-105's 
proscription against threatening criminal 
prosecution to gain advantage in civil case, 
demand of prospective defendant payment 
for damage to or theft of plaintifTs property 
and inform defendant that if payment is 
made defendant cannot be criminally 
prosecuted. 
Digest of Opinion. Ohio Rev Stat Code 
2307 61 requires, as a condition of bringing a 
civil action against any person wilfully damaging 
the piamtifTs property, that the plaintiff serve a 
30-da> prior notice on the prospective defendant 
demanding payment in the amount specified, and 
not if > the prospective defendant that if payment 
is made or an agreement for payment is complet-
ed, the prospective defendant cannot be criminal-
ly prosecuted 
EC 7-21 states that threatening to use the 
criminal process to coerce action in a private civil 
controversy is a subversion of the criminal pro-
cess DR 7-105 provides that a "lawyer shall not 
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON 
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - CLI-
ENT FUNDS - CONDUCT PREJUDI-
CIAL TO ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
T I C E -
Fact that opposing party no longer had 
legal representation presents lawyer from 
being disciplined under Oregon's DR 7-
104AX 1) for Us private contacts with that 
party, even though party had had legal rep-
resentation and lawyer thought she still did. 
Digest of Opinion: The lawyer, who had held a 
power of attorney for a client, was asked to return 
all of the client's papers to her. However, he 
retained the client's will. The client's guardian 
and conservator requested the will be returned. 
Two more letters were written to the lawyer, one 
from Dressier, a member of the law firm repre-
senting the conservator, and one from Meyer, a 
present, participate in presenting, or threaten to 
present criminal charges solely to obtain an ad-
vantage in a civil matter.** The apparent conflict 
of the Ohio statute and the ethics code presents a 
question as to what is ethically proper for a 
lawyer who represents a plaintiff. 
ABA Informal Opinion 14S4 (1981) held that 
the Model Code does not prohibit a law firm that 
is pursuing civil remedies on behalf of clients 
against persons who are also violating a criminal 
statute from reporting the violations to the pros-
ecutor. Opinion 1484 interprets DR 7-105 and 
EC 7-21 to mean that the prohibited conduct 
occurs only where the threat of criminal prosecu-
tion is made or criminal charges are brought to 
gain an advantage in an essentiall) private civil 
dispute. 
Utah Opinion 71 held that the pivotal issue is 
one of motivation. If lodging a criminal complaint 
is accomplished or threatened by a lawyer with 
the sole purpose of gaining an advantage in a 
civil matter the action is impermissible, but if the 
possibility of criminal sanctions is mentioned in a 
notice because of legislative mandate, the pur-
pose appears to be compliance with the law on 
behalf of the client See also Georgia Opinion 26 . 
If a lawyer acts pursuant to the requirements 
of the statute b> sending the notice prescribed in 
the statute, the motivation is apparent!) compli-
ance with the statute and not sole!) to obtain an 
advantage in a civil matter and therefore it is not 
ethically improper for the lawyer to send such a 
notice 
(Ohio State Bar Association Com mi net oo Legal 
Ethics and Professional Conduct, Informal Opin-
ion 17-9; 7/16/87) 
lawyer representing the client The lawyer wrote 
direct I) to the conservator proposing a "final 
settlement*' between them 
The bar alleges that the lawyer, by writing to 
the conservator, violated DR 7-104(A)(1), in that 
he communicated with a person he kne* was 
represented by a lawyer. The bar argued that the 
lawyer had a duty to communicate with the 
conservator only through Dressier, who bad rep-
resented the conservator in July 1984. The evi-
dence showed, however, that Dressier did not 
represent the conservator when the lawyer wrote 
to her in March 1985. Since Dressier no longer 
represented the conservator, the lawyer had no 
duty to request Dressier'* permission before com-
municating with her. It is a fortuity, but the 
lawyer did not violate DR 7-104(A)(1). 
The lawyer, however, did violate former DR 9-
102(B)(4) by refusing to deliver the will and 
former 9-102(B)(3) by failing to account to the 
former client for $9,000. 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 
awMoso/fr/to+JO 
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Obligations to Third Persons 
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSON 
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - COR-
PORATE E M P L O Y E E S -
Lawyer representing opposing party in 
dispute with corporation may contact former 
employees of corporation, including former 
members of corporation's control group, re* 
garding subject matter of lawsuit without 
consent of corporate attorney. 
Digest of Opinion: An attorney asks whether 
he may communicate with a former employee of 
a corporate party defendant about matters arising 
during the employee's tenure with the corporation 
without the consent of the corporate defendant's 
attorney. He also asks whether the propriety of 
any communication would be affected by the 
former employee's having been a member of the 
corporate control group during the relevant time 
period. 
Rule 7-l04<a)(l) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility states that a lawyer shall not 
"communicate or cause another to communicate 
on the subject of the representation with a party 
he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that 
matter unless he has the prior consent of the 
lawyer representing such other party H When 
the adverse party is an entity, this prohibition is 
complicated by the need to determine which em-
ployees or other agents of the entity should be 
included within the scope of the protection afford-
ed by the rule. 
Most authorities have limited their scope of the 
protection of a corporate party to those manageri-
al or other employees whose actions and state-
ments can bind or be imputed to the corporation. 
This interpretation was recently adopted by the 
Illinois Court of Appeals in Fair Automotive 
Repair v. Cor-X Systems, 128 IIIApp3d 763. I 
U w M i n Prof Conduct 600 (1984). There, the 
court held that for purposes of the Rule 7-
104(a)(1) prohibition, a corporate party consti-
tutes only "those top management persons who 
had the responsibility of making final decisions 
and those employees whose advisory roles to top 
management are such that a decision would not 
normally be made without those persons* advice 
or opinion or whose opinions in fact form the 
basis of any final decision." 
This same reasoning would eicludc former em-
ployees from the scope of the rule's protection, 
even if those employees were formerly part of the 
corporate control group. Since former employees 
are no looter in a position to act or speak on 
behalf of the corporation, direct communication 
with these persons does not deprive the corpora-
tion of legal counsel. However, this rule may 
prohibit direct communication with a former em-
ployee if that person is individually represented 
regarding the matter in question. 
Direct communication with former control 
group employees may result in eliciting informa-
tion adverse to the corporation But this no more 
deprives the corporation of the benefit of counsel 
than does direct communication with any poten-
tial witness. 
(Illinois State Bar Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Responsibility. Opinion 85-12; 4/4/86} 
Private Firm 
DISSOLUTION — W I T H D R A W A L -
Attomeys involved in dissolution of or 
withdrawal from law firm are required to 
give adequate notice of change in employ-
ment status to clients, consistent with cli-
ent's best interests and ethical rules concern-
ing solicitation, and advise clients of their 
right to continue with one of lawyers in-
volved in firm's change or select new 
attorney. 
Digest of Opinion An attorney inquires as to 
the ethical requirements and proscriptions relat-
ing to contacts with clients when a private law 
firm dissolves or when some of the attorneys 
withdraw. The attorney's professional obligation 
to the clients and to his former firm members is 
not expressly defined by the law or by the Rules 
of Professional Conduct The rules in these cir-
cumstances act as a regulatory framework, and 
their provisions dictate that the interests of the 
clients must prevail over all competing 
considerations. 
Rule 2-111(A) requires attorneys to provide for 
an orderly transition in the event of attorney 
withdrawal or dissolution, and to protect the 
clients* interests whenever there is a change in 
the employment status that materially alters the 
representation This rule provides that "a mem-
ber of the State Bar shall not withdraw from 
employment until he has taken steps to avoid 
foreseeable prejudice to . . . his client, including 
giving due notice . . . allowing time for employ-
ment of other counsel, delivering to the client all 
papers and property to which the client is enti-
tled, and complying with applicable law and 
rules" 
The rights and obligations of attorneys in-
volved in the dissolution of, or withdrawal from, a 
law firm are affected by rules governing attorney 
advertising and solicitation Rule 2-101 prohibits 
communications concerning the availability for 
professional employment thai are false, deceptive, 
or misleading. Nevertheless, the rule and the 
authorities interpreting the rule in recent years 
have permitted wide latitude to attorneys who 
wish to communicate directly with existing or 
ial clients for professional employment. See 
v. State Bar, 39 Cal3d 609, I Law.Man 
Prof.Conduct 948 (Cal 1985). 
Similarly, attorneys are prohibited from com-
municating with clients in person, by telephone, 
or through agents acting on their behalf, in an 
attempt to influence the decision of the client 
with respect to the choice of counsel. Rule 2-
101(B) and (C). Nevertheless, if the client directs 
inquiries to any of the attorneys involved in the 
€740-4OStySt/SCK.S0 
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Opinion 86-1 Advertising; Newslet-
ters; NonclienU, lawyer's duty 
toward; Solicitation. A lawyer may 
mail an environmental law newsletter, 
which mentions the name of the law 
firm without an address, to nonclients 
and may represent them if they volun-
tarily contact the firm requesting repre-
sentation. The lawyer must abide by the 
guidelines regarding direct mail adver-
tising. A lawyer may not engage in 
direct follow-up communications to non-
clients concerning specific events. A 
lawyer who writes for the purpose of 
public education should refrain from 
giving a general solution which may be 
misconstrued as applicable to all similar 
problems. Opinion 85-45; DRs 2-101, 2-
103; ECs 2-2,2-3.(8/19/85) 
Opinion 86-2 Criminal representa-
tion; Former clients; Minors; Multi-
ple representation; Relatives. A law-
yer may not represent a party who is 
charged with stealing property belong-
ing to the parents of a minor whom the 
lawyer previously represented. There is 
an inherent conflict of interest in repre-
senting one client against another 
client. Where the former client is a 
minor, the lawyer probably had substan-
tial contact with his parents. Therefore, 
the lawyer cannot represent the new 
potential client, even if all the parties 
consent after full disclosure. Opinions 
78-14, 78-30, DRs MQ5(AXC); Canon 9. 
(11/13/85) 
Opinion 86-4 Attorneys* liens; Es-
crow accounts; Jurisdiction. A lawyer 
may assert a retaining lien for payment 
of his fee on funds that are derived from 
the sale of a clients property and are 
held in escrow. Whether a lien is legally 
proper must be determined by the terms 
of the contract with the client, and is a 
legal issue beyond the scope of the 
committee's jurisdiction. Opinions 77-7, 
81-33,85*4. (undated) 
Opinion 86-8 Attorney-client privi-
lege; Automobile accident case; Con-
fidentiality; Disclosure; Former 
client A lawyer who knows the wherea-
bouts of a former client may not disclose 
that information to another lawyer who 
has filed suit against the former client 
in an automobile accident case and has 
been unable to locate him. A lawyer 
may not disclose a client confidence or 
secret unless the client consents after 
full disclosure, when permitted under 
the Code, or when required by law or 
court order. A lawyer may not disclose 
the whereabouts of a former client 
against whom bench warrants have 
been issued. Opinion 854; DR 4-101; 
ABA U141. (10/11/85) 
Opinion 86-10 Collections; Corpora-
tions; Division of fees; Jurisdiction; 
Legal services; Misrepresentation. A 
lawyer may not participate in a legal 
services plan where a percentage of the 
fee is retained by the referring corpora-
tion. A lawyer or law firm may not 
divide legal fees with a nonlawyer. Law-
yers may provide services through a 
referral program or prepared legal plan 
at reduced fees. The lawyers, however, 
may not misrepresent to the public any 
information about their services. Law-
yers who participate in a lawyer referral 
program may agree to bill for the law-
yers* service through the corporation 
establishing the program and pay a fee 
to the corporation for this collection 
service. The lawyers and the corpora-
tion must carefully abide by the Code 
regarding collection agencies. The cor-
poration may only be paid for nonlegal 
services and may not divide legal fees 
with a participating lawyer. Opinions 
77-54, 85*5; DRs 2-10KA), 2-103, 3-
102(A), 3-103, 5401, 5-103, 5-104, 5-107; 
ABA 254. 
Opinion 86-13 Communication with 
adverse parties; Corporations; Non-
clients, lawyer's duty toward. A law-
yer may communicate with a former 
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employee of an adverse corporate party 
if the former employee is not represent-
ed by counsel. If a lawyer must directly 
communicate with an unrepresented 
person, the lawyer should not provide 
advice, except he may advise him to 
obtain a lawyer. Opinions 83-4, 83-81; 
DR 7-104(AXl); EC 7-18. (8/30/85) 
Opinion 86-14 Discipline; Harass-
ment; Misconduct; Settlements. A 
lawyer may not threaten to file a griev-
ance complaint against an opposing law-
yer in a legal action in order to coerce a 
settlement. A lawyer must report unpri-
vileged knowledge of ethics violations to 
a tribunal. A lawyer may not threaten 
to file a grievance to obtain an advan-
tage in a civil suit or merely to harass 
another party. In his representation of a 
client, a lawyer may not knowingly 
engage in illegal conduct. Grievance 
complaints are designed to protect soci-
ety. Misusing them undermines this 
purpose and could drive a wedge be-
tween a lawyer and his client. Md. Code 
art. 27, §561; DRs 1-102, M03(A), 7-
102(A), 7-105; EC 7-21. (11/14/85) 
Opinion 86-15 Advice to client; Ju-
risdiction. Whether a lawyer should 
have told his client to stop payment on 
checks rendered in partial payment of 
debt is a matter outside the committee's 
jurisdiction. The committee will not 
render an opinion on legal issues or on a 
case pending in court, unless the court 
requests it. (9/13/85) 
Opinion 86-16 Discipline; Harass-
ment; Misconduct; Threat of crimi-
nal prosecution. A lawyer may not 
offer to discontinue a grievance filed by 
his client against the client's former 
lawyer in exchange for the payment of 
money allegedly due from the client's 
former lawyer. If a lawyer has knowl-
edge of the commission's finding of no 
violation he may not send a threatening 
letter. A lawyer shall not take actions 
for his client when he knows or when it 
is obvious that such action would merely 
serve to harass or maliciously injure 
another. Disciplinary proceedings are 
intended to protect the public, not pun-
ish an individual. DRs 7-102(AXl), 7-105. 
(10/14/85) 
Opinion 86-20 Attorney-client privi-
lege; Confidentiality, Disclosure; 
Foreclosures. A lawyer who represent-
ed the mortgagor in a foreclosure may 
not answer inquiries by the lender's 
lawyer about whether he had knowledge 
of certain facts or events concerning the 
foreclosure, unless his client has waived 
the attorney-client privilege. A lawyer 
may not knowingly reveal a confidence 
or secret of his client without his client's 
consent after full disclosure. Here, a 
statement by a lawyer of a lack of 
communication by his client would be a 
revelation of a secret or confidence. The 
lawyer, however, may reveal the confi-
dences if so ordered by a court. DR 4-
101.(12/10/85) 
Opinion 86-21 Divorce; Settlements; 
Threat of criminal prosecution. A 
lawyer may draw up a settlement agree-
ment in which the parties to a divorce 
agree not to press criminal charges 
against each other so long as the crimi-
nal charges were not filed in order to 
gain an advantage in the divorce. A 
lawyer shall not present criminal 
charges solely to obtain an advantage in 
a civil matter. DRs M02(AX5), 7-105(A). 
(9/19/85) 
Opinion 86-22 Advertising; Disci-
pline; Fees; Misrepresentation; Solic-
itation; Television. A lawyer may not 
advertise on television by stating *if you 
win, you don't pay.*' Such an advertise-
ment improperly includes a contingent 
fee rate without mention of possible 
court costs and expenses. The advertise-
ment is likely to mislead and deceive the 
public since it makes only a partial 
disclosure of relevant facts. However, 
merely because such advertisements 
:*2M6 ABA 'SNA Lawyer*' Manual on Pfrofg—ionnl Conduct 
074O4060 SS S0-.5n 
41 
On Professional Conduct 25 
(PeansyHania Bar Association Committee e* Le-
gal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Fcc-
aaal Opinion 15-120; received 1/29/S7) 
Obligations to Third Persons 
COMMUNICATION WITH PERSONS 
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL - COR-
PORATE E M P L O Y E E S -
Lawyer may interview, outside presence of 
corporate opponent's counsel, corporation's 
former or present nonmanagement employ-
ees as well as former management employees 
who were not employed when incident giving 
rise to lawsuit occurred. 
Digest of Opinion. A lawyer inquires as to 
whether he may communicate with the corporate 
employees of an opponent without securing the 
permission of opposing counsel. DR 7-10* pro-
vides in pan that a lawyer may not communicate 
on the subject of the representation with a party 
known to be represented by counsel unless he has 
received the consent of that lawyer or is author-
ized to do so by law. 
A lawyer is permitted to communicate with 
employees of an adverse corporate defendant oth-
er than directors, officers, managing agents, and 
rarsons designated under the West Virginia 
ules of Civil Procedure to speak on behalf of the 
corporation. Any other employee ethically may 
be contacted. Similarly, all directors, officers, 
and managing agents who were employed at the 
time of the incident f iving rise to the lawsuit are 
not subject to inquiry absent approval of the 
corporate attorney or as otherwise authorized by 
law. Other former employees or directors, offi-
cers, and managing agents from other time peri-
ods are subject to such inquiry. 
ABA Informal Opinion 1410 (1978) provides 
basic guidelines for determining whether an offi-
cer or employee should be considered a party for 
the purpose of the rule. 
fWest Virginia State Bar Committee an Legal 
Ethics, Opinio* S741; 1/20/17) 
Private Finn 
WITHDRAWAL - S O U O T A T I O N -
Lawyer withdrawing from law t n » n*Mf 
communicate by telephone or in person with 
clients with whom he has had professional 
relationship to Inform them that he b gftab-
Bshlng new practice and that they have right 
to choose between former firm and new firm 
for legal representation. 
Digest of Opinion: The general proscription 
against solicitation does not preclude a withdraw-
ing lawyer from informing clients of thf firm 
whom he or she personally represented prior to 
his or her separation from the firm Such direct 
contact falls within the exception for persons with 
whom the lawyer has had a prior professional 
relationship. DR 2-104 and Model Rule 7.3. 
It b clear that simple announcements of ne» 
associations are appropriate. 1 ALR4th 1164-
1165. In addition, ethics opinions from other 
jurisdictions have approved of telephone or per-
sonal communications with clients, with whom 
the lawyer has had a professional relationship, to 
inform them of the lawyer's new practice and 
their right to choose between the former firm and 
the lawyer's new firm with respect to legal repre-
sentation. See, e.g.. New York City Opinion 80-
65 (1980). 
(Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committer 
Opinion E-3I7; 1/87) 
Unauthorized Practice 
AIDING UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE 
- L E T T E R H E A D -
Lawyer retained by hospital to collect 
past due accounts may distribute blank let-
terhead to hospital or its agent for purpose 
of typing collection letter that lawyer writes, 
reviews for accuracy, and personally signs. 
Digest of Opinion: A corporation is engaged in 
the business of assisting hospitals in managing 
patient accounts receivable. It sends a series of 
notices in the hospital's name to patients who 
have not paid their bills. These notices become 
increasingly forceful until the last one says that 
the account will be turned over to a lawyer. 
The lawyer then drifts a demand letter with 
information provided by either the hospital or the 
corporation. All the information is routine, such 
as patient name and account number, except that 
the time period within which to respond is stated, 
the amount due is stated, and the hospital's tele-
phone number is listed for questions. The lawyer 
is asked to add any additional provisions required 
by law. The draft letter is typed on the lawyer's 
letterhead by the hospital, the corporation, a 
typing service (not necessarily retained by the 
lawyer), or by the lawyer. 
When the letter is typed somewhere other than 
in the lawyer's office, it is then delivered to the 
lawyer. The letter is reviewed by the lawyer and 
checked against hospital records to ensure that its 
content is accurate and that no payment has yet 
been received on the account or other disposition 
has occurred. The letter is manuall) signed by the 
lawyer and then mailed under the joint supervi-
sion of the hospital and the lawyer to ensure its 
timely mailing and an accurate recording of the 
recipient, the unpaid balance due. and the date 
mailed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Defendants Getty Oil Company and Getty Mining Company 
("Getty") have petitioned the court for an Order to Show Cause 
why sanctions should not be imposed against plaintiff Gold 
Standard, Inc. ("Gold Standard") for its improper ex parte 
contacts with former managerial employees of Getty who were 
involved in the decisions and actions forming the basis of Gold 
Standard's allegations in this case. Gold Standard should not be 
permitted to benefit from these improper contacts and further ex 
parte contacts with former Getty management personnel should be 
prohibited, absent consent from Getty's counsel. 
The Utah Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit ex 
parte contacts of an adversary's former management employees. 
Under the unique circumstances of this case, the damage to Getty 
from such contacts is particularly serious. Getty no longer has 
its own employees and no longer employs any of the management 
personnel who were responsible for negotiating and overseeing the 
Operating Agreement between Getty and Gold Standard which is the 
subject of this litigation. Getty's ability to properly defend 
itself in this lawsuit is dependant upon former management 
employees' testimony regarding their actions while employed by 
Getty. 
Gold Standard's attorneys have contacted and 
interviewed several former management employees and have prepared 
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an affidavit for at least one former employee to sign. Gold 
Standard also has identified additional former management 
employees which its attorneys will contact if permitted by the 
court. The protection against ex parte contact of a "party" by 
an adversary's attorneys is meaningless if all of those who acted 
in behalf of the party respecting the matter in dispute are 
excluded from this protection. In the corporate context, the 
definition of a "party" must be broad enough to protect the 
corporation against contacts with those who effectively 
constitute the party with respect to a particular matter in 
dispute. Under the unique circumstances of this case, allowing 
unrestrained ex parte contacts with former Getty employees is 
equivalent to allowing unrestrained contact of all of a typical 
corporation's current and former employees. 
Getty attempted to remedy the situation without 
resort to the court by consistently objecting to ex parte 
contacts with former Getty employees by Gold Standard's 
attorneys. Upon learning of the full extent and on-going nature 
of the ex parte contacts, including the October, 1987 meetings 
with Hautala, Getty promptly filed this Petition seeking a court 
order to remedy past injury and prevent future improper contacts. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Subsequent to the filing of Getty's initial 
"Memorandum in Support of its Petition for An Order to Show 
Cause" (hereinafter "Getty's Initial Memorandum"), Gold Standard 
has deposed former Getty employees, Robert Hautala and Charles 
Kundert, and has submitted affidavits opposing Getty's Petition. 
The following additional facts not set forth in Getty's Initial 
Memorandum are relevant. 
Both Hautala and Kundert testified in their 
depositions that they occupied positions of significant 
managerial responsibility at Getty in overseeing the Mercur 
project. Hautala served as Production Manager for Getty Oil's 
United States Mineral District and was responsible for all United 
States projects, including the Mercur project. Deposition of 
Robert L. Hautala (hereafter "Hautala Deposition"), dated 
December 3, 1987, at 11. Charles J. Kundert was the Minerals 
Engineering Manager responsible for all of the engineering 
functions of the mining group. Deposition of Charles J. Kundert 
(hereafter "Kundert Deposition"), dated December 2, 1987, at 7-
9. 
Hautala and Kundert both testified that they had 
contacts with Getty attorneys while employed by Getty. Hautala's 
attorney-client communications were so pervasive that he 
testified he is presently unable to distinguish between 
information he obtained from Getty's attorneys and information he 
obtained from others. Hautala Deposition at 66*68. Indeed, 
Hautala had almost daily contact with Getty's attorneys, usually 
for the purpose of seeking legal advice. Id. at 18-22. Kundert 
testified that he also had contact with Getty attorneys, in a 
context suggesting that he also was privy to attorney-client 
communications, although he could not recall specific information 
that would be privileged. Kundert Deposition at 28*29, 34-35.1 
Scott Smith, Gold Standard's president, submitted an 
affidavit in which he testified that he has spoken with other 
former Getty employees, including Charles Trimble and Cecil H. 
Smith, who he claims are willing to meet privately with Gold 
Standard's attorneys. Affidavit of Scott L. Smith (hereafter 
"Smith Affidavit"), % 6. Getty believes that each of these 
individuals was party to numerous attorney client communications 
and played central roles in the Mercur project.2 Moreover, Mr. 
Smith further testified that "[t]here are numerous other former 
Getty employees that [he] would like Gold Standard's attorneys to 
contact [regarding matters connected to this lawsuit]." Smith 
Affidavit, % 6. Thus, not only have improper contacts already 
occurred, but additional contacts will occur absent a court order 
prohibiting the same. 
1
 Copies of the relevant sections of the deposition 
transcripts of Hautala and Kundert are attached hereto as 
Exhibits "A" and "B" respectively. 
2
 Charles Trimble was Getty's District Minerals Landman who 
assisted in negotiating the terms of the Operating Agreement 
between Getty and Gold Standard. Cecil H. Smith was District 
Minerals Exploration Manager for Getty at the time of the 
original contract negotiations. The attorney that both of them 
communicated with extensively was Royal Peterson, an in-house 
lawyer who is now deceased. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS GETTY'S PETITION FOR AN 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
Gold Standard attempts to discredit Getty by accusing 
Getty of making "false factual assertions" to support its 
Petition. Such accusations, however, are simply not supported by 
the evidence. Gold Standard first asserts that there is no basis 
for Getty's claim that Kundert and Hautala were privy to 
attorney-client communications. Gold Standard attempts to 
support its position by reference to Kundert's testimony that he 
was uncertain of the extent to which he was privy to attorney-
client communications. Contrary to Gold Standard's selective and 
misleading quotations, however, Mr. Kundert did not "testify 
unequivocally" "that he was not a party to attorney-client 
communications relating to the Mercur project while employed at 
Getty." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 4 (emphasis in original). 
Rather, Kundert's testimony indicates that he regularly met with 
Getty attorneys at least several times a month and had 
responsibility for several litigation matters, Kundert Deposition 
at 27-28, but could not recall the extent or content of his 
contacts concerning the Mercur project. Kundert Deposition at 
34-35. 
For example, Mr. Kundert testified that he recalled 
speaking with Jack Sample, a Getty attorney, but could not 
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remember the content of the conversations. Kundert Deposition at 
33. In addition, he testified that he may have had other 
contacts with counsel for Getty: 
Q (By Mr. Lowrie) Aside from the 
possibility of discussion of Mercur with 
Mr. Sample with respect to the 10-K, are 
you able to affirmatively tell me that 
you did not discuss Mercur with lawyers, 
including Mr. Sample, prior to October 1, 
1980. 
A I can't be that positive because at 
that meeting which you asked about 
earlier, when I met Mr. Smith the only 
time, there was a lawyer there. I think 
— I'm sure Getty had a lawyer there and 
maybe in the ensuing few weeks after that 
I may have talked to one of our lawyers. 
That's the only time I can remember. 
Kundert Deposition at 34-35. It is not surprising that Mr. 
Kundert could not clearly remember the extent of his contacts 
with Getty attorneys nor his participation in privileged 
communications without an opportunity to refr4esh his 
recollection. Mr. Hautala similarly could not recall specific 
privileged communications. He testified that while he regularly 
sought out the advice of Getty attorneys and had almost daily 
contact with Getty attorneys, Hautala Deposition at 20-22, he 
could not remember the specifics of those attorney contacts 
without a chance to refresh his memory. Hautala Deposition at 
49-50. The risk of ex parte communications in the instance of 
Mr. Hautala is underscored by his inability to distinguish, 
without refreshing his recollection, between privileged and non-
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privileged sources of information. Hautala Deposition at 66-68. 
Even though Mr. Kundert's exposure to privileged communications 
was less frequent than Mr. Hautala's, the testimony indicates 
that there were in fact such communications. Furthermore, this 
testimony emphasizes the inadequacy of requiring that Getty rely 
on the former employees themselves to be responsible for 
protecting Getty's privilege. 
Moreover, Getty's log of privileged documents 
substantiates that both Kundert and Hautala were parties to a 
number of protected written communications. Of course, since 
communications need not be written to be protected, the privilege 
log is only a partial listing of privileged communications which 
Getty has a right to protect.3 
Gold Standard's interviews with these individuals are 
even more disturbing in light of their testimony that neither was 
ever asked not to reveal privileged communications. Hautala 
Deposition at 81-82, Kundert Deposition at 51. 
Gold Standard additionally accuses Getty of making 
false assertions regarding the content of the contact between 
Gold Standard and former Getty employees.4 This accusation is 
3
 A copy of relevant portions of Getty's privilege log is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "0". 
4
 Gold Standard does admit, however, that it has placed its 
own interpretation on language selectively drawn from Getty's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Gold Standard's Motion to Continue 
Hearing and to Permit Limited Discovery (hereafter "Getty's 
Memorandum Opposing a Continuance*) in order to arrive at its 
similarly without basis. Because Getty was not a party to these 
communications and is not privy to the full extent of Gold 
Standard's contacts with former Getty employees, Getty has made 
no representations regarding the actual content of these 
communications. See Getty's Initial Memorandum at 4. 
Gold Standard takes several sentences out of context 
from Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance to support its 
claim that Getty falsely asserted that Gold Standard had in fact 
obtained privileged communications from former Getty personnel. 
Gold Standard failed to mention, however, that the sentence 
preceding the language quoted by Gold Standard expressly 
qualified Getty's position: 
To the extent that Gold Standard has 
improperly communicated with former Getty 
employees and received confidential 
communications o£ other evidence, Getty's 
rights will continue to be impaired and 
Getty may be further injured if this 
information is used as the foundation for 
additional discovery. 
Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance at 3 (emphasis added).5 
accusations. See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 6 n.3. 
5
 All of the language quoted by Gold Standard comes from 
Getty's Memorandum Opposing a Continuance of the hearing 
originally scheduled on this matter. It was Getty's intent to 
emphasize that a further delay in bringing this matter before the 
court might be adverse to Getty's interests. For that reason, 
Getty had to identify the potential ways in which it might be 
injured by further delay. significantly, Gold Standard did not 
identify any similar "assertions" in Getty's Initial Memorandum 
which addresses the substantive issues currently before the 
court. 
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In any event, besides being clearly erroneous, Gold 
Standard's argument that Kundert and Hautala were not privy to 
privileged communications is irrelevant to Getty's position,6 
Getty maintains that the contacts, regardless of content, were 
improper and, further, that Getty should be able to protect its 
own attorney client privilege without relying on others. 
Although Gold Standard continues to represent that it has 
resisted discussion of privileged information, Gold Standard's 
attorneys admit that they contacted Joseph Berg III, a former 
Getty attorney, in an attempt to speak with him privately. 
Lowrie Affidavit, % 3. The fact that Berg declined to meet with 
them does not alter the fact that they contacted him and were 
willing to discuss the case with him. This fact unequivocally 
colors the reliability of the assurances given. 
b
 The Affidavits of Gold Standard attorneys George W. Pratt 
and James S. Lowrie, as well as the depositions of Kundert and 
Hautala raise a number of similarly irrelevant issues. First, it 
is irrelevant whether or not the former employees approached Gold 
Standard's attorneys on their own initiative or whether the 
attorneys made the first contact. Whether the attorney's solicit 
the contact or merely accept an invitation, the contact is 
improper. See e.g.. Shelton v. Hess, 599 F. Supp. 905, 911 (S.D. 
Tex. 1984). 
Second, the fact that the former employees do not 
claim that they were harassed or intimidated does not make the 
contact proper* 
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II. EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER MANAGERIAL 
EMPLOYEES IS PROHIBITED UNDER THE UTAH 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
Despite the myriad of arguments advanced by Gold 
Standard, the express language of the Comment to Rule 4.2 of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct makes it clear that ex parte 
contact with former managerial employees of a corporation is 
improper. The Rule prohibits contact with current managerial 
employees and 
any other person whose act or omission in 
connection with the matter [in dispute] 
may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil or criminal liability 
or whose statement may constitute an 
admission on the part of the 
organization. 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 4.2, comment (1988) (emphasis 
added). Gold Standard focuses solely on the straw man of whether 
the present statements of former employees can bind or be imputed 
to the corporation. The sentence in the Comment, however, is 
disjunctive. Statements which may constitute admissions form 
only the second part of the disjunction. The first part does not 
apply to present statements but to acts or omissions in 
connection with the matter in representation. As such, it covers 
former, as well as current, employees. 
Gold Standard would have the court effectively alter 
the language of the comment to read "any other current employee." 
The comment, however, contains no such limitation and expressly 
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covers "any other person* whose act or omission in connection 
with the subject of the litigation can be imputed to the 
corporation. Because litigation invariably involves matters 
which occurred prior to the filing of the lawsuit, as often as 
not, those whose acts or omissions can be imputed to an 
organization in connection with the dispute will no longer work 
for the organization. The permissibility of ex parte contacts 
ought not to depend upon the fortuitous factor of whether an 
employee remains employed throughout the litigation. 
Gold Standard's Memorandum completely 
mischaracterizes the relevant consideration. Gold Standard first 
argues in Section IV.A. of its Memorandum that the "current 
statements" of former Getty employees cannot possibly "bind" 
Getty as admissions."7 Plaintiff's Memorandum at 16. It next 
argues in Section IV.B. that the statements of former employees 
cannot be imputed to Getty. Plaintiff's Memorandum at 22. This 
is little more than a restatement of the first argument. Gold 
Standard's misunderstanding of Getty's argument is demonstrated 
by its erroneous restatement of Getty's position: 
In Getty's view# the fact that a former 
employee once possessed speaking 
authority means, contrary to common 
sense, that his current statements can 
7
 Getty acknowledges that the weight of authority 
interpreting Rule 801(d)(2)(E) of the Rules of Evidence has found 
that only current employees can makes statements which will bind 
the corporation. That, however, is not the issue here. 
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still be "imputed" to his employer within 
the meaning of the Rule [4.2]. 
Plaintiff's Memorandum at 23 (emphasis in original).8 
Getty's argument is not directed toward former 
managerial employees' current statements. Rather, consistent 
with the comment to Rule 4,2, Getty's argument is that the "act 
or omission" of a former managerial employee in connection with a 
matter in dispute "may be imputed to the organization for 
purposes of civil and criminal liability." The language of the 
Comment to Rule 4.2 includes former managerial employees who had 
responsibilities related to the Mercur project. Gold Standard 
essentially admits this in its Memorandum: "Getty is correct in 
its assertion that plaintiff will attempt to "impute" to Getty 
any favorable evidence it may learn by interviewing former Getty 
B
 See also Id. at 26 ("The former Getty employees are now 
people who have knowledge of what Getty did. Although they can 
describe past conduct that may have been binding on Getty when it 
occurred, they presently have no authority to bind Getty") 
(emphasis added). 
Again Gold Standard focuses only on present 
statements and neglects to identify the individuals whose past 
conduct may be binding on Getty. If Gold Standard truly believes 
that a former management employee's "act or omission in 
connection with th[is] matter" cannot "be imputed to the 
organization [Getty] for purposes of civil liability" in this 
case, then Getty asks that Gold Standard so stipulate. Getty 
believes that Gold Standard would be unwilling to enter such a 
stipulation because it intends to impute former managerial 
employees' actions to Getty. See Plaintiff's Memorandum at 25. 
Gold Standard cannot have it both ways. Either the Comment to 
Rule 4.2 expressly includes former management employees or acts 
or omissions of former Getty management employees, as a matter of 
law, cannot be imputed to Getty for purposes of civil liability. 
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employees." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 25. What Gold Standard 
fails to mention is that the "favorable evidence" might include 
the "acts or omissions" of the former employee being interviewed. 
Recognizing the impact of the express language of the 
Comment to Rule 4.2, Gold Standard criticizes it as "vague and 
poorly worded." Gold Standard would apparently have the court 
ignore the Comment on that basis. It should be remembered that 
this Comment has been subjected to the promulgation and 
refinement of a number of autonomous groups, including final 
approval and adoption by the Utah Supreme Court.9 A contention 
that the Comment is poorly worded suggests merely that Gold 
Standard is dissatisfied with the result of its clear mandate in 
this case. The Comment cannot simply be ignored or disregarded 
because Gold Standard believes it is poorly worded. 
The current employment status of an employee is 
irrelevant. The relevant distinction is whether or not the 
individual's prior acts or omissions can be used to bind the 
corporation. This is equivalent to the distinction between a 
bystander and non-bystander witness. A bystander witness is one 
9
 Over a six-year period and following a number of drafts, 
the American Bar Association adopted Rule 4.2 and its 
accompanying comment as part of the ABA Model Rules in 1983. An 
ad hoc committee appointed by the Utah Supreme Court recommended 
adoption of the ABA Model Rules with suggested alterations. The 
Supreme Court accepted, rejected, or modified in part the 
suggested alterations. Finally, the Rules were submitted to the 
entire bar for comment. Following this procedure, the Rules were 
formally adopted by the Utah Supreme Court as of January 1, 1988. 
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who witnessed, but was not otherwise participating, in an event. 
A non-bystander witness on the other hand is one whose actions or 
involvement may have contributed to the existence of the 
potential liability. In actions involving individuals, everyone 
but the individual himself is a bystander witness. In actions 
involving corporations, some current and former employees are 
bystander witnesses while other current and former employees are 
non-bystander witnesses. Employees who constitute the party are 
distinguishable from bystander witnesses by their authority to 
commit the organization to a position regarding the subject 
matter of the litigation. 
In the case of a corporation, unfair advantage may be 
obtained by contacting either (1) those who can presently bind 
the corporation; or (2) those whose actions could bind the 
corporation respecting a matter which occurred previously and 
which is now the subject of litigation. The operative critical 
factor in either case is not current employment status but the 
potential of the person to bind the corporation; either through 
current statements or as a result of past actions. 
Contrary to the assertions of Gold Standard, the 
cases, with one exception, are consistent with this approach.10 
In support of its position that the Comment to Rule 4.2 covers 
1 0
 Wright v. Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 691 
P.2d 564 (1984), rejected the approach required by the Comment to 
Rule 4.2. For reasons discussed below, the reasoning of Wright 
should not be applied by the court in this case. 
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only current employees, Gold Standard cites Massa v. Eaton Corp.. 
109 F.R.D. 312 (W.D. Mich 1985). Massa. however, is completely 
inapposite to this case. In Massa, the district court reversed a 
magistrate's ruling which allowed ex parte contact with current 
managerial employees, holding that such contacts were 
impermissible under DR 7-104(A)(1). Nowhere in the opinion does 
the court limit its ruling to current employees or in anyway 
distinguish current employees from former employees. 
Gold Standard also relies heavily upon Amarin 
Plastics, Inc. v. Maryland Cup Corp.. 116 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass 
1987). Amarin does not, however, support Gold Standard's 
position. As was explained in Getty's Initial Memorandum at 11-
12 n.7, the former corporate president with whom the court 
permitted ex parte contact in Amarin "left the employ of the 
defendant prior to the contract dispute that form[ed] the basis 
of the litigation." Amarin. 116 F.R.D. at 40 (emphasis added). 
Thus, the critical fact was not the corporate president's status 
as a former employee, but the fact that he was not in any way 
involved with the contract dispute forming the basis of the 
litigation. His acts or omissions, therefore, could not be 
imputed to the corporation for purposes of the civil liability 
involved in the case.11 
11 The court in Amarin distinguished the situation from that 
in Sperber v. Washington Heiahts-W. Harlem-Inwood Mental Health 
Council. Inc., Civ. No. 82-7428 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1983) vacated 
and withdrawn, a situation much closer to this case. In so 
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The other cases cited by Gold Standard are similarly 
inapposite or are actually supportive of Getty's position. In 
Frey v. Department of Health and Human Servs.. 106 F.R.D. 32 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (magistrate's order), a woman brought a sex 
discrimination action against her employer, a government agency. 
The plaintiff agreed "not to have any ex parte communication with 
the high level managerial employees responsible for the 
employment decision at issue . . . ." Id. at 34. In ruling on 
the plaintiff's right to ex parte contacts, the magistrate agreed 
that "at least the high level managerial employees who 
participated in the decision not to promote plaintiff fall within 
[the definition of 'party']." Id. at 35. The court in Frey made 
no attempt to distinguish former employees in its ruling. To the 
extent Frev is interpreted to cover former employees, there is no 
basis to assume that the court would have permitted interviews 
with former "managerial employees who participated in the 
decision." Moreover, the court in Frey recognized that a broader 
definition may be appropriate where the government is not a 
party: "There is even stronger reason to construe the term 
"party" in DR 7-104 narrowly in the case where the defendant is a 
government employer." Id. at 37. 
doing, the court assumed without deciding that the language of 
the Comment to Rule 4.2 was broad enough to cover former 
managerial employees. Id. 
§et-*009 .pis 16 
In Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp.. 1106 F.R.D. 414 
(D. Mass. 1986) (magistrate's order), the plaintiff brought an 
employment discrimination case against Lotus, alleging that he 
was wrongfully terminated because of his race. Part of Lotus' 
asserted reason for terminating plaintiff was its claim that 
plaintiff pressured female employees for sexual favors. 
Plaintiff's counsel wanted to conduct ex parte interviews with 
the female employees who complained of advances by the plaintiff. 
However, the employees involved were not managerial employees 
responsible for the decision to terminate the plaintiff's 
employment. The magistrate's ruling therefore made no reference 
to managerial employees or former employees.12 
The only case actually supporting Gold Standard's 
position is Wright v. Group Health Hospital. 103 Wash. 2d 192, 
691 P.2d 564 (1984). However, although the ruling in Wright was 
framed in broad terms, the issue before this court was never 
before the court in Wright. The plaintiff in Wright wanted to 
conduct ex parte interviews with nurses at a hospital regarding 
1 2
 Judge Daniels in Allen Steel Co. v. Okland-Fouloer Co. . 
Civ. No. C-80-9512 (Third Dist. Ct. May 4, 1984), permitted ex 
parte contact with specifically identified classes of lower level 
former employees. Even so, Judge Daniels precluded admission in 
the trial of any evidence obtained through such ex parte 
contacts. The Allen Steel opinion did not involve mid-level and 
upper management employees similarly situated to those involved 
in this case. Where low-level employees are involved there is 
not the same danger that their past actions will be imputed to 
the corporation or that they have been party to confidential 
attorney-client communications. 
get-g009.pis 17 
an alleged incident of medical malpractice involving the 
plaintiff's labor and delivery of a baby. The court noted that 
the plaintiff's attorney limited his request by seeking the 
*right to interview ex parte both current and former Group Health 
employees so long as they were not management employees." Id. at 
566 (emphasis added). 
The court in Wright made only parenthetical mention 
of the Comment to Rule 4.2. The court's position makes it clear 
that it declined to adopt the provisions of the Comment: 
We find no reason to distinguish between 
employees who in fact witnessed an event 
and those whose act or omission caused 
the event leading to the action. 
Wright. 691 P.2d at 569. This is an express rejection of the 
approach taken by the Comment to Rule 4.2 and is the only case of 
which Getty is aware which has taken this position. 
As described in Getty's Initial Memorandum and 
acknowledged by Gold Standard in its Memorandum, the federal 
district court for the district of Montana held in Porter v. Arco 
Metals Co., 642 F. Supp. 1116 (D. Mont. 1986), that the plaintiff 
could not conduct ex parte interviews with "present or former 
employees with managerial responsibilities concerning the matter 
in litigation. . . ." Id. at 1118 (emphasis added). Subsequent 
to Getty's initial Memorandum, the federal district court for the 
district of Kansas has reached a similar ruling. Chancellor v. 
Boeing Co.. Civ. No. 85-6131, F. Supp. , 1988 U.S. Dist. 
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LEXIS 1030 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1988) (a copy of which is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "D"). Acknowledging that the court in Wright 
had held otherwise, the court stated that, #[w]hen a former 
employee's acts or omission in connection with the matter in 
representation may be imputed to the corporation, then he or she 
may be a 'party.'" LEXIS Slip op. at 5 (citing Amarin. Sperber, 
and MGM Grand).13 
1 3
 Because of the absence of broad support for its position 
in judicial decisions, Gold Standard places considerable emphasis 
on selected advisory opinions of committees of various state bar 
associations. These opinions, however, which Gold Standard 
admits are split, are of no precedential value. Such opinions 
are not rendered in an adjudicative or adversarial context. 
Thus, they are decided without the benefit of briefing or 
argument. Cf. Surety Title Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State 
Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298, 301 (E.D. Va. 1977) vacated and remanded 
on other grounds, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978); Consumers Union 
of United States, Inc. v. American Bar Assoc, 427 F. Supp. 506, 
514 (E.D. Va. 1976) vacated and remanded on other grounds, 438 
U.S. 917 (1977). They are advisory only and are not binding on 
the courts of even the state whose bar association produced them. 
See e.g., In re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky State Bar Assoc, 
361 S.W.2d 111 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962). 
Moreover, none of the opinions cited by Gold Standard 
include any factual background and, in most instances, are not 
even based on specific factual circumstances. This makes it 
impossible to analogize to or distinguish from such opinions. 
££. Black v. State of Mo.. 492 F. Supp. 848, 861, 874-75 (W.D. 
Mo. 1980). 
Finally, a review of the abstracts provided by Gold 
Standard reveals that only the abstract of the Colorado Opinion 
even mentions the existence of the Comment to Rule 4.2, and then 
only as a secondary citation regarding a separate issue. The 
only reasoning evident in the digest of the Colorado Opinion is 
the Committee's conclusion that *[a]fter leaving the 
organization's employ a former employee cannot bind the 
organization as a matter of law." The Comment to Rule 4.2, 
however, makes it clear that a person's ability to. bind the 
corporation by his or her statements is only one part of the 
coverage of the rule. 
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III. GOLD STANDARD'S CLAIMED INTERESTS DO NOT 
JUSTIFY PAST OR FUTURE EX PARTE CONTACTS 
WITH GETTY'S FORMER MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES. 
Gold Standard argues that it has "an important, 
judicially recognized interest in conducting informal discovery•" 
Specifically, Gold Standard argues that "litigation can be 
conducted more economically and expeditiously if counsel may 
informally interview the individuals who have knowledge of the 
pertinent facts." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 14-15. 
These interests provide no basis for conducting 
otherwise impermissible ex parte contacts with former Getty 
management. In this case, these interests will be, at best, only 
minimally aided by a right to conduct ex parte interviews. 
Numerous individuals will yet be deposed in this action, 
including Hautala and Kundert whom Gold Standard has already 
contacted ex parte. In Scott Smith's Affidavit, he indicates 
that he has spoken with Robert Blair, Charles Trimble and Cecil 
Smith, all former Getty employees who have indicated a 
willingness to meet privately with Gold Standard's attorneys. 
However, Gold Standard has not represented that ex parte contact 
with these individuals will eliminate the need to depose any of 
them. In fact, there is little doubt that all of these former 
Getty employees will be deposed whether or not this court allows 
ex parte contact by Gold Standard's counsel. Aside from the 
purely tactical advantage of meeting with ,these individuals 
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outside the presence of Getty's counsel, Gold Standard has not 
demonstrated that costs or time will be significantly reduced by 
conducting ex parte interviews. 
In addition, Gold Standard's argument proves too 
much. Almost all ethics and discovery rules potentially may 
increase the expense and decrease the convenience of the parties 
to litigation. Expense and convenience are relevant only if the 
rule specifically takes such considerations into account or if 
the expense and inconvenience are particularly exceptional and 
onerous. Otherwise, the rules would become little more than 
suggestions which could be swept aside at the first sign of 
expense or burden on a party. For example, some conflicts of 
interest require an attorney to withdraw from representation 
after expending considerable time and resources in behalf of a 
client. Time and expense, however, do not justify ignoring or 
tolerating such a conflict. See, e.g.. Marcrulies v. Upchurch, 
696 P.2d 1195, 1205 (Utah 1985) (disqualifying party's counsel 
despite the "considerable hardship" "thereby imposed on [the 
plaintiffs]"). 
The two cases cited by Gold Standard in support of 
its efficiency argument, Frey v. Department of Department of 
Health and Human Services, 106 F.R.D. 32 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) and 
Mompoint v. Lotus Development Corp., 116 F.R.D. 414 (D. Mass, 
1986), are completely inapposite. Both cases involved single 
individuals who brought employment discrimination actions against 
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their employer or former employer. Neither case involved 
attempts to interview former managerial employees. 
The consideration of cost and the interest of justice 
discussed in those cases must be viewed under the peculiar facts 
of each case. For example, in Frey, a woman brought a sex 
discrimination claim against her employer, the Social Security 
Administration. The court's discussion of costs is narrowly 
tailored to the peculiar facts of the case: 
[T]o permit the SSA to barricade huge 
numbers of potential witnesses from 
interviews except through costly 
discovery procedures, may well frustrate 
the right of an individual plaintiff with 
limited resources to a fair trial and 
deter other litigants from pursuing their 
legal remedies. 
Id. at 36 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Mompoint. the 
plaintiff seeking to interview current employees was a terminated 
employee bringing an employment discrimination suit based upon 
race and ethnic origin. Unlike the plaintiffs in Frev and 
Mompoint, the plaintiff in this case is a corporation seeking a 
huge judgment against other corporations. "Costly discovery 
procedures" are an ongoing and unavoidable element of this case 
and Gold Standard has offered no evidence that the number of 
depositions or the quantity of written discovery will be reduced 
as a result of ex parte contacts. Furthermore, the societal 
interests in this case are less than in race and sex 
discrimination cases where procedural roadblocks can 
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significantly deter vindication of federally created rights of 
action. Finally, neither Frey nor Mompoint involved attempted 
interviews of managerial employees who participated in events 
forming the basis of the litigation. 
Getty's interest in its right to effective use of 
counsel, on the other hand, is significant. Because of 
subsequent events, unrelated to this case, Getty no longer 
employs any of the management personnel who were responsible for 
negotiating and implementing the agreement between Getty and Gold 
Standard. Getty's right to effective use of counsel requires 
that it be able to protect its interests by being present when 
those who acted in its behalf are questioned or asked to sign 
affidavits regarding the events which occurred while they were in 
the employ of Getty. 
Although Gold Standard argues that its purpose in 
conducting ex parte interviews is to facilitate fact finding and 
expedite preliminary investigation, the Affidavit of Charles J. 
Kundert, prepared by Gold Standard in conjunction with its ex 
parte interview of Kundert, demonstrates that Gold Standard's 
intent goes beyond fact finding. Kundert's Affidavit includes 
statements reflecting Kundert's view that the engineering study 
prepared by Bechtel was not intended to be a "Final Bankable 
Document" and his understanding that Bechtel did not consider its 
engineering study to be a feasibility study. Affidavit of 
Charles J. Kundert at % 11 (a copy of which is attached as 
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Exhibit "E"). Additional statements in the Affidavit suggest 
that others at Getty questioned whether or not a "feasibility 
study" existed for the Mercur Project. I£. at H 8, 11. In his 
deposition, however, Kundert testified that he also told Gold 
Standard's attorneys that he personally did consider the Bechtel 
study to constitute a feasibility study under the Operating 
Agreement. Kundert Deposition at 54-56. This critical aspect of 
Kundert's communication with Gold Standard's attorneys was not 
included in the Affidavit even though it was directly relevant to 
the subject matter of the Affidavit. The selective nature of the 
evidence set forth in the Affidavit reveals Gold Standard's 
intent to use the ex parte interviews with former Getty personnel 
as a strategic tool against Getty, rather than simply as an 
informal fact-gathering tool. It also emphasizes the inequity of 
permitting Gold Standard to continue or make use of ex parte 
contracts of witnesses that will be closely identified with Getty 
at trial. In this particular circumstance, the policy of the 
rule as an attempt to prevent overreaching by the lawyers applies 
as significantly to former employees as it does to current 
employees. 
No case cited by Gold Standard has allowed ex parte 
contact with management level personnel, current or former, based 
on considerations of economy and efficiency. Such contacts are 
improper absent the consent of Getty's counsel. 
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IV. GETTY'S ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE CAN BE PROTECTED 
ONLY BY PROHIBITING EX PARTE CONTACT WITH FORMER 
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES. 
Gold Standard erroneously argues that the "evidence 
plainly demonstrates that former Getty employees can be 
interviewed without any risk of intrusion upon Getty's attorney-
client privilege." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 29. However, the 
facts, as admitted by Gold Standard, demonstrate the risk to 
Getty's privilege in allowing ex parte contact with former 
employees. 
Gold Standard acknowledges that if ex parte contacts 
are permitted, Getty must rely on its former employees or Gold 
Standard's attorneys to protect its privilege. Gold Standard 
represents, however, that it is capable of protecting Getty from 
disclosure of privileged information by former Getty employees. 
This position is wholly inconsistent with the premises underlying 
our adversary system.14 Our adversary system presupposes that 
each party is entitled to its own individual, zealous 
representation. Gold Standard's proposition that it would 
protect Getty's privilege would seem to place Gold Standard in 
the position of representing interests at odds with each other. 
1 4
 Indeed, the assumptions behind the adversary system 
require that the party to whom a privilege belongs is the party 
entitled to assert that privilege. For example, parties 
routinely conduct privilege review of documents and create 
privilege logs rather than simply producing privileged documents 
and relying on their adversaries to honor the privilege. 
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It is further an inadequate solution for former Getty 
employees to be expected to protect the privilege on behalf of 
Getty* Privileged communications between Getty's counsel and 
former employees during said employees' tenure with Getty remain 
subject to the privilege until and unless the privilege is waived 
by Getty's current management.15 However, once privileged 
information is divulged by a former employee, even if the 
privilege is not deemed officially waived, the damage is done. 
Moreover, as was revealed during the deposition of 
Hautala, memories of former employees are often vague and may 
need to be refreshed to recognize the source of the information 
inquired about. In addition, such non-lawyer employees may not 
have a full understanding of the parameters of the privilege. 
Hautala Deposition at 75. Thus, it is entirely possible that 
1 5
 The Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of which 
corporate actors are empowered to waive a corporation's attorney-
client privilege in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Weintraub. 471 U.S. 343, 105 S.Ct. 1986 (1985). While Weintraub 
centered on the issue of the ability to assert the privilege in 
the context of a bankruptcy, the principles enunciated therein 
are controlling as to whether former employees of a solvent 
corporation have the ability to waive or assert the privilege. 
In discussing the applicability of the privilege to a bankrupt 
corporation, the Court began with the proposition that "in 
solvent corporations, the power to waive the corporate attorney-
client privilege rests with the corporation's management." Id. 
at 1991. "[W]hen control of a corporation passes to new 
management, the authority to assert and waive the corporation's 
attorney-client privilege passes as well." I£. Therefore, 
*[d]isplaced managers may not assert the privilege over the 
wishes of current managers, even as to statements that the former 
might have made to counsel concerning matters within the scope of 
their corporate duties." Id. 
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privileged information could be inadvertently divulged, 
regardless of the best efforts of Gold Standard's counsel and the 
former employee involved.16 The ethical rules are designed to 
prevent entirely such a possibility. Cf. Emle Industries. Inc. 
v. Patentex. Inc. 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2nd Cir. 1973) ("[a] 
lawyer's good faith, although essential in all his professional 
activity, is nevertheless, an inadequate safeguard [for 
protecting confidential information] when standing alone"). 
Thus, the mere possibility that confidential information may be 
divulged mandates that Getty's Petition be granted, regardless of 
whether any intentional disclosure of privileged information has, 
in fact, occurred in the past. 
Finally, Gold Standard suggests that Getty's position 
somehow encroaches on the free speech rights of former employees. 
As to privileged material, preventing disclosure by former 
employees is no more an encroachment on free speech rights than 
preventing disclosure by a current employee or the attorney 
involved in the communication. Certainly, Gold Standard is not 
suggesting that an attorney or employee of the corporation has a 
right to disclose privileged corporate communications at will. 
In any event, the restrictions of DR 7-104 and Rule 4.2 apply to 
1 6
 Parties routinely rely on their counsel to assist them in 
identifying and protecting privileged information. Allowing Gold 
Standard to engage in ex parte communications with former Getty 
employees will rob Getty of the opportunity for this type of assistance. 
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the attorney undertaking the ex parte communication, not to the 
current or former corporate employee being interviewed. 
V. THE SANCTIONS WHICH GETTY SEEKS ARE APPROPRIATE AND 
NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
Without citing to any authority, Gold Standard argues 
emphatically that the sanctions sought by Getty are 
inappropriate. Getty has petitioned the court to issue an order 
prohibiting further ex parte contacts and requiring Gold Standard 
to turn over to Getty those items which have resulted from 
improper contacts. These sanctions are appropriate. 
The courts have the authority and responsibility to 
remedy violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
which occur in the course of a case by imposing sanctions against 
a party and its attorneys. See Maraulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 
1195 (Utah 1985) (disqualifying plaintiff's attorneys for 
violations of Canons 4, 5, and 9 of the former Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility) . In Musicus v. Westinahouse 
Electric Corp.. 621 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1980), the court stated: 
The district court was incorrect in 
its view that breaches of attorney-client 
privileges or other ethical duties can 
only be raised in separate grievance 
proceedings brought against counsel, 
[citation omitted]. A district court is 
obliged to take measures against 
unethical conduct occurring in connection 
with any proceeding before it. 
Id. at 744. 
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This power to enforce ethical violations includes the 
ability to impose sanctions which are less drastic than 
disqualification, including exclusion of evidence and discovery 
of work-product. See Bruske v. Arnold, 44 111. 2d 132, 254 
N.E.2d 453 (1969), cert, denied, 398 U.S. 905 (1970) (statement 
obtained in violation of Canon 9 excluded for all purposes from 
trial)(a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "F"). The 
court in Bruske stated: 
In reaching this opinion, we are not unmindful 
that rules of discovery should not necessarily 
operate as exclusionary rules of evidence or that 
separate procedures exist for the regulation and 
discipline of unethical conduct on the part of 
attorneys. Rules, however, to be effective must 
carry an appropriate sanction; otherwise, the orderly 
process of a lawsuit is left to the mercy of the 
individual's sense of justice. We deem that the 
appropriate sanction in this instance was the 
exclusion from evidence of the statement. 
Id. at 456. See also United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110, 112 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied. 412 U.S. 932 (1973) (excluding from 
evidence a statement obtained in violation of DR 7-104 in a 
criminal case, the court stated: "To hold otherwise would be to 
overlook conduct which violated both the letter and the spirit of 
the canons of ethics"). 
Furthermore, it is appropriate to impose the 
sanctions against the party even though it is the actions of the 
party's attorney which give rise to the sanctions. Established 
law provides: 
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There is certainly no merit to the 
contention that dismissal of petitioner's 
claim because of his counsel's unexcused 
conduct imposes an unjust penalty on the 
client. Petitioner voluntarily chose 
this attorney as his representative in 
the action and he cannot now avoid the 
consequences of the acts or omissions of 
this freely selected agent. 
Link v. Wabash R.R.. 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962). See also Farm 
Construction Servs. v. Fudge. 831 F.2d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1987); 
Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures 
Corp.. 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) ("A litigant chooses 
counsel at his peril [citing Link]. and here, as in countless 
other contexts, counsel's disregard of his professional 
responsibilities can lead to extinction of his client's claim"). 
In a recent criminal appeal, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld a state court decision precluding the 
testimony of a witness because of defense counsel's violation of 
a discovery rule. See Taylor v. Illinois. U.S. , 108 S. Ct. 
646 (1988) . Defense counsel argued that the lawyer's misconduct 
should not lead to the exclusion of evidence which was important 
to the defendant's case. The Supreme Court found the "argument 
that the client should not be held responsible for his lawyer's 
misconduct" to be unpersuasive. Jd. at 657.17 Such a sanction 
1 7
 The court found the preclusion of the testimony to be 
proper even though the state discovery statute had a provision 
for *[d]irect punitive sanctions against the attorney." Id. at 
666 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
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should be equally or more available in a civil case where 
constitutional rights are correspondingly weaker. 
Finally, Getty's request for production of Gold 
Standard's attorneys' work product is justified in cases 
involving evidence obtained through an ethical violation. For 
example, in Parrott v. Wilson. 707 F.2d 1262 (11th Cir.), cert, 
denied. 464 U.S. 936 (1983), the court ruled that where a party's 
attorney "clandestinely taped telephone conversations" with two 
witnesses, the court could order disclosure of the work-product 
since recording of conversations of witnesses without their 
consent is unethical. Id. at 1271. See also Moodv v. IRS. 654 
F.2d 795, 800 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("in some circumstances, a 
lawyer's unprofessional behavior may vitiate the work product 
privilege"). Paraphrasing Moody. the court in Parrott reasoned 
that "the purpose of the work product privilege is to protect the 
integrity of the adversary process; therefore, it would be 
improper to allow an attorney to exploit the privilege for ends 
that are antithetical to that process." Parrott. 707 F.2d at 
1271. 
Since Gold Standard's interviews with former 
management employees of Getty were improper, Gold Standard's 
attorneys should not be able to use the work product privilege to 
withhold the work product which resulted from those interviews. 
The improper conduct in this case is analogous to the ethical 
violation extant in Parrott. For the same reasons, the court 
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should require Gold Standard's attorneys to produce all 
documents, written or taped statements, and other materials 
received from former Getty management employees, as well as all 
notes and summaries prepared by any person which were recorded or 
made during or after those contacts or interviews. 
Much of Gold Standard's argument against turning 
materials over to Getty is little more than a repeat of its 
argument that the contacts were proper. Gold Standard defends 
its continued possession and use of the Kundert Affidavit by 
stating that Kundert "properly responded to his duty, as a 
citizen, to assist litigation by providing his recollection of 
material facts." Plaintiff's Memorandum at 33-34. As emphasized 
above, Getty is not questioning Kundert's actions. It is the 
conduct of Gold Standard's attorneys in contacting and/or 
participating in interviews with former Getty employees and the 
fact that the attorneys sought and obtained information, 
documents, and a signed Affidavit through ex parte contact which 
violates the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
While Gold Standard vigorously resists any order 
which would "place any restriction on the future use of 
[Kundert's] affidavit," it argues that the statements of former 
employees cannot be attributed to nor acts or omissions imputed 
to the corporation. Gold Standard cannot have it both ways. If 
ex parte contact with former management personnel is merely a 
fact finding tool which works no injustice on Getty, then there 
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is no need to use the material which it obtained at trial. The 
very fact that such material has been sought and obtained outside 
the presence and without the knowledge of Getty's attorneys 
emphasizes the inappropriate nature of the contacts in this case. 
Gold Standard argues that the sanctions sought by 
Getty are unduly harsh and unprecedented. To the contrary, the 
sanctions sought here are reasonable. Getty does not seek to 
disqualify Gold Standard's attorneys or otherwise sanction Gold 
Standard beyond that which is minimally necessary to restore 
Getty to its position in this litigation before the improper 
contacts occurred. 
VI. GETTY IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM SEEKING THE RELIEF FOR 
WHICH IT HAS PETITIONED THE COURT. 
Gold Standard incorrectly contends that Getty is 
estopped from seeking the relief it has requested pursuant to its 
order to show cause. Without citing any Utah authority, Gold 
Standard implies, through its emphasis on the timing of Getty's 
Petition, that Getty can be estopped from seeking this relief 
because it did not immediately run to court seeking relief at the 
earliest possible notice that improper contacts had occurred. 
The facts in this case simply do not support Gold 
Standard's estoppel theory. In summarizing Utah law of estoppel, 
the Utah Court of Appeals recently emphasized that estoppel 
requires more than the mere allegation of delay: 
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speak or act.18 This is especially true once the person has made 
his position known to the other party. See Leaver v. Grose, 610 
P. 2d 1262, 1264 (Utah 1980). 
In this case, Gold Standard made it clear that it has 
never felt it needed the consent of Getty or its counsel prior to 
making contacts with former Getty employees. A number of 
contacts and attempted contacts occurred before Getty ever 
learned of the contacts. In a Letter from James S. Lowrie to 
Gordon L. Roberts dated February 11, 1987, Mr. Lowrie stated: 
I do not intend to give you advance 
notice any time I try to do any 
investigation in regard to those matters. 
I don't think I am required to do that 
under the rules and I don't think that 
you are entitled to have such close 
control of our work product. 
Furthermore, your client's former 
employees have done an adequate job of 
protecting themselves. . . . 
Please consider that I have taken 
your request [to notify Getty's attorneys 
of plans to contact former employees ex 
parte] under consideration, discussed it 
with our work team over here, and that we 
deny it. 
1 8
 French v. Johnson. 16 Utah 2d 360, 401 P.2d 315, 315 
(Utah 1965) ; See also Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National 
Building Company. 89 Utah 456, 57 P.2d 1099, 1125 (Utah 1936). 
Warpar Mfg. Corp. v. Ashland Oil. Inc.. 606 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. 
Ohio 1984), cited by Gold Standard, involved very different 
circumstances which the court itself termed "unique.* Id. at 
853. Plaintiffs were aware of a potential conflict of interest 
for nearly two years before filing a motion to disqualify 
defendants counsel six weeks before trial. The case had already 
been ongoing for six years. 
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gee also Affidavit of James S. Lowrie at ^ 6. Gold Standard has 
never claimed that it would have stopped its contacts with former 
Getty employees if it would have known of Getty#s continued 
opposition. To the contrary, it openly represented that it 
intended to continue such contacts without even notifying Getty's 
attorneys. 
Getty informed Gold Standard that it opposed any ex 
parte contact with former Getty employees. Despite this, Gold 
Standard now argues that the contacts were permissible because 
Getty's former counsel concluded a letter with the phrase "so be 
it.* However, Gold Standard has been consistently and 
unequivocally informed of Getty's objectives, and cannot now 
contend that those contacts took place with Getty's blessing. 
No reasonable person would conclude that Getty had 
consented to ex parte contact by Gold Standard's counsel. Thus, 
there is no theory under which Gold Standard can invoke the 
doctrine of estoppel to preclude Getty from seeking the sanctions 
requested. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should rule that ex parte contacts which 
have occurred with former management level employees of Getty 
were improper. The court should prohibit further ex parte 
contacts by Gold Standard's counsel with former managerial 
employees without the presence or consent from Getty's attorneys. 
Finally, Getty asks that the court grant its request for 
ft«t-g009.pls 36 
production of the documents and notes obtained or produced in 
connection with the ex parte contacts. 
DATED this /5"~ day of March, 1988. 
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. 
Attorneys for Getty Oil Company 
and Getty Mining Company 
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1 I manager. I was the production manager. It 
2 I was—Mercur was part of it. Pine Grove, Maulrrt ^ 
3 I Dnnurr (phonetic), which is in southwestern Utah, 
4 I was an ongoing project and it was actually equal to 
6 I or further along than Mercur at that time. And 
6 I there were a number of small projects that Getty 
7 I was Involved in, also, all in the United States. 
8 ] Q. You were the production manager for all of the 
9 J projects that were ongoing in the United States 
10 District? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 I Q. Out of the Salt Lake City office? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 I Q. Before you were moved to that position in 
15 J August of 19S0,'While you were still at 
16 J Petrotomics, did you have any involvement or 
17 J dealings with the Mercur project? 
18 A. Not directly. In meetings.with Getty Oil 
19 I Company and reviewing their reports that they sent 
20 I ^ hai'f through, don't ask me what kind of reports, I 
21 I don't remember, but I remember Mercur Gold. Also, 
22 I we have an annual budget meeting that was held in 
23 I September of 1979. The Getty Corporate Minerals 
24 I Group gave a presentation on Mercur indicating 
25 I rough ideas of tonnage and so on. 
I 1 1 
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projects to estimate the cost of reclaiming those 
projects. 
Q. That was as an Independent contractor to Getty? 
A. As an independent contractor. I didn't speak 
for Getty, but I was paid by Getty for doing that 
contract work. 
Q. And since you left Getty in 1983 you have not 
had authority to bind Getty to contracts? 
A. I don't think so. 
Q. During your time with Getty, would you, in 
order to do your job for Getty, would you regularly 
seek out the advice of any of the Getty attorneys 
that we've talked about? 
A. Oh, yes, primarily Joe Berg. I talked to Joe 
Berg a lot. 
Q. You talked to the other attorneys, as well? 
A. I did probably on specific jobs on the day we 
were working on4 I can't remember any of them. I 
don't even remember which one of the other two 
attorneys were working on, say, Mercur or Pine 
Grove. See, we also had a coal division in the 
office there and that was a separate group, and 
these attorneys did work for the coal group, too, 
so I don't remember who was *fcfe^» ^ C &***£*& • 
Yes, we met with our attorneys quite 
20 
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1 I often. 
2 I Q. We're going to be treading in an area here that 
3 I at least for attorneys is sensitive, which is the 
4 I so-called attorney-client privilege, and before we 
5 I get into that area, which will occupy us for 
6 I several minutes, I want you to know that unless I 
7 I tell you to the contrary, I don't want to know what 
B I was said during any conversations you had with any 
9 I Getty attorneys while you were employed by Getty. 
10 I It may be that I'll ask certain questions and then 
11 I I'll ask you to tell me what was said during your 
12 J particular conversation, but unless I say to the 
13 J contrary, please don't tell me that, because Getty 
14 J is entitled to have that information protected, 
15 J assuming it was properly protected to begin with, 
16 I just as kind of a caution* 
17 MR, CLARK: May I interject something, 
IB I George, and that is that, Mr. Hautala, at this 
19 I point I think it is especially important for you to 
20 J listen very carefully. I know that Mr. Pratt is 
21 I going to phrase his questions carefully, so you 
22 I need to listen carefully to his questions and not 
23 I volunteer more than what he asks you, simply 
24 I because of the sensitivity that he's just 
25 I described. 
I 2 1 
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1 I MR. PRATT: I think thatfs fair. 
2 I Q. (BY MR. PRATT) Without telling me, again, what 
3 I the content of any conversations were, what were 
4 I the general subject matter areas that you would 
5 I have caused to have discussion with Getty's 
6 I attorneys? 
7 I A. Contracts, press release, land. 
8 J Q. Land titles, that sort of thing? 
9 I A. The general land acquisition problems which go 
10 I along with any mining venture. I am going to 
11 J volunteer this. I am sure there's other things I 
12 I cannot really remember in the general sense. 
13 I Q. You said that your contacts were primarily with 
14 I Mr. Joe Berg? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 I Q. Would that have been on a daily basis or a 
17 I weekly basis? 
18 I A. It almost was on a daily basis, remembering 
19 I that Joe was gone and I was gone a lot from the 
20 I office, so we weren't there. But when we were both 
21 I in the office, I am sure we said at least hello 
22 I every day. 
23 I Q. Primarily were your interactions such that he 
24 I was coming to get information or that you were 
25 I going to him for advice, or was it a little bit of 
22 
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1 | five years ago. 
2 I Q. Can you recall the specifics of any 
3 I conversations you had with any of the other Getty 
4 I lawyers that we identified earlier on In the 
5 I deposition? 
6 I A. I couldn't recall the specifics. I am sure 
7 I that, given a chance to refresh my memory, I could 
8 I at least bring up the general views that were 
9 J discussed or opinions. But for me to go back and 
10 J try to pick one out of the air, it would be very 
11 difficult. 
12 J Q. It's been some time now? 
13 I A. Five years. 
14 I Q. Those details fade after a period of time. I 
15 J take it that while you were doing your job in Salt 
16 J Lake City the conversations that you had with 
17 I attorneys were not special to you? 
IS I A. I don't get what you mean. 
19 I Q. I don't blame you. There's no particular 
20 I reason why conversations that you had with 
21 I attorneys during that time would stand out in your 
22 I mind any more than conversations that you had with 
23 I anyone else? 
24 I A. I don't know that I'd agree with that. Like I 
25 I say, I can't remember the specific conversations. 
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1 I However, whether we were dealing with issues; for , 
2 I example, if there were a land issue that was frftippr 
3 I to a project, I can remember the general aspects of 
4 I that land issue. But to remember when it occurred 
5 I and maybe who was even present when the discussion 
6 I was given--
7 I Q. Or who said what to whom? 
8 I A. That is right. I couldn't probably remember 
9 J that. I probably could remember the general 
10 I aspects of what the attorney recommended, and I can 
11 I do that. 
12 I Q. Have you provided any documents to Jones, 
13 I Waldo, Holbrook and McDonough? 
14 I A. Yes. I did. It was after a meeting with 
15 I Parson, Behle and Latimer. I believe I sent some 
16 I documents. 
17 I Q. Were any of the documents that you provided to 
18 I Jones, Waldo to the best of your knowledge 
19 I documents that were created in order to secure 
20 I legal advice? 
21 I A. No. 
22 I Q. Did any of the documents that were provided to 
23 I Jones, Waldo contain legal advice? 
24 I A. No. 
25 Q. While you were at Jones, Waldo did you sign 
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1 I Jones, Waldo, or even how did you know to send it 
2 | to Jones, Waldo? 
3 I A. When I talked to Mr. Pratt I told him I sent 
4 I him documents, as I recall. "I am sending these 
5 I things on feasibility to you,n and asked if they'd 
6 I be Interested in seeing what I sent, and I think he 
7 I told me yes and told me where to send it. 
B I Q. Mr. Pratt asked you a number of questions about 
9 I what you can recall about specific conversations 
10 J with Mr. Berg that you may have had during the 
11 J course of your employment there at Getty. I 
32 J believe you testified that on occasions when you 
13 J were in the office you spoke with Mr. Berg on 
14 I almost a daily basis, is that right? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 J Q. And did I also understand you correctly to 
17 I indicate that with respect to certain general 
IB J conversations that you had with Mr. Berg that you 
19 I can recall the nature of some of those 
20 I conversations? 
21 I A. Would you repeat that question again? 
22 I Q. Yes. Let me try that again. I believe you 
23 I also testified that you can recall in general the 
24 J subject of some of your conversations with Mr. 
25 Berg? 
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1 k. Yes. 
2 I Q. And in particular, do you recall discussing 
3 I items with Mr. Berg that relate, or at that time 
4 I related, to the relationship between Getty and Gold 
5 I Standard? 
6 I A. If you mean that, the agreement between Gold 
7 I Standard and Getty, yes. 
8 I Q. Go ahead. 
9 I A. And what is required and so forth. 
10 J Q. So you did have conversations of that nature 
11 with Mr. Berg, is that right? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 I Q. And did you have conversations on that subject 
14 I with Mr. Berg on more than one occasion? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 I Q. And would it be fair to say that that was a 
17 J topic of many of the conversations that you had 
IB with Mr. Berg? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 J Q. Given the extensive nature of the conversations 
21 I that you had with Mr. Berg, might it be possible 
22 I that you have information that came to you from Mr. 
23 I Berg, but that you are now unable to recall the 
24 I source? 
25 I MR. LOWRIE: Read that question back. 
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1 I (Record read as requested.) 
2 I MR. PRATT: Objection, calls for 
3 I speculation. 
4 I A. It's possible. I was pondering trying to think 
5 I of specifics. Certainly it's possible. 
6 I Q. (BY MR. CLARK) At the meeting that you had at 
7 I the offices of Jones, Waldo, was there any 
B I particular subject matter that you were asked not 
9 I to talk about with Mr. Pratt and Mr. Lowrie? 
10 I A. I can't remember any. 
11 J Q. Was there any item whatsoever that they 
12 J indicated that they did not want you to talk about? 
13 J A. I can't remember anything. 
14 J Q. I think you indicated that when you met with 
15 Mr. Pratt, Mr. Lowrie, that it was Mr. Smith who 
16 telephoned you and asked or called to make the 
17 I arrangements for you to do that, is that right? 
18 I A. Again, the best I can recall, it was Smith who 
19 I asked if I would be willing to come down and talk 
20 I to the attorneys. 
21 I Q. Do you recall ever making a telephone call to 
22 I Mr. Smith relating to this lawsuit? 
23 I A. I can't. There have been phone calls between 
24 J Mr. Smith and myself, however, oftentimes they're 
25 J not even involving a lawsuit. I may have at one 
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1 I Q. (BY MR. CLARK) Is that your understanding 
2 I now? 
S I A. I would have to have private counsel to make 
4 I sure I know that clearly rather than here.I am 
V ) 
5 I getting a gist that that is what It's supposed to 
6 I be. Itfs a difficult thing for me to put into 
7 J context because of the different kinds of 
B I conversations. 
9 I Q. I take it that it would be your view that in 
10 I order to even determine what might be protected by 
11 J the attorney-client privilege that you would not be 
12 I personally in a position to make that 
13 I determination? 
14 MR. PRATT: Calls for a legal 
15 I conclusion. 
16 I MR. LOWRIE: Read the question back. 
17 I (Record read as requested.) 
IB J A. I agree, yes. 
19 Q. (BY MR. CLARK) And you indicated, however, I 
20 I believe In your testimony, that when you reach a 
21 I certain level of responsibility In a company that 
22 I you do develop a sense that certain matters ought 
23 I to be kept confidential; did you say that? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 I Q. Has it your view when you were employed by 
75 
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1 I asked for that letter," and I doh't know if they 
2 I told me. I think thatfs all it was '. I think they 
3 I said yes. 
4 I Q. They said yes to--
5 I A. That there were other Getty people that they 
6 I had received the letter referring to not to be 
7 I contacted. 
B Q. Do you recall whether they told you at that 
9 J time that Getty had made a general request of them 
10 I not to contact former Getty employees? 
11 J A. I don't recall it. It could have come up in 
12 I that conversation. It certainly didnft strike a 
13 I bel1 to me. 
14 I Q. And were you ever advised that Getty may be 
15 I entitled to have lawyers present when you were 
16 J talking to Mr. Lowrie or Mr. Pratt? 
17 MR. LOWRIE: Not by us. We will 
IB I stipulate that is the case because we do not 
19 I believe that to be the law. 
20 I Q. (BY MR. CLARK) You can still answer my 
21 I question. Were you advised of that by them? 
22 A. No. 
23 I Q. Was there any discussion with Mr. Pratt or Mr. 
24 I Lowrie about what may or may not be privileged, 
25 I attorney-client privileged information? 
I B l 
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A. No. 
2 I Q. Were you specifically asked to refrain from 
3 I giving attorney-client privilege information? 
4 I MR. PRATT: Asked and answered. 
5 I A. No. 
6 I Q. (BY MR. CLARK) Did they tell you that you may 
7 J want to have an attorney present to represent your 
8 J own interests in any of these meetings? 
9 I A. I don't remember that coming up in any of the 
10 I meetings Ifve attended, with Parson, Behle or with 
11 | Jones, Waldo. 
12 I Q. Were you told at any time by Mr. Pratt or Mr. 
13 I Lowrie that the complaint in this matter included 
14 I allegations against John Doe defendants? 
15 I A. Somewheres along the line that rings a bell, 
16 I but who told me that I can't remember, or if it 
17 I just came up recently. I honestly don't know. I 
18 J don't remember it being brought up in that meeting 
19 at all. x^S^v^^J %**< «A >\XUs ik«6e>*;4-ttr*% ' 
20 J Q. Were you ever advised by Mr. Pratt or Mr. 
21 I Lowrie that your interests may be adverse to the 
22 I interest of Gold Standard? 
23 I A. No. 
24 MR- ?RATT: I think he was advised this 
25 J morning that he would not be a defendant in this 
B2 
rrj M e r r t D r v w itff f p p T •00 LINCOLN BUILDING 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN BARRICK 
RESOURCES CORPORATION; 
BARRICK MERCUR GOLD 
MINES, INC., TEXACO, INC. 
(a severed party), GETTY 
OIL COMPANY, GETTY MINING 
COMPANY, GETTY GOLD 
MINE COMPANY, and JOHN 
DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
CIVIL NO. CV-86-374 
DEPOSITION OF: 
CHARLES J. KUNDERT 
TAKEN: DECEMBER 2, 1987 
REPORTED BY. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
Deposition of CHARLES J. KUNDERT, taken on 
behalf of the Plaintiff, at 1500 First Interstate 
Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
commencing at 10:00 a.m. on December 2, 1987, before 
RENEE L. STACY, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
Registered Professional Reporter and Notary Public 
in and for the State of Utah. 
* * * * 
SEELY, STACY, JONES & ASSOCIATES 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 328-1188 
1 deposition before? 
2 A Yes, I have. 
3 Q Can you tell roe when that was? How many 
4 tiroes, first of all* I'm sorry. 
5 A Probably only made a deposition once. 
6 That was in, oh, probably around 1980, but I have 
7 testified in court in Delaware for a two day 
8 session, I think in 1983, I believe. 
9 Q Was that testimony in court of the 
10 deposition in connection with your employment with 
11 Getty? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Would you briefly outline for roe your 
14 employment history with Getty, when you commenced, 
15 what positions you held and when you ceased working 
16 for Getty? 
17 A Yes. I came with Getty in the middle of 
18 June of 1968 and I've forgotten what title I held at 
19 that time, but I was a senior mining geologist in 
20 exploration, and in 19 -• about seven years later, 
21 seven or eight years later, I became the minerals 
22 engineering manager, transferred out of exploration 
23 into -- into our mining development and mining group 
24 and that's the position I held until I left in the 
25 fall of 1984. 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
1 Q What were the circumstances of your 
2 leaving in the fall of 1984? 
3 1 A We had been taken over by Texaco and they 
4 were in the process of selling the mining division 
5 and I was of such an age that I could take an early 
€ retirement and two of us asked to get out without 
7 staying on another, oh, six months or a year, 
8 whatever the case may be, and we were able to 
9 arrange that. 
10 Q So unlike some of the other Getty 
11 employees, you weren't discharged? 
12 A No. No, I retired early. 
13 Q You said you were manager of minerals 
14 engineering? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q You acquired that position sometime 
17 around 1976; is that correct? 
18 A Yeah, f75 or '76. I, frankly, am a 
19 little bit vague. 
20 Q Can you tell me what that position 
21 entailed? 
22 A Yes. At that time we had -- I was 
23 responsible for our mine, our uranium mine in 
24 I Wyoming and also all the engineering activities that 
25 went on with any of our projects that were in the 
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1 development stage, including the Jabiluka uranium 
2 project in Australia, our copper prospect in 
3 Arizona. All of it. All of*the engineering 
4 functions of the mining group. Later another 
5 gentleman was made -- I reported directly to the 
6 vice-president at that time. Someone else came in 
7 at the next level and I no longer reported to the 
8 vice-president. I reported to him. 
9 Q Was the vice-president Mr. Mintz? 
10 A No. Jack was -- he was the manager I 
11 reported to. Jack was not a vice-president. 
12 Q Who was the vice-president that you 
13 reported to? 
14 A Well, there were several of them. 
15 Carlton was one; Carlos, Don Carlos; McKinley, Glen 
16 McKinley, and the last one was Ed Wendt. 
17 Q And then Mr. Mintz came in between you 
18 and Mr. Wendt at some point; is that correct? 
19 A I think it was McKinley at that --
20 Carlos. No, it was Carlos at that time,^was the 
21 vice-president. 
22 Q Can you tell me when that was? 
23 A Oh, brother. '79 or '80. I'm not sure. 
24 Probably '79. 
25 Q Can you tell me what corporation you 
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1 had been responsible for our Jabiluka uranium 
2 deposit for several years and this was really the 
3 crux of the matter. As far as responsibility for 
4 the lawsuit, gosh, our chief counsel, I'm sure, 
5 would be responsible for that, not us. 
6 Q But were you ever called upon to make any 
7 decisions with respect to the conduct of the 
8 litigation, how it would be handled, what approach 
9 would be taken? 
10 A No. 
11 Q Mow, aside from these, was there any 
12 other litigation that you were involved in in 
13 connection with your position as roanager-of mining 
14 engineering for Getty? 
15 A Yes. We had two or three -- I've 
16 forgotten exactly how many -- small problems where 
17 we built the shop out at Shirley Basin, Wyoming. It 
18 was about a $7 million installation and we had some 
19 subcontractor problems and we had several — two or 
20 three cases of litigation involved there and I was 
21 totally responsible for those. 
22 Q These were garden variety construction 
23 claim cases, were they? 
24 A Mo. One of them was rather serious. Our 
25 principal contractor had installed a series of 
RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR 
(801) 328-1188 
27 
fiberglass tanks and these came out of the ground 
and we were a little bit concerned* These were very 
expensive and they were all broken and we had quite 
a -- it took us awhile to resolve that one. 
Q Do you know what the others were? Were 
they fairly typical of the construction project 
sort, of cost overruns or backcharge claims or "you 
didn't give us the right specs"? 
A Yes. 
Q Were these involving a major claim 
against the supplier? 
A No. It was our principal contractor. 
Q Aside from the litigation that we've 
talked about, did you consult on a daily basis with 
lawyers? 
A I avoided them as often as I could. Mot 
on a daily basis but more on -- oh, several times a 
month, at least, because we had contracts -- when 
the exploration people negotiated a deal with a 
prospector, we reviewed the contract as part of our 
minerals production responsibility. All exploration 
contracts we reviewed to make sure that sometime 
down the road if this thing ever became a mine there 
wasn't anything in there that we couldn't live with. 
We reviewed all those, all those 
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1 exploration contracts and that was part of our — so 
2 in that vein we would be in contact with lawyers 
tfr 
3 ^ t * our legal staff, and also at least every year, 
4 seriously, the wording for the 10-K and the wording 
5 for the annual report, I was responsible for that in 
6 the mining, in the minerals group, and there was a 
7 lot of exchange with our legal department on that. 
8 Q In 1973 did you have responsibilities 
9 with respect to the formation of contracts with 
10 prospectors? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Then you did not participate in any 
13 review prior to the formation of a joint operating 
14 agreement between Getty and Gold Standard in that 
15 year, did you? 
16 A No. 
17 Q I would like to have you describe for me, 
18 if you will, your responsibilities with respect to 
19 the Mercur project that Getty had. 
20 I A As of when? 
21 Q From start to finish, in a brief overview 
22 first, if you can. 
23 A When I became the minerals engineering 
24 manager, I think in 1975 — I could be off a year 
25 there. I think that's when it was. — Mercur had 
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specific. I'm sure I probably talked to Jack Sample 
on occasion but I don't remember anything that we 
focused on. It may have been just general terms. 
MR. CLARK: I will request of you, Mr. 
Kundert, that you not reveal any of those 
conversations to the extent that you had them. 
MR. CROCKETT: That isn't the fact. 
That's the content, that you not reveal the content. 
Q (By Mr. Lowrie) At this point, I would 
make the same request of you, that in answering 
questions that call for the fact of the conversation 
that you not tell me about the content of the 
conversation . 
Aside from the possibility of 
conversations with Mr. Sample with respect to the 
content of reports to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission indicating shareholders in connection 
with securities matters, do you recall whether or 
not you had any conversations with any Getty lawyers 
with respect to the Mercur project? 
MR. CLARK: I'm going to object to that. 
I think it mischaracterizes his testimony. He said 
that he had conversations, not that there was a 
possibility of conversations. 
MR. LOWRIE: No. He said the' possibility 
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1 of conversations. 
2 MR. CLARK: And I think the question 
3 invites disclosure of the subject of the 
4 communications and would object to the question on 
5 that basis and request of the witness that the 
6 subject of the communications not be disclosed, 
7 Q (By Mr. Lowrie) Now, do you have the 
8 question I asked you in mind? 
9 A Mo. 
10 Q First of all, do I correctly understand 
11 that you do not recall for sure whether or not you 
12 discussed Mercur with Jack Sample prior to October, 
13 1980? 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q. Now, I gather that generally one of your 
16 reasons for talking with counsel for Getty was in 
17 connection with the 10-K; is that correct? 
18 A Yes. 
19 Q Aside from the possibility of discussion 
20 of Mercur with Mr. Sample with respect to the 10-K, 
21 are you able to affirmatively tell me that you did 
22 not discuss Mercur with lawyers, including Mr. 
23 Sample, prior to October 1, 1980? 
24 I A I can't be that positive because at that 
25 meeting which you asked about earlier, when I met 
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1 Mr. Smith the only tine, there was a lawyer there. 
2 I think — I'm sure Getty had a lawyer there and 
3 I maybe in the ensuing few weeks after that I may have 
4 talked to one of our lawyers. That's the only time 
5 that I can remember. 
6 Q Okay. I'd like to ask you some rather 
7 specific questions, if I may, Mr. Kundert. Do you 
8 recall a lawyer for Getty during the course of the 
9 time that you were employed with Getty and with 
10 respect to the Mercur project ever stating to youf 
11 "I need information from you with respect to the 
12 Mercur project in order to give legal advice to the 
13 corporation," or words to that effect? 
14 MR. CLARK: I'm going to object to that 
15 question on the basis that it calls specifically for 
16 disclosure of material that would be protected by 
17 the attorney-client privilege. 
18 MR. LOWRIE: Well, then will you 
19 stipulate that you will not try to make such a 
20 showing that any such questions were ever put to Mr. 
21 Kundert in connection with the pending motion, Mr. 
22 Clark? 
23 MR. CLARK: I don't believe that we will 
24 so stipulate. I'm not sure what we will do. 
25 MR. LOWRIE: I'm going to request that 
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1 Wilson or Mr. Pratt, and I don't remember which one, 
2 had — one of them told me that he had — was going 
3 to visit or had visited Jack Mintz and I don't 
4 remember which one. Other than that, no. 
5 Q All right. 
6 MR. LOWRIE: And we will represent to you 
7 that it wasn't Mr. Pratt. 
8 Q (By Mr. Clark) When you had your 
9 conversation with Mr. Pratt, do you remember, did he 
10 ask you to expressly avoid telling him about any 
11 conversations with Mr. Berg or Mr. Sample? 
12 A No. 
13 Q And at any time in any of your 
14 conversations with Mr. Pratt, did he advise you that 
15 Getty may have an interest in what you say and that 
16 you would have the right to have either your own or 
17 Getty's counsel present? 
18 A Not that I recall, no. 
19 Q Let's talk for a minute about the 
20 affidavit itself. I think you've already indicated 
21 that you wouldn't have signed that unless it's true; 
22 is that right? 
23 I A As I believed at the time and still do, 
24 this is factual, yes. 
25 I Q Do you remember what changes that you 
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1 feasibility study was equated with dollars, the 
2 definition of what a feasibility was, and the 
3 dollars had been spent, so as far as my personal 
4 view was concerned, that was a feasibility study in 
5 keeping with the agreement. 
€ I Q In your own view then, does the Bechtel 
7 report satisfy the operating agreement in that 
8 particular regard? 
9 MR. LOWRIE: That is beyond the scope of 
10 the discovery in this deposition. 
11 MR. CLARK: I believe that's fairly 
12 opened by your questions and, in addition, that 
13 would not be beyond the scope of this deposition if 
14 he told that to Mr. Pratt. 
15 MR. LOWRIE: Well, since there's no judge 
16 here, I guess I'll just make my objection. You can 
17 govern yourself accordingly. I don't know that I 
18 need to fight with you with respect to that. 
19 MR. CLARK: You can answer the question. 
20 I THE WITNESS: (To the Reporter) Would 
21 J you read the question please? 
22 I (Question read back by the reporter.) 
23 | THE WITNESS: As I read the operating 
24 I agreement, yes, it does. 
25 I Q (By Mr. Clark) Are you aware that there 
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D . A . Nichols 
I. A. Jensen 
At toraey-Cllent 
Wo rk P roduc t 
R . E . Peterson R . A. Jensen 
D. A. Nichols 
Attorney-Client 
Vork Product 
R . E . Pe t i r n P. Leer 
R. A. Jensen 
Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
R. S• Peterson R. D. Copley Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
R. I. P« J. C. Seaplt 
J. Brandon 
Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
R. E. Pi P. Lear 
R. A. Ji 
At to m a y - C I lent 
Work Product 
R. R. P< I. C. Trleblt, Jr. Attorney-Client 
Attorney-Client 
P. Lear D. A. Nichols 
R. E. Peterson 
R. A. Jensen 
Attorney-Client 
J. E. lerg Pile Attorney-Client 
R. T. Vogel Pile Attorney-Client 
5 8 . Mtotorandua datad 10/28/83 r« Cold 
Stand* rd. 
59. Htsortadui datad 10/24/83 r« Cold 
Standard. 
4 0 . Haaorandua datad 8/14/84 ra Cold 
Standard. 
8 1 . Mfiertodue datad 3/20/84 ra Cold 
Standard• 
8 2 . Haaorandua datad 3/19/84 ra Cold 
Standard. 
8 3 . Haaorandua datad 8/20/81 ra Harour 
Projact l a i U t t r l n i Conatructlon 
Contraot• 
8 4 . Bandvrlttan aaaorandua datad 8/29/84 
froa Legal Oapartaant fllaa. 
85. Haaorandua datad 11/22/82 ra 
Na rcur Projaot. 
R.P. Hlanc C. Smith 
U . E . Wendt 
J . K . bcre, III 
A t t o m e y - C l l t n t 
Work P roduct 
C. Q. Salth R. P. Rlanc Work Product 
R. P. Rlanc B. E. Wandt Mark Product 
U. E. Wandt 8. HcCajr 
R. M. Millar 
E. U. Sbultr 
Work Product 
R. P. Rlanc B. E. Wandt 
J. H. Rack 
C. S. Young 
Attornajr-Cllant 
Work Product 
G. Ratavlck R. P. Rlanc 
B. Padar 
R. T. Vogal 
J. E. Earg, III 
J. R. Pataraon 
Attornay-Cllant 
n i t Attoruajr-Ci lant 
Work {roduct 
R. T. Vogal R. 
J . 
J . 
S. 
S . 
0 . 
H. 
P. 
C. 
K . 
D. 
H. 
A . 
Sa 
Rlanc 
Saapla 
» « H 
Nattulat 
Nichols 
ikl 
Attornay-Cllant 
66 . Ntaorandua dated 4/27/83 re 
Mereur Project. 
6 ? . Droit dotod 4/27/63 of Mereur 
Etllolof Agreement, with band-
written coatinti, fro* file* of 
Lcgtl Dtptrtttnt. 
66. Letter doted 10/28/83 re Gold 
Stoadord• 
69. Letter doted 4/4/85 re Mereur 
Project ( « c U « i t l o n obligation*. 
70. Letter dated 10/25/84 re 
Cold Standard. 
71. Handwritten aeao dated 10/25/84 
requesting legal advice re CSX. 
72. Meaorendua dated 10/10/84 re CSI 
•ooloilni draft letter to S. Salth. 
73. Letter dated 6/29/84 requesting 
legal advice• 
R. 1. Doran C . J . Katavlck 
R. P. Blanc 
J . Bonaqu U c o 
U. Pader 
D. E . Miller 
C. r. Moore 
J. R. Peterson 
J. Ronao 
R. T. Vogel 
P. Wicks 
At to rne y-CIlen 
Wo rk Product 
Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
R. P. Blanc S. Salth 
8. £. Wendt 
J. E. Berg 
Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
J . L. Brandon B. E. Wendt Attorney-Client 
J. L• B randon B. E. Wendt Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
B. E. Wendt J. L. Brandon Attorney~Cllent 
Work Product 
J. C. Collins R. P. Blanc Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
V. 8. Rsals B. E. Wendt 
Welttel 
R. P. Blanc 
Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
74. Latter dated 3/5/81 r« Mercur 
Project . 
75. HtioriRtUS dated 3/4/81 r« 
Mtcour Project. 
74. Updated H a t of legal files Involving 
Gold Standard litigation dated 
4/29/87. 
77. Meaorendua to file dated 5/13/85 
re Gold Standard. 
78* Draft of 1980 Annual Report, with 
handwritten ooaetnci , froa files 
of Legal Depertaent. 
79. Meaorendua dated 2/17/81 re 
1980 10-K and draft with hand-
written notea to J. C. Saaple. 
8 0 , Letter dated 12118/80 re 10-K. 
8 1 . Letter dated 8/27/81 re Davy 
NoKtf engineering agr«t«sa«int. 
E . i e r g J. C. Leone 
K . D. Cop ley 
U. £. Wendt 
0 . C. Londean 
J. C. Saaple 
Attorney-Cl lent 
C . Leone R. D. Copley 
U. E. Wendt 
U. C. Londean 
J. C. Saapla 
Attornoy-Cllent 
A. Etherlngton Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
R . Puller Pile Attorney-Client 
Wo rk P roduo t 
Attorney-Cllent 
Pader S . E. Lauta rbaeh 
B. E. Uendt 
J. C. Saaple 
Attorney-Client 
Saaple B. E. Wendt 
D. A. Mlohola 
S. Hueaalg 
J. M. Hints 
C. Kundert 
D. Spauldlng 
R. P. llano 
ail with attaohaenta 
Attorney-Cllent 
R. T. Vogoi J. E. lerg Attorney-CIlent 
8 2 . Letter dated 4/27/U1 re Stmen 
Interest. 
81 . Letter dated 4/17/75 sotting 
forth legal advice. 
8 4 . Meaereodusi dated 12/3/84 re Nercur 
Project. 
85. Letter deted 9/21/84 re Cold 
Standard. 
• 6 . Latter deted 9/17/84 re Geld 
Standard. 
8 7 . Letter dated 8/29/84 re Geld 
Standard. 
88. Letter dated 8/24/84 requesting 
itfil advice. 
89. Letter dated 6 / 29/84 requesting 
legal adviee. 
90. Letter dated 3/11/85 setting 
forth legal advice. 
91. Undated draft of a lease 
agreement froe) files of 
Legal Department. 
92. Letter dated 5/31/85 re draft 
of Gold Sales Agreement (draft 
atteebed) 
0. Cujl.ffi J . n e r g Attorney-Client 
R. C. 1'rultt R. C. Peterson 
C. 0. Snltb 
I . C. Tr isible . Jr. 
Attornfjr-Cl lent 
A. R. Stherlngton W. B. Reals Attorney-Client 
Work Product 
A . R. Ether log ton J. C. Collins Attorney-Client 
Work Produet 
A. R. Stherlngton W. ». Eeala Attorney-Client 
Work Produet 
J. C. Collins A. R. Stherlngton Attorney-Cllent 
Work Produet 
A. R. Stherlngton J. C. Collies Attorney-Cllent 
Work Produot 
W. 8. Reals B. 8. Wendt Attorney-Client 
Work Produet 
O. W. Gushee R. Ports Attorney-Client 
Attorney-ClioAt 
A. R. Et tiering ton A . 0. Antonio 
S. O'Connell 
S. Carlson 
Attorney-Cllent 
Work Produot 
TabE 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OCXJRT 
IN AND FOR SAET IAKE OCUHTy, STATE OF UTAH 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES 
CORPORATION; BARRICK MURCUR 
GOLDMINES, INC.; TEXACO, 
INC.; GETIY OIL COMPANY; and 
JOHN DOES 1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Getty Oil Ctocpany and Getty Mining Company (hereafter 
"Getty"), asks this Court to impose sanctions upon the plaintiff fs lawyers 
claiming they conducted ex parte interviews with f ormer managerial-level 
employees of Getty, in violation of ER7-104(A) (1) of the Code of 
Professional Conduct. (ER7-104 (A) (1) is substantially identical to current 
Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, adopted January 1, 1988). The 
Court has reviewed the memoranda sufciaitted by the parties together with the 
attachments, including the depositions of Charles J. Kundert and Robert L. 
Hautala. Ihe Court took the matter under advisement after oral arguments 
and new being fully advised rules as follows: 
Ohe question is whether DR7-104(A) (1) applies to former employees of a 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
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corporation that is a party involved in litigation and represented by an 
attorney. DR7-104 (A) (1) provides as follows: 
During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer 
shall not: 
(1) Communicate or cause another to cexnraunicate on the subject 
of the representation with a party he knows to be represented by 
a lawyer in that matter unless he has the prior consent of the 
lawyer representing such other party or is authorized by law to do 
so. 
It is conceded fcy plaintiff's lawyers that they have made ex parte 
contacts with and have interviewed two of defendant, Gettys1, former 
employees, Charles Kundert and Robert L. Hautala. It is also conceded that 
both of these employees were in a managerial capacity with Getty and had 
sane direct involvement with the circumstances giving rise to the litigation 
at issue. 
Recognizing a split of authority on this issue, the Ccurt is, of the 
opinion that ER7-104(A) (1) and Rule 4.2 do not apply to ex parte contacts 
with former employees of a party. She question becomes who is a ••party" so 
as to receive the protection of the rule. If the party is an individual, 
the question is easily answered. If, however, as in this case, the named 
party is a corporation, it becomes more difficult to determine which of the 
current employees and whether any former employees come within the 
protection of the rule. 
The purpose of the rule is to ensure that any represented party involved 
in litigation receives the counsel and advice of its lawyer on all matters 
that may have a bearing on the outcome of the litigation. It is jbmportant 
that an attorney control the flew of information from his client to opposing 
counsel to ensure against the client doing or saying something that may have 
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a detrimental effect on that client1 s position in the lawsuit without the 
advice of counsel. If an enplcyee, whether or not in a managerial capacity, 
may do anything that can bind the corporation or may say anything that under 
the Rules of Evidence may be deemed an admission and imputed to the 
employer, then the purpose of the rule canes into play and that employee 
should not be contacted without the consent of the attorney. If the 
employee is not in a position to bind the company or to say anything that 
would be deemed an admission and attributable to the company* then, even 
though that enplcyee is a current enplcyee, there may be ex parte contacts 
by opposing counsel. There is no reason for counsel to control the flew of 
information fron that employee inasmuch as he or she can say or do nothing 
that will be imputed to the corporation. 
Ex parte contacts by opposing counsel,, under those circumstances 
mentioned above, where the employee cannot bind the employer, do not deny 
the employer the benefit of its attorney any more than ex parte contacts by 
opposing counsel with any other non-enployee witness. The same may be said 
of former employees. Former employees generally do not have the ability to 
bind the corporation by anything that they may do, nor, under the Rules of 
Evidence, can anything that they say be deemed to be an admission and 
inputted to their former employer. The purpose for the rule, therefore, is 
irrelevant under those circumstances. Since the former enplcyee can no 
longer bind the employer and can no longer say anything that would be deemed 
to be an admission by the employer, the employer's counsel should no longer 
have the right to control the flew of information from that witness. While 
it is true that the information provided by that witness may be prejudicial 
mil) RTANIAHP ] AMKH1UVN BfiRRICK CW86-374 
*<-* *•• employer ' .In i the employer f s counsel, t o 
-. .. information from *^i* ^iuiesi- *Miy wore than i t would be 
••tsont.* al lcw t h e errployer 's attorner *:o rjorrtrpl *I»J Miw ',»f J npuni t 
frur * wno nad prejudicial infornaticn. 
Moreover, the court recognizes a legitimate interest ^ illcwinq M"*mi'^ l 
t o gather information in an inform > - - warmer 
tgith<«ii tilf inUMimxin: ot opposing counsel, so long' as. their' conduct: does 
not deny a party the benefit of their attorney. 
Gettys" attorneys, m puilo! irm i if ih<> wujeis <a ex patte contacts with 
w ifcjryjss*«( ii'Ir I«I !u Hie a f f idav i t %A LhaiJes Ktmdert. obtained by 
plaintiff1,*, munsel. in an ex pa r t e IntprviM-/ I tvv flnim that" I hi* rtffiiLr • I 
"ti,' be misleading and may inrlpol - t^n i , h * u u « cpiuLuns tJidt in lf•*• 
fYiFitpx* HI ie ex p a r t e interview die the ' p p o s i t e of t he a f f i an t 1 * ai?r« • L 
opinion on the same i ssue and that, t h i s apparent iirsonsistainjv .J* 1**1.11^ *3 
attrifcutablI 1i ll>' riiilrt It* t-irainaii|i«• . ui tjit; interviewing a t t e n d While 
IIin uuurL l^ n a t u r a l l y concerned about any conduct which may tpjvl t o d i s t ru t 
t h e t ru th - seek ing purposes of discovery, never theless these «h?- dangers 
t h a t exii:;t" \\\ ii:r rw jk iae txxitacts !jy counsel with any witnesses whether 
employees, former employees, or non-employee bystander wi tnesses . 
Furthermore, sane r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ~ 
investig* * < . .... ^*,^ a_* manner. * *Li*vr opposing 
counsel t o be p re sen t during any interview of any witness by opposing 
counsel , to guard aga ins t t h e dangen- H »H | m w n m t d u t s , would obviously 
ki¥,jfJii-»iii .1 . expensive d (lt><xwery process t h a t i s arguably 
.riln'-ady too expensive, t o o complicated, and too burdensonie. 
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1 11 n i"-,iii.wiis s ta ted above, Hie Court ru les t h a t counsel i s not 
prohibited from making ex par te contacts with farmer employees of the 
defendant. 
A second and equally important matter i s the issue of pr ivi leged 
cxxrioitiications. Some of the former employees \ihcm p l a in t i f f f s ha1 /e 
contacted * been p a r t i e s t o 
privi leged cxanraurdcations d u n m u*- time tha t they were employed by 
defendant Getty. Hiose cxraminications would continuo in hn priw) ]t\y\i r\nl 
tliM rlpfendrini h uhi MIII III in in > mini u e t p i IVJlege , 'llie obligor ion imposed 
on p l a i n t i f f ' s at torneys i s not to inquire into any privileged 
cxxtnunications. 
After leadliiy the mitv\ n i t . uuUidtted by the pa r t i e s , i t appears tha t 
p l a in t i f f f s counsel lias not inquired into privileged matters nor i s thorn 
any substant ia l evidenof" that in iviliqed (uiiniumcdt ions IMVP IJOGII divulged. 
"I tit* LOUJ I , huwever, wil I i q>iin.- ilia! before any ex par te interviews, are 
conducted by former enjj.h*yi'-*oi* of the deferxtantf*' that i clear winiitri }'<• 
made t h a t p l a i n t i f f "fi i«insHi i," III i i l l i i n f i 1 1 III IIIim mi J i i i i i f < i n n / cxatnraunications 
IkifliAi'ii 1J it." InUivic'woi' »ynj the enp'\ I lyeip s cxunsel tha t may be pr ivi leged 
and further tha t the interviewee i s not to divulge any such comraunications. 
In addition i mi i i I i i 11 v .1 11 i< 1t\ I m »r 1i1 11 M II I 111» 11 ii 11 i I i steii tun any 
t>udi i-umiunlLciLiuri^. 
Based cm the foregoing, the court, wil l deny tJhe defendants" nequnrit for 
sanctions. I'hiinH ff lr-i 'MIIKJUI > i pie|:«i»" »i < I witii I h i s 
GOLD STANDARD AMERICAN BAKRICK 5 
memorandum dec i loosing counsel for approval and then to 
1
 !••..' '.:o\irt !oi signature in accordance with the local rules of practice. 
Dated this (Q day of April, 198fl. 
\ 
V 
. , v I 
Frank G. Noel 
District Court Judge 
zl 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepsdd copy" of the foregoing 
Memorandum Decision was mailed to the follcwing: 
Stephen G. Crockett 
Robert S. Clark 
Jill A. Niederhauser 
P.O. Box 11019 
Salt lake Citv. 
Gordon L. Roberts 
185 South State, f \i 
Salt Lake City, UT" 84 ^  
James Lcwrie 
170 South Main, #1500 
Salt lake City, UT 84101 
Robert M. ifcDci al~ 
47 West 200 South, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT r * w 
]Jk HJLULr ^ • /fas'UUs^ ' 
TabF 
James S. Lowrie (USB #2007) 
George W. Pratt (USB #A2642) 
James W. Peters (USB #5131) 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1500 First Interstate Plaza 
170 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STAl^ _ ^ 
GOLD STANDARD, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN BARRICK RESOURCES 
CORPORATION; BARRICK MERCUR 
GOLD MINES, INC.; TEXACO, INC. 
(a severed party); GETTY OIL 
COMPANY; GETTY MINING COMPANY, 
GETTY GOLD MINE COMPANY; and 
JOHN DOES I through 10, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING GETTY 
PETITION FOR ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE 
Honorable Frank G. Noel 
IIII March 1 8 , 19 8 8 , i h e a r i n g wa:; h o l d on 1 h e P e t i t i o n 
Fin Mi ili i In 'lln ii i I' in , i I i I i 11 11 ili' I t11 ii l,ii it ', i l l i l i I i i mi 11 i ny 
a n d G e t t y M i n i n g Company mi N o v e m b e i 2, 198 ' M Mi*; h e a l i n g , 
t h e G e t t y d e f e n d a n t s w e r e r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e i r c o u n s e l 
St ('pin n i i ,inil I nlii i I i I 11 I nl I null i l l I n r , 
iii'i K'IW'I I  I IH in I liflii i in ip I I  in Ii.iiii r k i\i l iMiili inln w e r e i p p r e s o n t e d by 
t h e i i c o u n s e l , F z a n c i i i M W i k o t r u m , o t P a i s o n s , l i e l i l i 1 U 
L a t i m e r ; S c o t t L . S m i t h was r e p r e s e n t e d by h i s c o u n s e l , 
11 i i II m i III III III III In I I I in i i i III i l in I I I Ill 11 III H I in mi in III mi I III ii 11 III I III I n i l Ill in in Ill mi J in mi ' i n ii < I i n I i ' i I 
by i t s c o u n s e l , I nne'i . howiine and ( j e u i g e W I'll ml I  ill J o n e s , 
W a l d o # Hoi brook U McDonouqh. 
Ilhiip m i n t In i«* he m l inrl r d i o l u l l y r ,nti<. i Hei oil I he HI ill 
a r g u m e n t s p r e s e n t e d a I t h e h e n i i n g I I has a l s o rev iewed t h e 
memoranda, d e p o s i t i o n ? - and o t h e r p a p e r s s u b m i t t e d by c o u n s e l 
mi III III I  o n i i e i II mi III II i . i in I III II I i Il  I ' I mi II II n . 
Based upon I he f o r e g o i n g , t h e cour t i s of t h e o p i n i o n 
t h a t t h e G e t t y P e t i t i o n must hp d e n i e d in i I s e n t i r e t y 'Hie 
co in I ' I. r e a s o n i n q i s s e t foiflli mi ill! Mumuitindum D e c i s i o n d a t e d 
A p r i l In, I '" 11111 In oiiloi In p i o t e c t G e t t y ' s a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t 
p r i v i lloqn however I he e I I I I he I Sever; t lunil p l a i n t J f f \ r i ruin " r • II 
s h o u l d p i o v i d e a warn ing to liny ioitiiei (Jet ty employees l.hal may 
be i n t e r v i e w e d by i t , as s e t loiLli III t h e Memorandum Dec i s ion , , 
A r e m r 11 mi in yi II \ , 
II IS HEREBY ORDERED that Getty's Petiti on For Order 
To Show l in1- e i s denied, 
III II II II l l l i 1 I ' l l i ' l i 1 O R i i H M H I l i II II Il I n II i n i - I i II i • • 
- -
J
 rievi a i e conduc t ed by p l a i n t i f f ot formei employees of 
v.**^  d e f e n d a n t s , LhaL p l a i n t i f f ' s c o u n s e l w i l l g i v e a c l e a r 
- 2 -
1
 i I n i n c j t h a t p a i n t i f f ' s coun,*;e 1 a n e iniit i n q u i r i n q int.r 11 y 
conun mini i«vil iniifi b e t w e e n (I111 iiiii'h 1 1 i 1 »wi -i n 1 II II 1 | i 11 I i r n l i i i 
d e f e n d a n t " L counse l Uiiat, may De pr IV i ."I rye i i , ami I III II 1 he 
i n t e r v i e w e e i s not t o d i v u l g e any such communicat ions . In 
addi t i ::: 1 1 j: Il a:i 1 it3 f f ' s ::::c: 1  ins e Il si nail Il  :i: 1 ::: t Ji 1: lq 1 11 1 r 1 nil 1 in 1 I 
t o a n y s u c h c o m m u n i c a 1 1 o n s . 
DATED this >b^x daj of April, 1988. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM : 
fj^y 11 ^
 ;:;r 
jyooE mm 8. HOEL 
rable Frank G. Noel 
1455P 
GWP 
